













































Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences  
 
 


























































 In the mid-twentieth century, French philosophers looked to contemporary biological 
research as they attempted to come to grips with the philosophical and historical crises of the 
previous decades.  My dissertation provides a genealogy of the relationship between 
developments in the fields of evolutionary theory, genetics, and embryology, and the emergence 
of French structuralism and posthumanist history. The story centers around two generations of 
French philosophers, including Raymond Aron, Georges Canguilhem, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
and Raymond Ruyer, and the biologists they turned to as resources for their philosophy, 
including Maurice Caullery, George E. Coghill, Étienne Rabaud, and Étienne Wolff.  As I show, 
because these philosophers did not look to “life” as a metaphor or to “science” understood as 
either mere ideology or pure rationality, but instead grappled directly with the specific content of 
evolutionary theory, embryology, and genetics, biology profoundly reshaped the philosophical 
concepts of human and history. 
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The philosophical problems of knowledge, consciousness, action, form and development, 
creativity, dynamism, individuality, norm and value, communication, meaning, freedmen, and 
even space and time, are essentially biological problems. - Raymond Ruyer, 19551 
 
 
 In the first half of the twentieth century, the discipline of biology underwent a series of 
profound, rapid transformations.  From the spread of gene theory to the overturning of 
preformationism, the theory that embryogenesis was the result of an unfolding of preformed 
parts, to the modern synthesis, which reconciled genetics and Darwinian selection to the 
emergence of molecular biology and the discovery of the structure of DNA, biology moved at 
breakneck speed and with seeming inevitability towards a complete scientific explanation of 
life on earth.  In what follows, I show how these revolutions in the understanding of 
biological life ramified in French philosophy.  French philosophers had long been interested 
in science and epistemology, from Auguste Comte (1798-1857) to Henry Bergson (1859-
1941) and Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962).  These thinkers saw philosophy as outside of 
science, and therefore able to adjudicate between competing scientific epistemologies. By 
contrast, the figures examined here, Raymond Aron (1905-1983), Raymond Ruyer (1902-
1987), Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), all 
understood biology as integral to their own philosophical projects.  That is, rather than 
looking on as outsiders writing chapters in the history of rationality, these mid-century 
                                                
1 Raymond Ruyer. “La Formation Du Concept de Réflexe Aux Xviie et Xviiie Siècles, Par 




philosophers drew upon contemporary biology as a promising resource for solving the most 
pressing epistemological, metaphysical and ontological questions of the day. 
 The most surprising aspect of this story is the role that biology played in the overturning 
of both humanism and Marxism in French philosophy of history, an outcome that continues to 
shape historical theory and practice in the present.  As I show in the chapters that follow, 
Aron, Ruyer, Canguilhem, and Merleau-Ponty each had encounters with biology that 
decisively altered his thinking.  For Aron, the aporias of French evolutionary theory before 
the modern synthesis pointed to the central task of philosophy of history, an account of the 
human as both subject to and transcendent of natural laws.  For Ruyer, Canguilhem, and 
Merleau-Ponty, humanism could not withstand the weight of modern biology: though they 
each began with different commitments, all three moved away from the humanist tradition.  In 
Ruyer and Canguilhem, this shift was submerged, evident not in any programatic statement 
but in their interpretations of biological findings.  Merleau-Ponty, a onetime Marxist 
humanist, had already begun to divorce himself from both Marxism and humanism when he 
turned to biology, and it was in embryology that he found a way to unfold his posthumanist 
philosophy.   
 This research contributes to a growing body of historical scholarship that sits at the 
intersection between intellectual history and the history of science.2  While my argument is 
structured around the trajectories of thought for four philosophers, the questions at the core of 
                                                
2 For example: Deborah R. Coen Vienna in the Age of Uncertainty  : Science, Liberalism, and 
Private Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007; Marwa Elshakry. Reading Darwin 
in Arabic, 1860-1950. London, [England]: University of Chicago Press, 2013; Matthew L. 
Jones. The Good Life in the Scientific Revolution  : Descartes, Pascal, Leibniz, and the 
Cultivation of Virtue. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006; Fredrik Albritton Jonsson. 
Enlightenment’s Frontier  : The Scottish Highlands and the Origins of Environmentalism. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013; John Tresch. The Romantic Machine  : Utopian 
Science and Technology after Napoleon. London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012. 
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this study do not lie strictly within the discipline of philosophy.  In other words, this is not 
simply a story of biology’s impact on philosophy.  It is also an account of the philosophical 
content of modern biology, content that Aron, Ruyer, Canguilhem, and Merleau-Ponty all 
took quite seriously.  This story begins with Aron because, as I argue, his Introduction to the 
Philosophy of History identified analogous epistemic crises in evolutionary theory and French 
neo-Kantianism.  Aron, it turns out, had set the terms in which much of the subsequent French 
discourse on history would be conducted; Georges Canguilhem and Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
each developed an historical method that engaged with the biological paradigms of the time.  
With the molecular turn and the discovery of the structure of DNA in the 1950s, Canguilhem 
and Merleau-Ponty revised their theories of history, the former turning to information as a 
model, the latter to what I call “phenomenological natural history.”  Meanwhile Ruyer’s 
thought developed independently, largely outside the Paris milieu.  Nevertheless his approach 
to biology was in many ways similar to that of his Parisian colleagues, ultimately informing 
much of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of nature.  As these four chapters illustrate, the history 
of philosophy in France is inseparable from the revolutions in biology that were ongoing 
throughout the mid-twentieth century. 
 Despite recent interest in intellectual history within the history of science, with the 
exception of work on the cultural origins and philosophical reception of Darwinian theory 
scholarship on the modern life sciences remains firmly tied to materialist methodology.3  
Historians of science have been especially interested in the history of genetics and molecular 
                                                
3 On the origins of Darwin’s thought in Romanticism, see Robert J. Richards The Romantic 
Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe. University Of Chicago 




biology, and as a result there are many excellent studies of these sub-disciplines.4  Twentieth-
century embryology has been of less interest to historians, though Scott F. Gilbert, a 
developmental biologist, has done much to clarify the history of this field.5  Meanwhile, the 
larger picture in the history of the life sciences has been profoundly shaped by the emergence, 
in the fifty odd years since the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, of science studies.6 This interdisciplinary movement adopted the approaches and 
the insights of sociology and anthropology, among other disciplines, to argue that science 
must be understood in its social context.  Scholars in history of science and science studies 
have rightly come to see science not as a simple unfolding of rationality in time or a 
progressive acquisition of positive knowledge, but as a profoundly social, material, and 
political set of practices and institutions.7  Our understanding of the revolutions in biology has 
therefore been primarily informed by the material and social conditions that enabled and 
shaped the relatively recent explosion of biological knowledge.  In the last twenty years, a 
great deal of work has been done to illuminate the ways in which biological epistemology has 
                                                
4 Lily E. Kay. The Molecular Vision of Life  : Caltech, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the 
Rise of the New Biology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; Lily E. Kay. Who Wrote the 
Book of Life?: A History of the Genetic Code. Stanford University Press, 2000; Evelyn Fox 
Keller. The Century of the Gene. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2002; Michel 
Morange. A History of Molecular Biology. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
5 See Scott F. Gilbert, ed. A Conceptual History of Modern Embryology. New York: Plenum, 
1991; “The Embryological Origins of the Gene Theory.” Journal of the History of Biology 11, 
no. 2 (October 1, 1978): 307–51.  See also Ernst Mayr, and William B. Provine, eds. The 
Evolutionary Synthesis: Perspectives on the Unification of Biology. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1980, 96-122. 
6 Thomas S. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1962. 
7 On the uneasy relationship between science studies and the history of science, see Lorraine 




been materially constituted, whether in the form of instruments, experimental systems, or 
model organisms.8   
 Without contesting the degree to which science is a social phenomenon—to some 
degree both a “social construction” and a product of “social context,” notwithstanding the fact 
that these two meanings of the social are sometimes directly at odds with one another—the 
present study explores a dimension of science that has more often than not been lost in the 
aftermath of science studies.  This project is an intellectual history of the relationship between 
a closely related group of French philosophers and the biologists they turned to for help in 
thinking through a set of interrelated epistemological, ontological, and metaphysical 
questions.  As the grand syntheses constructed by Kant, Hegel, Comte, and Marx in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries began to crumble under the weight of cultural responses 
to world war and economic catastrophe, as the Kantian subject was threatened by 
existentialism and faith in progress undermined by repeated catastrophe, French thinkers in 
the thirties, forties, and fifties began to attempt a new synthesis, no longer grounded in either 
reason or spirit, but instead under the aegis of biology.9  A glance at the table of contents 
                                                
8 See for example: Adele E. Clarke, and Joan E. Fujimura, eds. The Right Tools for the Job  : 
At Work in Twentieth-Century Life Sciences. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1992; Angela N. H. Creager. The Life of a Virus: Tobacco Mosaic Virus as an Experimental 
Model, 1930-1965. 1 edition. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2001; Jim Endersby. A 
Guinea Pig’s History of Biology. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009; Robert 
E. Kohler. Lords of the Fly  : Drosophila Genetics and the Experimental Life. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994; Hannah Landecker. Culturing Life: How Cells Became 
Technologies. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007; Paul Rabinow. Making 
PCR: A Story of Biotechnology. Reprint edition. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1997; 
Nicolas Rasmussen. Picture Control: The Electron Microscope and the Transformation of 
Biology in America, 1940-1960. 1 edition. Stanford.: Stanford University Press, 1999; Hans-
Jörg Rheinberger. Toward a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing Proteins in the Test 
Tube. 1st ed. Stanford University Press, 1997. 
9 Peter Gordon argues that the 1929 debate at Davos between Ernst Cassirer and Martin 
Heidegger was the definitive moment in the overturning of Kantian spontaneity in favor of 
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quickly reveals that I have undertaken this project as an intellectual historian.  This is also 
readily apparent in both the method and the structure of this work, which is comprised of four 
somewhat distinct studies, each centered on a philosopher and his encounter with biology.  
Nevertheless I see this research as, if not a complete answer to, then at least an 
acknowledgement of, recent calls from historians of science for a rapprochement between 
their discipline and intellectual history. 
 Most recently, John Tresh has suggested that there is a subterranean affinity between 
history of science and intellectual history.  As Tresch argues, the group of scholars that 
established the history of science as an autonomous field after World War II was deeply 
indebted to Arthur Lovejoy’s approach to the history of ideas.  These “neo-revolutionaries,” 
as Tresch calls them, shared Lovejoy’s interest in cosmologies, which explains why the 
histories of scientific ideas were so frequently featured in the early years of the Journal of the 
History of Ideas.10  The emergence of science studies and the vigorous commitment to 
contextualization obscured but did not efface this connection to intellectual history, and 
Tresch sees the potential for future dialogue through the study of what he calls “materialized 
cosmologies,” which examine “ideas of nature in their complex and concrete ecologies, 
tracing their roots, movements, and mergers as they have coordinated actions and 
                                                                                                                                                   
Heideggerian thrownness.  Peter Eli Gordon. Continental Divide: Heidegger, Cassirer, 
Davos. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010.  On anti-Enlightenment thought 
and culture in Weimar German see Jeffrey Herf’s classic, Reactionary Modernism: 
Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich. Cambridge University 
Press, 1984. 
10 John Tresch. “Cosmologies Materialized  : History of Science and History of Ideas.” In 
Rethinking Modern European Intellectual History, edited by Darrin M. McMahon and 
Samuel Moyn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 155-58. 
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interventions, defining the contours of the real.”11  Tresch seems to call for the history of 
science to return its attention to how local practices not only affirm but institute worldviews, 
or in other words, how the localness of scientific practice participates in and produces 
universality.  
 Tresch’s argument in many ways echoes Lorraine Daston’s recent appeal to ontology as 
a way beyond epistemology in the history of science.12  As Daston argues, because it exists 
“between” epistemology and metaphysics, ontology escapes the dichotomy of constructivism 
versus realism.  The payoff here is similar to what Tresch hopes to accomplish with the study 
of materialized cosmologies.  By studying “how scientists furnish the universe,” Daston 
suggests, historians of science can go beyond local histories and begin to understand how 
science universalizes itself.13   Daston uses the example of cloud classification, showing that 
“[novices] must be taught to see things and to see the same things, a world held in 
common.”14  Thus, both Tresch and Daston are interested in the relationship between the 
materiality of science and its processes of universalization. 
 A corresponding concern with the relationship between ideas and practice animates 
recent methodological discussions within intellectual history.  While the tension between 
idealist and contextualist approaches is very often overstated—everyone practices some 
combination of the two—intellectual historians have for a long time displayed ambivalence 
                                                
11 Ibid., 167. 
12 Lorraine Daston. “On Scientific Observation.” Isis 99 (2008): 97–110. 
13 Ibid., 98. 
14 Ibid., 107. 
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towards the social as an explanatory register.15  As Samuel Moyn put it in a recent essay, 
“The field has always been defined and unified by its defensive posture more than anything 
else,”16 pointing out that intellectual history has for various reasons, some institutional, some 
merely dogmatic, identified itself in opposition to the broader discipline of history.  Moyn 
suggests that, within intellectual history, the choice between context and the autonomy of 
ideas is a false one, and moreover that the preoccupation with this distinction is symptomatic, 
on both sides of the methodological divide, of theoretical and political complacency that does 
not even attempt to analyze the relationship between representation and practice.  Against this 
stagnation, Moyn calls for a critical theory that deploys Cornelius Castoriadis’s concept of the 
“social imaginary.”  Cultural history is an inadequate replacement, Moyn argues, because 
while it shares with “imaginary intellectual history” the belief that meaning and the social are 
mutually constitutive, it carries with it the (faulty) assumption that social life is shaped 
primarily by “low” concepts, not high theoretical ones.17  Ultimately suggesting that Marx 
and Foucault are equally viable models for how to write histories of “intellectualized” 
practices, Moyn points intellectual history towards practice not as a counterpoint to thought, 
but as both its condition and its outcome. 
                                                
15 Much of it in response to Quentin Skinner and the Cambridge School. Quentin Skinner. 
“Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.” History and Theory 8, no. 1 (January 1, 
1969): 3–53. Against the Cambridge School see especially Dominick LaCapra. “Rethinking 
Intellectual History and Reading Texts.” History and Theory 19, no. 3 (October 1, 1980): 
245–76; Peter Gordon. “Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas.” In Rethinking 
Modern European Intellectual History, edited by Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn, 
32–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
16 Samuel Moyn. “Imaginary Intellectual History.” In Rethinking Modern European 
Intellectual History, edited by Darrin M. McMahon and Samuel Moyn, 112–30. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014, 113. 
17 Ibid., 120. 
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 Yet many of the terms of the methodological debates recently highlighted by Moyn in 
fact emerged out of French philosophers’ engagements with biology in the mid-twentieth 
century.  Castoriadis, whom Moyn invokes, was profoundly influenced by Merleau-Ponty, 
and his “social imaginary” was in part an answer to the biological commitments evident in 
The Visible and the Invisible.  Cofounder with Claude Lefort of the Marxist, anti-Stalinist 
journal Socialisme ou Barbarie (1948-1965), Castoriadis had increasingly distanced himself 
from Marxist materialism throughout the nineteen sixties.  In 1978, he published an essay, 
“Merleau-Ponty and the Weight of the Ontological Tradition,” in which he was concerned 
with the recuperation of “time as time of creation and not of repetition.18  Time, that is, as the 
realm of politics rather than of ontology.  As Castoriadis saw it, Merleau-Ponty’s late work in 
The Visible and the Invisible was marked by a failure to get beyond an ontological concept of 
perception as reception.  What was needed instead was a theory of representation, which, 
unlike the theory of perception, could account for the autonomy of thought, or the “radical 
imagination.”19  Castoriadis suggested that there was a kind of gravitational pull in philosophy 
towards a banal psychology of imagination, “making it merely reproductive in character and 
recombinatory in its activity, thereby granting its works a deficient, illusory, deceptive, or 
suspect status.”20  In other words, most theories of imagination were simply corollaries of 
ontological, apolitical time. 
 For Castoriadis, Merleau-Ponty’s great failure was his inability to see that, in grounding 
a philosophy in life, he was tying himself to this very same ontological concept of time.  
                                                
18 Cornelius Castoriadis. “Merleau-Ponty and the Weight of the Ontological Tradition.” 
Thesis Eleven 36, no. 1 (August 1, 1993): 1. 
19 Ibid., 4. 
20 Ibid., 3. 
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There was no newness, Castoriadis believed, and therefore no history in the materiality of life.  
“The flesh procreates of the flesh: it does not create,” he wrote.21  Merleau-Ponty’s concepts 
of life and flesh therefore bound him to a defunct materialism that the “imaginary” was 
designed to overcome.  In a wonderfully suggestive footnote, Castoriadis conceded that his 
own characterization of life as a closed cycle did not account for evolution, an issue that he 
had “deliberately left aside.”22  Against Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of nature, Castoriadis 
wanted to institute an “ontology of genesis.”23   
 As this brief excursion into the work of Castoriadis illustrates, the effects of the 
encounter between French philosophers and modern biology in the mid-twentieth century are 
visible in historical theory and practice to this day.  Biology is part of the story of materialism 
in history, and attempts to grapple with the biological basis of human autonomy still inform 
understandings of critical practice.  While Moyn addresses himself to his own field, 
intellectual history, the field of history of science has also been shaped by this legacy.  The 
tension between materialism and humanism, so sharply visible in theoretical debates in 
history of science, have more obvious, but equally deep roots in mid-century French 
thought.24  Thus, the intellectual history of biology in French philosophy of history is also a 
genealogy of contemporary historical theory. 
                                                
21 Ibid., 35. 
22 Ibid., 36n. 
23 Ibid., 36. 
24 Michel Callon. “Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the 
Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay.” In Power, Action, and Belief  : A New 
Sociology of Knowledge?, edited by John Law. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986; 
Bruno Latour. Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987. 
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 On a more immediate level, however, my research concerns the historical relationship 
between biology and historical theory in France.  While Tresch is interested in how science 
“[defines] the contours of the real,” and Daston wants us to examine how scientists “furnish 
the universe,” here I have asked a related but quite distinct question.  In mid-twentieth century 
France, in what ways did biology reshape modes of historical thinking?  In answering this 
question, I have tried to show how biology shaped, not the real or the universe, but the 
relationship between the materialism, humanism, and the possibility of historical 
understanding.  
 In mid-twentieth century France, biology, as both practicing scientists and philosophers 
understood it, contained a philosophy of life.  While biologists’ own statements about the 
philosophical implications of their work were often more optimistic and less systematic than 
those of their professional philosopher readers, they too expressed the belief that knowledge 
of life was not simply instrumental, but spoke to the core questions of human existence.  Are 
we wholly governed by our environments and therefore by the laws of physics and chemistry, 
or do we have some degree of autonomy, the power to shape our surroundings and our future?  
Are humans animals that have evolved language and tools, or do humans constitute something 
new in the history of life on earth?  Has evolution come to an end? Has history?  
 These questions seemed especially urgent in the late twenties and early thirties, when 
French evolutionary theory was in a state of epistemic crisis.  Most biologists rejected both 
Mendelian genetics and Darwinism in favor of neo-transformism—the theory that evolution 
proceeded by the inheritance of acquired characteristics—but after decades of attempts they 
were unable to make experimental progress.  Meanwhile, French academic philosophy was 
dominated by neo-Kantianism, which understood history as the logical unfolding of 
 
12 
rationality.  Neither biologists nor philosophers could accommodate the concept of natural 
law to human history.  To the politicized generation coming of age in the thirties, these were 
more than just philosophical crises.  With total war looming on the European horizon, the 
pressing task was to reconcile the modern sciences with a theory of history.  Only then, with 
an adequate history of the present, could the imminent crisis be faced on firm epistemic 
ground. 
 In this context, Raymond Aron, at the time a young philosophy student, expressed 
anxiety over the relationship between biology, history, and human autonomy.  In his 1938 
Introduction to the Philosophy of History, he rejected both philosophical and biological 
accounts of human history.  He aspired instead to a philosophy of history that could explain 
the dual nature of human existence as fundamentally rooted in the biological, and at the same 
time, as a radical transcendence of natural law.   
 On March 26th, 1938  Aron defended his dissertation in front of a baffled, if impressed, 
audience.  At the defense, Paul Fauconnet, a Durkheimian sociologist, accused Aron of 
threatening to dismantle the sociological frameworks his generation had worked so hard to 
establish. This was the work, he declared, of a man either “desperate or satanic.” Aron had 
conceived of the thesis project in a moment of personal philosophical turmoil as a twenty-five 
year-old living in Cologne, observing the ascendency of National Socialism in the early 
thirties. During the work’s gestation, he witnessed the book burning of May 10, 1933 in 
Berlin. Upon returning to France later that year, he continued to speak and write about the 
threat that Hitler posed, and watched as war became more and more inevitable. Less than a 
fortnight before Aron’s defense, on March 12th, 1938, Hitler annexed Austria. Desperation 
was certainly reasonable under the circumstances. 
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 Chapter 1, “Raymond Aron and the Crisis of French Neo-Transformism,” examines the 
origins of Aron’s philosophy of history.  Aron had originally planned a dissertation on the 
epistemology of Mendelian genetics, but his time in Germany awakened his political 
consciousness and he abandoned the study of biology.  I argue that his early research on 
genetics and evolutionary theory was nevertheless central to his understanding of history.  
Aron’s approach to biology was altogether different from that of his most famous 
predecessors, in particular Bergson.  For Aron, philosophy was no longer an outside arbiter of 
meaning in biology, adjudicating between different concepts of life.  Instead he treated 
biological knowledge both as a resource for thinking about philosophical problems and as a 
horizon of knowledge.  In his Introduction to the Philosophy of History, Aron suggested that 
human beings were simultaneously biological and historical, which meant they were both 
subject to evolution as a process of natural law, and radically set apart from this law. 
Existential phenomenology ultimately provided the solution.  Aron argued that the subject of 
history was neither the neo-Kantian spontaneous subject nor the biological species, but rather 
man as “historic being.” 
 In the second chapter, “Isomorpohic Life: Raymond Ruyer and the Embryology of the 
Posthuman,” I turn to Raymond Ruyer, whose work remains largely unstudied both in and 
outside of France.  I show how an association with a group of biologists while he was a POW 
in Austria decisively reshaped Ruyer’s philosophy.  Before the war, Ruyer had been critical of 
materialism, ascribing to a version of mechanism in his work on the mind-body problem.  
During this period he was also a default humanist, neither defending nor questioning the 
specificity of human life.  After his time as a POW, during which he seems to have learned a 
great deal especially from the embryologist Étienne Wolff, Ruyer became a neo-materialist, 
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arguing that finality was a property of all forms, a category he distinguished from aggregates, 
or structures.  As a result, he also began to question the degree to which human 
consciousness, expressed in purposeful behavior, was unique.  Consciousness, he ultimately 
argued, was a property of matter.  
 In Chapter 3, “From Humanist Vitalism to Information: Georges Canguilhem’s 
Biological Epistemology” I argue that Canguilhem's epistemology of history shifted away 
from humanism as he became more familiar with contemporary biology.  Between 1929 and 
1966 Canguilhem’s philosophy of the living underwent two major transformations.  Before 
his medical training, he was highly critical of the vitalist tendencies in science, which he saw 
as a form of irrationalism.  During and after his medical training, first with The Normal and 
the Pathological (1943) and then Knowledge of Life (1953), he elaborated an increasingly 
radical vitalist philosophy of his own.  In the sixties, as he absorbed and reflected upon the 
findings of genetics and molecular biology, he moved away from vitalism and towards a 
concept of life that was no longer entirely distinct from non-life.  Canguilhem’s vitalist 
philosophical project was grounded in an understanding of life as normative, or law making.  
Only in the nineteen fifties did he begin reading contemporary biological research, a fact 
about which he expressed some embarrassment when he met the molecular biologist François 
Jacob in the sixties.  After the molecular turn and the discovery of the structure of DNA, 
Canguilhem came to see life not as a source of meaning but as a structure for the transmission 
of information.  His approach to the history of life lost humanist aspirations.   
 The fourth and final chapter, “From Marxist Totality to Global Vision: Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenological Natural History,” charts the movement of Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy of history from his early engagement with Marxism and Gestalt 
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psychology to his work on nature in the late fifties.  For Merleau-Ponty, Aron’s Introduction 
had gone too far in limiting the universality of historical knowledge, and his own Marxist 
philosophy of history was in part an answer to the threat of relativism.  In the early fifties 
Merleau-Ponty moved away from Marxism, and in 1953 he declared that “one explains 
nothing by man.”25 As he began to develop his posthumanist philosophy of nature, Merleau-
Ponty turned his attention from experimental Gestalt psychology to organismic biology.  I 
argue that developments within embryology laid the conceptual groundwork for what I refer 
to as Merleau-Ponty’s “phenomenological natural history.”  Whereas Merleau-Ponty’s early 
philosophy of history rested on the claim that local contingencies were ultimately subsumed 
by the determinate movement of the total, giving the historian the epistemological role of 
distinguishing accidental from determined facts, his new philosophy, as it emerged in his 
lectures on nature, advocated a “global vision” in which scientific causality operated only 
locally.  Totality, once the realm of objectivity, gave way to a globality that was the realm of 
autonomy. 
 This research illustrates that science ought to be within the purview of intellectual 
history, not only as cultural context but as a core figure in the history of ideas.  Each chapter 
of this dissertation has a similar narrative structure: A traditionally educated philosopher 
begins his career, at some point along the way he begins reading and attempting to understand 
the implications of modern biology, and his thought subsequently changes in significant ways.  
For Aron, neo-transformist evolutionary theory displayed symptoms analogous to the 
ailments of philosophy, and it therefore helped him diagnose a broad epistemological problem 
for the philosophy of history.  For Ruyer, embryology revealed a reality that overturned his 
                                                
25 Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays. Evanston, Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970, 44. 
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previous metaphysical commitments.  Canguilhem saw DNA in particular as entirely 
consistent with his previously developed philosophy, obscuring the degree to which his ideas 
actually changed as he delved more deeply into modern biology.  For Merleau-Ponty, modern 
biology was in many ways the answer to problems he had begun to formulate before 
developing his philosophy of nature.  Thus, while biology served a slightly different purpose 
for each thinker, all of them believed philosophy had to confront biology in order to proceed 
at all.  Science was not external, or merely contextual; it was itself the source of ideas that 
shaped the trajectory of twentieth-century historical theory. 
 Together these chapters also tell a story in which modern biology—not “life” as a 
metaphor or science understood as either mere ideology or pure rationality, but the specific 
content of modern biological theory and experimentation—had a profound effect on the fate 
of philosophy.  The theoretical tradition that to this day shapes historical practice, and 
especially intellectual history and the history of science, was forged out of a desire to 
reconcile biological concepts of life with more traditionally humanist, hermeneutic traditions.  
Whether this synthesis was a success depends on one’s perspective.  What is undeniably true, 










 On March 26th, 1938,26 a young French doctoral candidate named Raymond Aron 
defended his dissertation in front of a baffled, if impressed, audience. Aron’s thèse 
secondaire, Essai sur la théorie de l'histoire dans l'Allemagne contemporaine, was a forceful 
critique of German sociology. Even more inflammatory to his committee was his thèse 
principale, Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire: Essai sur les limites de l'objectivité 
historique, which was an attempt to overcome the French neo-Kantianism of his teachers, 
some of whom were in the room.  At the defense, Paul Fauconnet, a Durkheimian sociologist, 
accused Aron of threatening to dismantle the sociological frameworks his generation had 
worked so hard to establish. This was the work, he declared, of a man either “desperate or 
satanic.”27  Satanic Aron was not, but Fauconnet displayed psychological insight in accusing 
Aron of desperation.  
 Begun almost a decade previously as a thesis on the epistemology of Mendelian 
genetics, Aron’s dissertation was in part the product of an intellectual atmosphere that had 
become increasingly characterized by anxiety about the relationship between biology, history, 
and human autonomy. By the time he completed the dissertation he was convinced that 
evolutionary biology and the philosophy of history had run up against the same epistemic 
                                                
26 Apparently this date is under dispute, and Gaston Fessard, who was present, gives the date 
as March 26th despite the fact that the Revue de métaphysique et de morale reported it as 
March 18th. Robert Colquhoun provides a wonderfully detailed reconstruction of that day in 
Robert Colquhoun. Raymond Aron: The Philosopher in History: 1905-1955. Vol. 1. London: 
Sage Publications, 1986, 140-145. 
27 “Thèse de Doctorat.” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 45, no. 3 (July 1, 1938): 29. 
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stumbling blocks.  Thus Aron’s project was not only the marker of a generational shift in 
French thought, a case of the young rejecting the ideas of the old, it was also a turning point 
in French philosophy’s relationship with biology, marking the beginning of a period in which, 
rather than looking on as outsiders writing chapters in the history of rationality, philosophers 
began to see contemporary biology as a resource for thinking about the most pressing 
epistemological, ethical and ontological questions.  As Aron saw it, neither biology nor 
philosophy had yet been able to account for human history.  The Introduction attempted to 
articulate a philosophy of history that could explain the dual nature of human existence as 
fundamentally rooted in the biological, and at the same time, as a radical transcendence of 
natural law. 
 Fauconnet’s disapprobation on that day in 1938 was indeed reflective of the broader 
generational shift underway.  Gaston Fessard, a Jesuit theologian who was present at the 
defense, reported that the atmosphere was “charged and anguished.”   Some four decades 
later, at his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, Aron looked back to that time: “The 
mood of my generation did not fit in with this attitude—one which was both resigned and 
confident, and still related to the positivism of Auguste Comte: an acceptance of a social 
determinism comparable to natural determinism, and an ineradicable optimism as to the 
eventual outcome.”28  When Fauconnet expressed surprise at the “emotive tone” of the 
Introduction, Aron, according to his own recollection, was “surprised at his surprise, or rather, 
I felt indignant at the lack of historical awareness of professional sociologists…”29  To the 
young philosopher, historical consciousness was less a choice than an obligation and an 
                                                
28 Raymond Aron. De la condition historique du sociologue; leçon inaugurale au Collège de 
France prononcée le 1er décembre 1970. Paris: Gallimard, 1971, 22. 
29 Ibid., 25. 
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exigency.  His teachers’ confidence, both epistemic and political, seemed completely 
untenable.  
  Aron had conceived of the thesis project in a moment of personal philosophical turmoil 
as a twenty-five year old living in Cologne in the early thirties, at a time when National 
Socialism was in ascendancy. During the work’s gestation, he witnessed the book burning of 
May 10, 1933 in Berlin.30 Upon returning to France later that year, he continued to speak and 
write about the threat that Hitler posed, and watched as war became more and more 
inevitable. Less than a fortnight before the defense, on March 12th, 1938, Hitler annexed 
Austria. Desperation was certainly reasonable under the circumstances, and in retrospect one 
can imagine Aron’s surprise at Faucennet’s line of questioning.31 
 But in fact the urgent tone of the Introduction was only partly a reaction to the political 
crises of the time. Aron’s frustration was also directed at a recalcitrant French academy, an 
intellectual milieu at an impasse. Neither his formal training in philosophy nor his brief foray 
into biology had given him confidence in French academic culture. The Introduction was an 
attempt to reconcile his philosophical training with the historical and intellectual landscape of 
the thirties. His education in the mid-twenties had been circumscribed by the insularity of the 
French academy. Before going to Germany he was aware neither of analytic philosophy nor 
of phenomenology. Neo-Kantian idealism ruled the day, and in addition to reading a great 
                                                
30 Colquhoun, Raymond Aron: The Philosopher in History, 65-6. 
31 Indeed H. Stuart Hughes characterized the period between 1930 and 1960 in French 
intellectual life as one of desperation.  
See H. Stuart Hughes. The Obstructed Path: French Social Thought in the Years of 
Desperation, 1930-1960. New Yo: Harper & Row, 1966. 
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deal of Kant, Aron wrote exams on Comte, Aristotle and Spinoza.32  While he felt these 
exercises had given him a sharpness of mind, they remained to him just that: exercises. 
Furthermore, Aron’s mentor, Léon Brunschvicg, was a neo-Kantian whose idealist approach 
to the history of consciousness in Les étapes de la philosophie mathématique (1912) and 
L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique (1922) implied an almost Newtonian 
understanding of history. Even before his time in Germany, when he discovered 
phenomenology, Aron found this approach unsatisfying. 
 At the conclusion of the dissertation defense, Fauconnet complimented Aron’s work for 
its “verbal and intellectual virtuosity” and “faithfulness to the sources.”33 Before dispensing 
these admittedly measured compliments, however, Fauconet made it clear that he had 
concrete hopes for the fate of Aron’s project, namely failure. “I conclude,” he is reported as 
saying, “with an act of charity by reiterating my admiration and my sympathy; an act of faith 
in the value of the theories you condemn, and an act of hope, hope that in the future the youth 
will not follow you.”34 The rest of Aron’s committee was somewhat more enthusiastic, and he 
was awarded his doctorate with a “very honorable” mention. In any case, Fauconnet’s wish 
did not come true. 
 Some fifty years later, shortly after Aron’s death, his friend and former classmate 
Georges Canguilhem described the dissertation as an “historic event in [French] culture.”35  
                                                
32 Raymond Aron. Memoirs: Fifty Years of Political Reflection. Translated by George 
Holoch. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1990, 25. 
33 “Thèse de doctorat,” 29. 
34 Ibid., 29. 
35 Georges Canguilhem. “La problématique de la philosophie de l’histoire au début des années 
30.” In Raymond Aron: la philosophie de l’histoire et les sciences sociale, edited by Jean-
Claude Chamboredon, 9–24. Paris: Éditions ENS Rue D’Ulm, 1999, 21. Canguilhem was 
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While the committee may have reacted to the Introduction in 1938 with a mixture of 
frustration and admiration, looking back at the defense from 1988 threw into relief the true 
significance of Aron’s philosophical project. “Today,” reflected Canguilhem, “one can 
consider this moment, at the time an academic exercise, as the moment in which French 
philosophy of history finally entered the history of French philosophy.36” This statement is 
striking for two reasons. First, Aron is one of the most well-known French intellectuals of the 
twentieth century, but neither during his lifetime nor since has he been considered primarily a 
philosopher of history.37 Second and perhaps more significantly, Canguilhem seemed to 
suggest that before 1938 there was no properly French philosophy of history. Were not 
Comte, Bachelard (etc.) philosophers of history well before Aron began to stir things up? In 
what sense did Comte’s positivist theory of history, for example, not count as “French 
philosophy of history”?  
 Aron’s Introduction should be treated, to use Canguilhem’s phrase, as an “historic event 
in the culture” not only because it signaled the beginning of a new, dazzlingly innovative 
period in French philosophy, but also because, as I shall argue, Aron’s contact with 
contemporary biology, brief though it was, introduced a specific set of problems into the 
philosophy of history in France, and these would remain active for decades: What is the 
                                                                                                                                                   
referring both to the importance of Aron’s philosophy of history and to his importation of 
phenomenology into France, discussed further below. 
36 Ibid., 23. 
37 In the early 1970s, French scholars began noting the absence of attention to Aron’s 
philosophy of history. While some work has been done since then, it remains a marginal topic 
in Aron scholarship. For some examples see Sylvie Mesure, Raymond Aron et la raison 
historique. Paris: Vrin, 1984; and Gaston  Fessard. La Philosophie historique de Raymond 
Aron. Paris: Julliard, 1980.  In a chapter entitled, “An unexpected parallel,” Fessard 
constructed a reading of the Introduction linking it to Ignatius’s Spiritual Exercises. 
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relationship between being biological and being historical? To what degree are humans 
subject to natural law? To what degree are history and biology either exceptions to or 
governed by natural law? These questions remained critical to the philosophy of history in 
France well into the latter half of the century. The decades that separate Aron’s Introduction 
from, for example, Lyotard’s La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir saw a complete 
revolution in the discipline of biology - the modern synthesis and the molecular turn, and an 
explosion of new categories for thinking about the living.  Thus, while biology continued to 
be central to thinking about history, the meaning of the biological underwent a profound 
transformation. Aron’s Introduction was an “event” because it helped set in motion a new 
way of thinking about the relationship between the biological and the historical.  
 Though this fact went unmentioned by Canguilhem, the Introduction also played a role 
in introducing German phenomenology into French philosophy. According to Pierre Bertaux, 
though his story is disputed and perhaps apocryphal, Sartre asked Aron, likely sometime in 
1931, whether he had any ideas that would help him build his philosophy and Aron told him 
to go to Germany and study Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger.38 Whether or not this 
conversation happened, Bertaux’s story reflects the fact that Aron was the first among his 
classmates to realize the significance of phenomenology.39 And indeed Aron’s philosophy of 
history was profoundly influenced by Heidegger in particular. In a 1980 interview, when 
Aron was asked whether the Introduction was perhaps the first existentialist book in France, 
he replied that his analysis was merely ontic, in other words that “it [represented] the essence 
                                                
38 Pierre Bertaux. “Amitiés normaliennes.” Commentaire 8, no. 28–29 (1985), 15. 
39 Of course Emmanuel Levinas went to Freiburg and studied with Husserl in 1928, but he 
was in Strasbourg. 
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of a particular area of human reality, that is, the historic area.”40 By this he meant that the 
Introduction, while not strictly speaking a work of existential phenomenology, was an 
application of that philosophy to the philosophy of history. As we shall see, Aron used 
Heideggerian concepts to move beyond the impasses of French neo-Kantianism and neo-
Lamarckism. 
 Before going to Germany, Aron had in many ways a quintessentially bourgeois French 
upbringing.  He was born in Paris in 1905 to secular parents of Jewish origin.  When he was 
about eight, his family moved to Versailles, where he attended the local lycée until, at 
seventeen, he began commuting to the Lycée Condorcet in Paris to prepare for the qualifying 
exam to enter the prestigious École normale supérieure (ENS).  After two years at Condorcet, 
he passed the qualifying exams with top classification (très bien).41  In 1924, Aron was in a 
cohort of five students beginning their philosophy studies at the ENS.  The other four were 
Canguilhem, Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Nizan, and Daniel Lagache.   They were a tight-knit 
group from the beginning, spending their days discussing politics and philosophy, going to 
cafés and the cinema in the evenings.  In his memoirs, Aron recalled a feeling of exhilaration 
upon realizing that Sartre and Nizan—a pair known for ferocious take-downs of other 
students—had deemed him worthy of entry into their circle42.  “I was perhaps more moved by 
this ‘recognition’ on the part of Sartre and Nizan,” Aron reminisced, “than by the praise given 
                                                
40 Raymond Aron, Jean Louis Missika, and Dominique Wolton. The Committed Observer: 
Interviews with Jean-Louis Missika and Dominique Wolton. transl. James and Marie 
McIntosh. Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1983, 50. 
41 For details on Aron’s early life (more than he provides in his memoirs) see the first volume 
of Robert Colquhoun’s very thorough biography, Raymond Aron: The Philosopher in History: 
1905-1955. Vol. 1. London: Sage Publications, 1986. 
42 Aron, Memoirs, 21. 
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me by Léon Brunschvicg for a presentation on the ontological argument in St. Anselm and 
Kant.”43  Yet much as he admired them, Sartre and Nizan’s politics were never Aron’s.  Long 
before L’Opium des intellectuels (1955) made him famous as a critic of Marxism, Aron’s 
political affinities set him apart from his friends.  Nizan died in the war in 1940, but Aron’s 
dialogue with Sartre lasted throughout his lifetime.  
 Aron’s mentor at the ENS was Léon Brunschvicg (1865 -1944).   As the most 
prominent proponent of university idealism, Brunschvicg shaped the education of multiple 
generations of philosophy students.  In 1893 he founded, with Xavier Léon, the influential 
Revue de métaphysique et de morale.  He taught at the Sorbonne from 1909-1940, in 1927 
becoming professor of the History of Modern Philosophy.  By this time, Bergsonism was on 
the wane and Brunschvicg’s neo-Kantianism infused the philosophy curriculum at the ENS.  
Aron’s diplôme d’études supérieures on Kant’s concept of the intemporal was supervised by 
Brunschvicg.   
 In 1928, Aron passed the agrégation, the final qualifying exam, with the highest score 
given that year.44  He was on track for a comfortable career teaching philosophy in a lycée.  
His philosophical aspirations had grown, however, and he decided to continue his studies, 
working towards a doctoral degree.  When it came to the choice of a topic, he was both 
ambitious and pragmatic.   Reflecting on this time almost 60 years later, Aron wrote that he 
emerged from the agrégation wondering what he had really gotten from all that time reading 
Kant and Aristotle.  His classmates chose to “minimize risk by writing a thesis on the history 
                                                
43 Ibid. 34n1. 
44 Aron, Memoirs, 25. Sartre failed that year, apparently because he answered every question 
with his own philosophical views rather than those of the philosophers he was supposed to 
have studied. He passed the next year with an even higher score than Aron’s, having decided, 
according to Aron, to “give the examiner what he wanted.” 
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of philosophy,” and he himself “might have written a good book on Kant or Fichte,” but 
neither approach appealed to him.45  Meanwhile, Brunschvicg’s idealism “left little room for 
metaphysics or the perennial philosophy.”46  Even Bergson seemed to relegate himself to 
critiquing particular results in science while keeping clear of the foundations.  Aron, however, 
hoped to discover how philosophy could speak directly to science rather than simply claiming 
to be outside of it, either as the ideal reality behind objects of thought (Brunschvicg) or as an 
alternative epistemology with which to fill remaining gaps in knowledge (Bergson).47  He 
wanted to do something new, but, not knowing where to start he made the decision by a 
process of elimination.  Philosophical inquiry was meant to be directed at some scientific 
discipline—this his training had taught him—and, not being inclined to learn mathematics, 
Aron determined, with Brunschvicg’s input, that biology was the appropriate choice. 
 As is well known, neo-Lamarckism, or neo-transformism, overshadowed and excluded 
both Mendelism and Darwinism in France well into the nineteen-forties.48  In the nineteenth 
century, the negative reception of Darwin was the result of a number of factors, not least of 
which was a degree of cultural chauvinism.  But French biologists’ commitment to 
transformism was not simply a matter of loyalty to their countryman Lamarck.  Nor can it be 
                                                
45 Aron, Memoirs, 37. 
46 Aron, Memoirs, 37. 
47 This is my characterization of Aron’s view - not my own reading of either thinker. 
48 Ernest Boesiger provides a geneticist’s perspective on the lack of contribution by French 
scientists to the modern evolutionary synthesis in, “Evolutionary Biology in France at the 
Time of the Evolutionary Synthesis.” In The Evolutionary Synthesis: Perspectives on the 
Unification of Biology, edited by Ernst Mayr and William B. Provine, 309–20. Cambridge, 
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explained away as a remnant of Romantic science, as has sometimes been suggested.49  As 
historians have shown, neo-transformism’s persistence was in part the result of factors 
endemic to French biology, including substantive objections to both Darwinism and 
Mendelism from the traditions of physiology, causal embryology, and microbiology.  If by the 
early twentieth century these objections were no longer viable, institutional inertia helps 
explain why in the late 1920s, pardoning the expression, the paradigm had not been 
overturned.50  
 In 1928, following Brunschvicg’s advice, Aron “went to” the laboratory and “read many 
books” on biology.51  At that time, a generation of biologists trained by the ethologist Alfred 
Giard (1846-1908) were active at in Paris. The zoologist Étienne Rabaud (1868-1956) was the 
chair of experimental biology at the Sorbonne. Maurice Caullery (1868-1958), also a 
zoologist, was chair of “the evolution of organized beings.”  Giard had conceived of his 
project as a corrective to the tendency, since the work of Claude Bernard, to distinguish too 
sharply between morphology and physiology.52 With regard to evolution, Giard saw his work 
as combining the ideas of Darwin with those of Lamarck. The resulting theory was arguably 
more Lamarckian than Darwinian, since Giard ended up reducing natural selection to a 
secondary process, always subject to the organism’s interaction with its milieu. After Giard’s 
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death, Caullery and Rabaud diverged sharply on matters of evolutionary theory.  By the late 
twenties, in the wake of decades of failed and inconclusive experiments, Rabaud in particular 
moved into the realm of polemic. Caullery came, with reservations, to accept Mendelism. 
Experimental results were strongly in favor of Mendelian genetics, but he continued to argue 
that more Lamarckian mechanisms must have operated in the past. The epistemic hurdles 
began to mirror the aporias of neo-Kantian idealism. Where the neo-Kantian position implied 
an ontological/temporal rupture between human and natural law, the neo-transformist position 
came down to asserting a natural law that, while not demonstrable in the present, had 
nevertheless operated in the past. Neither school could reconcile the ideas of human history 
and natural law. 
  The twenties were a period of turmoil, frustration and polemic in French biology.  
Darwinism and Mendelism were still largely rejected, but neo-transformist models were 
beginning to crumble as well.  As Laurent Loison has shown, plasticity—the organism’s 
response to its environment, its development, self-adjustment and adaptation to its 
surroundings—was for many decades far more central than the question of heredity.  When 
heredity did become a question, the focus was on soft inheritance, or the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics, and not on selection.  It is to some degree this resistance to exploring 
the role of selection that marks late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century French biology as 
neo-Lamarckian. 
 In other words, French biologists were not strictly speaking followers of Lamarck.  
They were also inspired by two others of their countrymen, Claude Bernard and Louis 
Pasteur, which contributed to their experimental focus on physiology and microbiology.53 The 
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theoretical framework of neo-Lamarckism was more mechanical than Lamarck’s theory.  
Zoologist Frédéric Houssay (1860-1920) tried to demonstrate experimentally how the bodily 
structures of fish species were formed over time as the result of water pressure.  Botanists 
Gaston Bonnier (1853-1922) and Julien Constantin (1857-1936) showed with some success 
how abiotic conditions acted directly on the morphology of plants.  These experiments were 
all meant to demonstrate that organisms were plastic, and that changes occurred through 
individual responses to the environment, not through natural selection.  Whereas for Lamarck 
characteristics were acquired as the result of “a progressive internal, mechanical force,” neo-
Lamarckians were more attuned to the action of the environment on the organism.54 
 Loison argued that this prioritization of the action of the environment over that of the 
organism lead to the concomitant prioritization of plasticity over heredity.  A tension arose 
between the need to explain changes, individual morphological adaptations, and to explain 
stability, or the persistence of species.  Phyletic evolution, or the evolution of species, was 
“totally reduced to individual changes, and thus the organism was the only relevant level for 
studying the operation evolutionary mechanisms.”55  In other words, there was also an 
epistemic conflict between the unit of experimentation, the individual, and the explanandum, 
the species.  Resolving that conflict required an account of heredity, which the neo-
Lamarckians did not have.  They believed that the Bernardian concept of the milieu intérieure 
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was a sufficient explanation of heritability.  Acquired characteristics would find their way into 
germ cells.  The precise mechanism was not, for them, important.56  
 Why wasn’t natural selection accepted as a possible solution?  Before the modern 
synthesis, which brought some degree of consensus on the compatibility of genetics and 
evolutionary theory, many biologists understood selection as purely negative force: they 
rejected the idea that selection could provide anything beyond the elimination of maladapted 
traits.  In France, “most biologists accepted [natural selection], but always by reducing its 
evolutionary role to almost nothing.  Natural selection was seen as being responsible for 
destroying the unfit, but certainly was not responsible for the creation of the fittest.”57  This 
may have been a misunderstanding of Darwin, but it was also a reflection of a genuine gap in 
scientific knowledge at the time.  It was as yet unknown how it was, by what precise 
mechanism, novel traits were produced.  Darwinian selection acted on phenotypes, but the 
source of new phenotypes still had to be explained.  This was where Lamarck might have 
proven useful, and indeed seemed for a time to offer solutions as illustrated by the work of 
Houssay, Constantin, and Bonnier. There were various attempts to reconcile the tension 
between plasticity and heredity, but the most significant for the questions Aron would face 
was Félix Le Dantec’s (1869-1917) La Stabilité de la vie. Étude énergétique de l’évolution 
des espèces (1910).  Le Dantec argued that plasticity was a property of all life, but that it 
decreased as complexity grew.58  That is, while the simplest organisms could be transformed 
by the environment, as complexity increased heredity became more powerful than plasticity.  
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As Loison puts it, “Biological evolution was then identified with the universe’s 
thermodynamic transformation: plasticity should follow the same laws as entropy, but in the 
opposite direction.”59  For Le Dantec, evolution was slowing down, perhaps already at a 
standstill.  Thus, the neo-Lamarckian position found itself deeply at odds not only with 
Darwinian perfectibility, but also with any ideals of historical progress.  
 There is no evidence that Aron read Le Dantec’s work, and since the biologist died in 
1917 Aron could not have visited his laboratory at the Sorbonne.  One of Le Dantec’s 
colleagues, however, had a direct influence on Aron’s philosophy.  Maurice Caullery was not 
only still professionally active when Aron studied biology, but was also participating in an 
international conversation about the relationship between genetics, natural selection, and 
Lamarckism.  Moreover, Caullery’s 1931 La Problème de l’évolution, which Aron cited 
heavily in the second chapter of the Introduction, “Natural Histories,” was influenced by Le 
Dantec in important ways.  Like Le Dantec had in 1910, Caullery argued in 1931 that 
evolution was reaching an end.  As we shall see, this claim was one of the central problems 
Aron sought to address through his philosophy of history. 
 Caullery did not believe genetics could explain evolution.  In an essay in Science, he 
addressed Thomas Hunt Morgan’s famous Drosophila melanogaster experiments.60  Morgan 
(1866-1945), an American, had made huge strides towards localizing genes, arguing in his 
1915 Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity that the chromosome was the material basis for 
heredity.  Morgan had also been able to produce dazzling experimental results in favor of 
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Mendelian inheritance patterns.  “As a result of these magnificent researches,” wrote 
Caullery, “which look upon genes and their localization as tangible realities, a veritable 
genetical mentality has been created. These, however, have merely imaginary existence.”61  
For Caullery, genes were as yet nothing more than a model, not necessarily a description of 
material reality.  “They permit of experimentation and prognostication, and this justifies their 
use,” he wrote,  “but it must not be forgotten that they are only symbols.”62  
 Caullery’s suspicion of Morgan and the detached “genetical mentality” he championed 
reflected the state of genetics as a discipline.  Morgan and his students had been instrumental 
in isolating genetics from embryology and medicine, successfully carving out an independent 
discipline.63 While the separation of questions of heredity from those of development was 
critical to the astounding degree of experimental success achieved by Morgan and his 
students, the identity of their discipline did involve an abstraction.64  As Michel Morange 
argued in his A History of Molecular Biology, in the early twentieth century, “many biologists 
considered genetics a formal science removed from reality.”65  If genetics was a formalization 
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and not a description of material reality, Caullery nevertheless conceded that, “Everything 
happens as if genes were exactly as the geneticists say they are.”66  
 In fact one of Caullery’s students, Émile Guyénot, had been instrumental in confirming 
Morgan’s experiments.  Guyénot designed his doctoral research ostensibly to demonstrate that 
the morphological changes Morgan produced were actually a result of environmental 
conditions.  He created an aseptic, controlled environment for his Drosophila melanogaster 
but his results ended up confirming Morgan’s, and therefore also Mendelian inheritance.  As 
Richard M. Burian, Jean Gayon and Doris Zallen put it in their important article on the history 
of genetics in France, Guyénot’s work was significant because, “In effect, [he] brought 
genetics before a tribunal composed of Claude Bernard and Louis Pasteur.”67  Caullery was 
supportive, and appears to have accepted a limited version of Mendelism after this point.  
 And yet, Caullery was still unwilling to accept genes as the basis of evolution.  The 
problem was two-fold.  First, Morgan’s experimental mutants did not produce new species, 
just recessive traits that faded with time.  Second, Caullery did not think genetic mutation 
could explain the astounding degree of adaptation to their specific environments that species 
exhibited.   While genetics might give a plausible account of heredity, it offered no 
explanation of plasticity.  “To explain these facts [of adaption to the environment] it seems to 
me that it is impossible to reject the direct action of the environment on organisms or the 
influence of the phenotype on the genotype, that is to say, a mechanism of the kind suggested 
by Lamarck.”68  Any theory of evolution had to explain the highly coordinated nature of 
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phenotypes, so intricate as to be “veritable machines.”69    Mendelism therefore did little to 
resolve theoretical obstacles faced by French neo-transformists. 
 Nevertheless, partly as a result of Guyénot’s work Caullery had begun to doubt the 
plausibility of the inheritance of acquired characteristics.  As Laurent Loison has shown, it 
was in the period around nineteen-teens that Caullery turned to Le Dantec’s work.  Caullery 
began to believe with Le Dantec that “the ability of organisms to vary with environmental 
conditions, or their plasticity, was a function that decreased with the complexity and 
morphological specialization living beings.”70  Caullery’s position was further influenced, 
Loison contends, by Henri Poincaré’s 1911 “L’évolution des lois,” in which the latter 
discussed the possibility that natural law might change over time.   
 In 1914 Caullery published an essay in Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale on the 
nature of biological law.  He argued that whereas, “in the entire range of the inorganic world, 
in mechanics, physics, chemistry, the idea of law…is in fact a universal, uncontested given,” 
this was not the same for biology.71  If it were, his “task would be completed.”72  Nevertheless 
the alternative, vitalism, was incoherent, merely a modern form of finalism that rendered 
experimentation meaningless.  Caullery pointed to Claude Bernard’s ambivalence about 
vitalism as symptomatic of this contradiction.  On the one hand, Bernard’s concept of milieu 
intérieure was a kind of “intraorganic teleology.”  On the other hand, Caullery pointed out, 
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Bernard did not let this undermine experimental determinism.  Therefore Bernard would have 
rejected 20th century vitalism precisely because it rendered “positive biology,” in other words 
experimental knowledge, incoherent.  Caullery concluded with a call for epistemic modesty, 
citing Le Dantec’s assertion that “honest” science should merely be descriptive. 
 Thus, by the time Aron encountered his work, Caullery’s position was quite 
complicated: he had come to accept the existence of Mendelian genetic mechanisms, but not 
their role in evolution; he had serious doubts about the inheritance of acquired characteristics; 
finally, his epistemic models were unstable.  Perhaps biology should restrict itself to 
description and give up the search for causes.  Or perhaps there were biological laws, but they 
operated differently in the present than they had in the past.  Meanwhile Caullery was 
diverging ever more sharply from his colleague Étienne Rabaud.  Rabaud was extremely 
influential, and in his memoirs Aron remembered him as having “declared war, once and for 
all, on Mendelism.”73  Less willing to accept Mendelian mechanisms than Caullery, Rabaud 
had by this time come to reject the importance of morphological adaptation altogether.   
 Unlike Caullery, Rabaud remained resistant to the Mendelian genetic model of heredity.  
While he was known to complain about the poor quality of the American Mendelian 
experiments, this was more in the spirit of polemic than a reflection of any actual ignorance 
about the work of his colleagues abroad.  Indeed, Rabaud was well aware of the advances 
being made across the Atlantic.  It was not so much the results that he doubted as the 
epistemic basis for the experiments themselves.  In 1912, in a heated exchange with Arend 
Hagedoorn he wrote, “It is not a matter, of course, of casting doubt on the well-established 
facts, but of discussing their interpretation and above all their application to all biological 
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phenomena.74”  The mode of interpretation appropriate to living things was not, Rabaud 
suggested, to be found in the language of genes.  When Hagedoorn accused neo-Lamarckians 
of relying on reason rather than experimentation, Rabaud was adamant in his own defense.75  
The French, he insisted, did not cling to neo-Lamarckism because they relied on reason above 
experimental proof, but rather because “in observing and experimenting, it is not enough to 
represent [the] results by an assemblage of letters.”76  For Rabaud, understanding the living 
required understanding organisms as cohesive wholes.  Mendelian genetics, he argued, 
reduced living organisms to mere excited matter. 
 Having spent much of his career trying and failing to experimentally establish the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics, by the 1920s Rabaud had reached a turning point.  In 
his 1922 L’Adaptation et évolution, Rabaud argued that in fact neither Lamarckian nor 
Darwinian mechanisms could explain evolution.  The former was proving impossible to 
demonstrate, and the latter simply displaced the question.  Even if one accepted that evolution 
proceeded through the accumulation of tiny variations, what was the source of these 
variations?  “In contrast to the neo-Lamarckian solution,” he wrote,  “the Darwinian solution 
attributes a very secondary role to the environment and gives way to chance.  It implies, 
nevertheless, a certain direction in the manner in which the variations succeed one another…  
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All this happens as though these happy coincidences, as if by chance, tended towards a 
definite goal.”77  For Rabaud, Darwinism implied finalism that was “seductive and hollow.”78 
  While Mendelian genetics might have seemed like a solution to Darwinian finalism, 
Rabaud’s adamant rejection of its epistemic foundations led him instead to deny the 
importance of morphology altogether.   As Loison has shown, this rejection of morphology 
was intricately linked to the neo-Lamarckian inclination towards holism.  Thus, ultimately 
Rabaud came to see the idea of morphological adaptation as incoherent because it required 
conceptual division of the organism into parts.79  He argued that,  
The illusion comes from the fact that adaptation is usually considered only from the 
morphological point of view. In an organism, it is the form that draws first the 
attention and observers naturally tend to subordinate everything to anatomic 
dispositions. This mistake commits us to the impasse in which we find ourselves: 
having established as a principle the agreement between forms and conditions, we are 
not able to explain the origin of this agreement.80  
 
For Rabaud, morphology became an incidental byproduct of physiology.  Whereas Caullery’s 
response to this impasse was to argue that Lamarckian mechanisms had operated in the past, 
Rabaud simply concluded that the very idea of morphological adaption was an artifact of 
sloppy reasoning.  
 This was the state in which Aron found French biology when he began his dissertation 
research.  After eighteen months of mandatory military service in the French air corps, he 
decided to pursue further research in Germany.  In March of 1930, Aron traveled to Cologne 
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on an exchange, with plans continue his research while working as a teaching assistant at the 
university.  The early months there were hard on him, according to his memoirs and surviving 
correspondence.  His coursework and teaching obligations left him with little time for his own 
research.  Furthermore, the national political climate was growing ever more distressing.  He 
began to feel that his academic frustrations were in some way related to the violence and 
contradictions of the political realm. 
 On a Sunday morning in November of 1930, eight months after he had arrived in 
Cologne, he was walking along the banks of the Rhine when he had a moment of clarity, 
which he would later describe to his friend Paul Bertaux.  In a letter to Bertaux dated 
November 19, 1930, Aron wrote that while walking that day he, “saw the connection between 
the disparate problems that preoccupied me: philosophy becoming conscious of itself, 
philosophy chasing the phantom of history, socialism becoming spiritual reality once again by 
the rediscovery of the desire for values, or what have you, all appeared related”.81  This 
realization— that his political preoccupations were in fact related in some ultimate way to his 
philosophical ones—eventually led Aron to his dissertation on the philosophy of history.  
Philosophy, he had decided, needed to take on history and vice versa.  It seems that his first 
step was to begin in earnest to study Marx.  In a section of the Introduction on the relationship 
between memory and history, Aron referred to this period late in 1930, writing,  
In 1930, I decided to study Marxism in order to submit my political opinions to 
philosophical review.  But I feel incapable of recovering the psychological atmosphere 
of that period in my life: doubt about the function of philosophy, a desire to find an 
object of reflection not too far removed from personal, actual, preoccupations, etc.  
But all these signs are abstract; they translate into conceptual terms the state of being, 
which I recall, which I remember.82 
                                                
81 Raymond Aron. “Raymond Aron: 1905-1983: Histoire et Politique.” Commentaire 8, no. 
28–29 (Février 1985), 281. 
82 Aron, Introduction, 66. 
 
38 
For Aron, then, the Introduction was a project born, if not of desperation, as Fauconnet had 
charged, then at least out of an urgent sense that the philosophy of his training in 1920s Paris 
was not adequate to the world he saw emerging in 1930s Germany.  
 Aron abandoned the project on genetics that November day, but both Brunschvicg’s 
idealism and the epistemological crisis in French biology loomed large in the Introduction. 
While historians have noted in passing Aron’s early interest in biology, this moment is 
curiously glossed over when they interpret his oeuvre. The omission is significant both 
because it obscures one of the main arguments of the Introduction, about the distinction 
between human and natural law, but also because it downplays Aron’s importance in the 
history of French philosophy’s engagement with modern biology.  The phrase “French 
philosophy and biology” calls to mind names like Bergson, Foucault and Deleuze. Georges 
Canguilhem and Maurice Merleau-Ponty are also more widely known than Aron as 
philosophers of the biological. But it was Aron who, in the wake of the decline of 
Bergsonism, first took up the study of biology in a new way. After Aron, biology was neither 
a late chapter in the history of rationality nor a science in need of philosophical foundation. It 
became instead a new source of raw material for philosophy. 
 For Bergson, philosophy was an epistemic alternative - a way to access truths 
unavailable to science. His idealism/vitalism contained a critique of scientific time, which 
certainly influenced Aron’s. But Bergson’s élan vital was also a partisan stance in the conflict 
between Darwinian and neo-transformist accounts of evolution. According to Bergson, 
because natural selection understood evolution as operating through mechanisms, it required 
an understanding of life as the sum of some number of parts. Organisms, for Bergson, could 
only be properly understood as wholes. Therefore neo-transformism, which understood 
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organisms as purposeful wholes, was the only account of evolution consistent with the 
philosophical understanding of life.  For Bergson, science had to bring itself into accord with 
the truths of philosophy, not vice versa. 
 Whereas for Bergson philosophy came to the aid of science, in the case of biology 
adjudicating between conflicting concepts of the living, for Aron it was philosophy that 
needed help. Biology did not ultimately provide the solution, but it offered him a resource for 
thinking beyond the limits of French neo-Kantianism.  In the Introduction, Aron went to great 
lengths to show how biology, the “most interesting” example of an historical discipline, 
nevertheless lacked a true account of human history.83  This was so because, as a “mode of 
inference” about the relationship between past and present, evolutionary biology had no way 
to conceptualize the relationship between succession, the fact of change over time, and 
continuity, a meaningful explanation of those changes.84 
 Aron’s Introduction was and still is often read as advocating historical relativism.85 But 
relativism was never Aron’s aim. In fact, his epistemological project should be understood as 
a two-pronged attempt to develop a positive philosophy of history. On the one hand he 
wanted to rescue the insights of German neo-Kantianism from the tradition’s uncritical 
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acceptance of science as the way out of relativism. On the other hand, he was equally 
dissatisfied with the epistemic leaps of faith made by his teachers in France. For Brunschvicg, 
the leap was from logical to ontological truth. For the neo-transformists, the leap was from 
observation to mechanism. In both cases, one kind of knowledge was being translated into 
another without a plausible theory justifying the translation. For Aron, philosophy of history 
arose to provide such a theory. Thus, to the degree that the Introduction was a call for 
epistemic modesty, a search for the limits of knowledge, it was also an attempt to develop a 
substantive philosophy of history out of those very limits. 
 Therefore, rather than placing Aron’s work along a smooth trajectory in the rise of 
historical relativism, we should instead see it as one of the most sustained mid-twentieth 
century attempts to overcome relativism. That it failed, either by virtue of a philosophical 
flaw or simply because it was misunderstood, is part of a later story, the story of the 
ascendency of post-structuralism.  Not only did the Introduction give new life to the 
philosophy of history in France, it did so in such a way as to make biology absolutely central. 
Aron challenged his contemporaries to examine the relationship between their own epistemic 
practices as philosophers and historians and those of the scientists they studied.  
 Aron’s thèse secondaire, published in 1938 as La philosophie critique de l’histoire: 
essai sur une théories allemande de l’histoire, laid the groundwork for his thèse principale, 
the Introduction.  In the preface to the former he stated that whereas the present work was on 
the critical philosophy of history, the second part of the project was about historicism, “which 
is to say the philosophy of historical relativism.”86  To begin, Aron laid out the scope of his 
project, an examination of four German thinkers: Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Heinrich 
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Rickert (1863-1936), Georg Simmel (1858-1918) and Max Weber (1864-1920).  From such a 
study Aron hoped to discover whether the critique of historical reason they provided was a 
replacement or a complement to Kantian critique.   The central question of the work was 
therefore,  “is it possible to transpose the Kantian method in such a way as to make the 
philosophy of history unnecessary and to ground an original logic for historical science?”87  
Ultimately Aron concluded that rather than making the philosophy of history obsolete, the 
German critique in fact provided an opening.  “It is in effect,” he wrote, “through the 
intermediary of methodology that the philosophy of history, condemned by positivism in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, has regained the right of existence.”88  This “right of 
existence” regained, Aron’s hope was to exercise that right. 
 The German neo-Kantians had walked up to the edge of historical relativism but, Aron 
concluded, they had not been willing to jump.  It might appear that historicism, which Aron 
defined as “the doctrine that proclaims the relativity of values and philosophies as well as 
historical knowledge,” had resulted from the philosophies of Dilthey, Rickert, Simmel and 
Weber but this was not the case.89  As Aron wrote, “[Dilthey] recognizes the diversity of 
epochs and kinds of men, the integration of values and philosophies into original ensembles 
that express the unpredictable transformations of creative life.  Weber asserts the unceasing 
novelty of the values with which men choose their destinies and renew their understanding of 
the past.  Simmel also subordinates the cultural forms to the fate of an irrational force, life.”90  
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Nevertheless, Aron contended, these apparent seeds of “relativism and irrationalism” did not 
flourish.  While all four thinkers placed the idea of a truly universal philosophy into doubt, 
they all ultimately embraced the truth of logic and of positive science.  Though he hoped to 
avoid relativism as well, Aron was also motivated by critiques of positive science.  In his 
eyes, the project of the German neo-Kantians had failed. 
 Aron concluded that what the German neo-Kantians ultimately offered was a new set of 
problems, a pair of contradictions.  The subjects of his study all “[recognized] two 
fundamental antinomies…the first between historical relativity, which seems a fact, and 
universal truth required by reason,  and the other between individual perspectives, partial and 
multiple, and the totality of historical development.”91  These antinomies, the sticking points 
in a German conversation about methodology and objectivity in social science were, for Aron, 
an opening for a philosophy of history.   
 His attempt to make something of that opening to some degree followed in the footsteps 
of the German neo-Kantians.  “The critique of historical reason,” Aron wrote of their project, 
“determines the limits and not the foundations of historical objectivity.”92  Sure enough, even 
the title of his thèse principale, Introduction to the Philosophy of History:  An essay on the 
limits of historical objectivity, referred to this search for limits.  However, equally if not more 
important to Aron’s own philosophy of history were his interest in French neo-transformism 
in the late 1920s and his encounter with German phenomenology in the early 1930s.   That is, 
whereas the German neo-Kantians created a space for the philosophy of history to rebuild 
                                                
91 Ibid., 294. 
92 Ibid., 294. 
 
43 
itself, the bricks and foundation that finally composed that philosophy were made of 
something altogether different. 
 Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire: Essai sur les limites de l'objectivité 
historique opened with a clarification about the meaning of objectivity.  Aron was not 
interested in the question of whether individual historians could free themselves of prejudice 
or preference.  He was only interested in “an ideal historian.” Referring to his title, he wrote 
that, “objectivity does not mean impartiality, but universality.”93 The subtitle, Aron clarified, 
was not the goal of the project but its starting point.   Though he did not mention his thèse 
secondaire, it was clearly this work that provided him with his point of departure.  Aron 
wanted to move from the Kantian question, “Under what conditions is historical knowledge 
possible?”, to the Weberian formulation, “Is a universally valid science of history possible? 
To what extent?”.94 In other words, taking as a starting point the illegitimacy of the 
transcendental grounds of 19th-century philosophy of history, the task now was to map the 
limits of historical knowledge.  It was precisely the failure of the German neo-Kantians as 
outlined in La philosophie critique de l’histoire that had definitively revealed the inadequacy 
of transcendental analysis for the philosophy of history in the 20th century.   
 But German neo-Kantians were not the only targets of Aron’s project.  The first chapter 
of the work undertook a critique of Antoine-Augustin Cournot’s (1801-1877) probabilist 
concept of history.  For Cournot, history was distinct from natural law, because unlike law it 
was subject to chance.  Aron argued that this concept relied on a flawed metaphysics of order.  
Cournot’s materialism had led him to a perplexing claim that history was “incalculable for 
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us,” and Aron asked whether there was not “here a contradiction between determinism and 
ontological unpredictability.”95  This contradiction wasn’t apparent to Cournot because, as 
Aron wrote, “he granted himself the right to observe the future as though it were at an end.  
Thus he succeeded in avoiding the primary difficulty of historical logic: how to comprehend 
global movement while it remains incomplete?”96  Cournot’s metaphysics of order was in fact 
a secularized theological concept.  He ultimately depended on Providence by another name. 
 Aron’s critique of Cournot was an opening for a discussion of the difference between 
histories of nature and human history.  For Cournot, history was the negation of natural law, 
and therefore his philosophy raised more problems than it solved.  Aron turned next to 
biology, “the most interesting example of an historical discipline,” and in particular to 
transformism, which he called “as unhistorical as is possible.”97  Perhaps because his main 
source was Caullery’s Le Problème de l’évolution, he criticized transformism for its use of 
“hypotheses verified by present day experience” to explain evolutionary history.98  Darwin’s 
work contained “another form of the same confusion,” because it used theories about 
mechanisms (i.e. heredity, natural selection) to reconstruct history.99   
 In 1938 Aron believed that both Lamarck and Darwin had been proven wrong.  It is true 
that by this time only a small subset of scientists still believed in the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics.  But here Caullery’s influence becomes evident, because Aron also claimed 
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that, “they all consider genetic variation false.”100  Mendelian mechanisms might create 
“fluctuation,” but they did not constitute true mutations because they did not result in the 
creation of new species.  Paleontologists had established a set of historical facts; different 
species have existed at different times, some of which have become extinct.  Evolutionary 
biologists had experimented with various ways to alter organisms, either by Mendelian or 
Lamarckian methods.  Aron’s contention was that no one had actually theorized the 
relationship between these two bodies of knowledge.101  “[The] fact of succession,” he wrote, 
“ does not logically impose the hypothesis of descent.”102 
 Working through Caullery’s text, Aron found, with Caullery, that every proof lacked 
something.  For example, the idea that ontogeny recapitulated phylogeny, in other words that 
embryos developed physiologically by going through previous stages of evolution, was 
overturned in favor of the claim that “the future,” not the past, “is already virtually inscribed 
in the egg.”103  Thus, there was no agreement either about the mechanism of change or about 
the appropriate kind of knowledge that would in fact prove the theory of evolution.   
 Aron saw a series of indirect proofs, none of them definitive.  At the same time, “the 
laws of heredity, in particular genetics, suggest that living matter is remarkably stable.”104  
The fact was, no one could reproduce evolution in a laboratory.  Yes, Morgan, as Aron was 
surely aware, had produced an array of mutants, but he had never been able to create a new 
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species.  Caullery had argued that, “We can accept…with great likelihood, that once 
stabilized, groups [species] do not give rise to truly new groups.”105  Surveying fifty years of 
experimental attempts had led him to this conclusion.  This conflict between material 
evidence of evolution in the past (fossil records) and the inability to reproduce this process 
either by Mendelian/Darwinian or Lamarckian methods had resulted in a state of confusion, 
or, as Aron wrote, a “crisis” in philosophy.106 
 To Aron, biologists appeared satisfied simply to demonstrate the fact of descent.107  
Moreover, the standoff between transformism and Darwinism had resulted in the kind of anti-
finalism exemplified by Rabaud.  For biologists, history had become “a series of events and 
no longer an intelligible sequence.”108 This “doctrine of chance” reached its apex in genetics, 
which made living forms “reducible to assemblages of vital atoms, of genes.”109  In 1938, 
Aron could follow by conceding that of course most biologists found this genetic concept of 
life unsatisfying.  Caullery was among them, but Aron pointed out that, in claiming that 
different mechanisms operated in the past than could be observed today, Caullery was 
inverting the meaning of history.  “Thus history,” wrote Aron, “first necessary to positively 
explain finalism, is then invoked to show the unintelligibility of evolution.  Contradictory 
double necessity, but undoubtedly an inevitable contradiction.”110  What was left was a 
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generalized confusion in biology about the nature of the inquiry.  Controversy over the 
mechanism of evolution had led to a theoretically incoherent stance on history itself. 
 This crisis in French neo-transformism and by extension philosophy was the product of 
the kind of epistemic eclecticism practiced by modern biologists.  As biologists tried to bring 
various bodies of knowledge under one overarching theory of evolution, the contradictions 
between their epistemologies had become impossible to avoid.  To Cournot, for whom the 
history of nature was a reflection of metaphysical order, facts could never contradict theory.  
But as twentieth-century biologists tried to construct histories of species, experimentation, 
observation and theory were often at odds.  
 In tracing this conflict, Aron was situating the philosophy of history with respect to the 
limits of scientific knowledge.  However, he was careful to distinguish this project from 
Bergson’s.  Where Bergson had argued that metaphysics should fill the gaps in science, 
Aron’s deployment of philosophy was an exploration of the edges of knowing.  “It is no 
longer about a provisional rupture,” he wrote, “ a lacuna in science, it is about recognizing the 
limits beyond which our objective science cannot go.”111  Where science ended history began.   
 If history moved at the limits of science, this was because human beings had a special 
relationship to evolution and natural law.  While man might have evolved out of the animal 
world, his emergence was a rupture with evolution.  Aron distinguished his position from that 
of materialists, including Marxists, who made claims similar on the surface.  Yes, the creation 
of tools and with them the ability to alter conditions of existence was original to man, the 
“first act of history.”112 But the materialists implied that man’s history was just an 
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intervention or response to evolutionary conditions.  Aron wanted to go further.  Human 
history, he argued, was not just a sophisticated environmental response, but also implied a 
“spiritual relationship between individuals.”113   
 This argument drew not on his formal training in France, but on the ideas he had been 
exposed to years earlier while studying abroad.  Aron had arrived in Germany only a couple 
of years after the publication of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (1927), and just on the heels of 
Heidegger’s 1929-30 lecture course on metaphysics.  In his Memoirs he recalled a period of 
“unsystematic reading,” alternating between the neo-Kantian sociologists that would become 
the subject of his thèse secondaire on the one hand, and Heidegger and Husserl on the other.  
The encounter with phenomenology had a profound and immediate impact.  Aron had had to 
repress his “metaphysical impulses” throughout his neo-Kantian training in France, and 
phenomenology felt like liberation.114  That moment on the Rhine, described so vividly to his 
friend Bertaux, was the outcome, it appears, of a period of deep reflection on the relationship 
between history, meaning, and human reality inspired by Husserl and Heidegger.  As Aron’s 
philosophy of history crystalized, Heidegger in particular remained central to his thinking. 
 Heidegger’s influence was especially apparent in Aron’s distinction between humans 
and other animals.  In a crucial a crucial chapter of the Introduction, “Time and Concepts of 
History,” which directly followed the chapter on natural history and human history, Aron 
argued that human events could be understood without being “translated” into causal terms.115  
In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger had applied the hermeneutic circle to everyday human experience, 
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arguing that understanding the world precedes any interpretation, causal or otherwise.  Aron 
made this claim historical.  To do so while maintaining the distinction between evolution and 
human history, he needed to show why this hermeneutics did not apply to animals.  Again he 
echoed Heidegger, in this case evoking the latter’s definition of “world”:116   “All men, like 
animals, move towards nothingness.  But in this instance, on a higher level, opening 
themselves to indefinite horizons.   It is in rising to the totality that the essence of human 
becoming discovers itself.  Only the human species is engaged in an undertaking the goal of 
which is not death, but the realization of itself.”  Unlike animals who live, evolve, and die in a 
closed environment, humans encounter the world as a possibility for self-actualization.  We 
do not know to what extent Aron was aware, by 1938, of Heidegger’s 1929-30 lectures on 
metaphysics, which elaborated the ontological grounds for distinguishing between humans (or 
Dasein) and “mere” animals. Nevertheless, it is clear that Heidegger’s phenomenology played 
a crucial role in enabling Aron to make a new kind of claim about the specificity of human 
history.  The subject of history was not, he claimed, the transcendental ego of the neo-
Kantians.  It was rather an “historic being.”117   
 For Aron, the solution to the crisis of historical meaning was to be found in a new 
concept of man.  For Brunschvicg the subject of history was rationality, and he therefore 
depended on an unsustainable division between human reason and natural law.  The neo-
transformist position, exemplified by Caullery, treated all history as the history of species, and 
entailed an equally unsustainable division between phenomena observable in the present and 
natural law operating in the past.  German neo-Kantian sociologists had gotten closer, 
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insisting on the importance of meaning and subjectivity, but they had ultimately fallen back 
on positivism, undermining any meaningful distinction between human and natural history.  It 
was only by rethinking the very meaning of the human that history could become both 
intelligible and meaningful.  Man was an animal whose essence was not animal, but historic.  
Like other animals, Aron suggested, humans were indeed biological, subject to evolution and 




Isomorphic Life: Raymond Ruyer and the Embryology of the 
Posthuman 
 
 In the nineteen-forties, on the grounds of former Wehrmacht training barracks near the 
evacuated town of Döllersheim in northeastern Austria, a group of French POWs set up an 
academic collective to pass the time and learn from one another.  These men, many of whom 
had been academics back in France, lectured to one another, conducted research, and 
produced scholarship.  They referred to themselves as the Université en Captivité.  Among the 
scholars at Oflag XVII-A, an officers’ prisoner-of-war camp (Oflag was short for 
Offizierlager), was the philosopher Raymond Ruyer.  Born in 1902 in Plainfang (Vosges) in 
the Lorraine region of France, Ruyer had attended the École normale supérieure in Paris for 
philosophy and afterwards moved to Nancy, where he taught first at a lycée and then at the 
university.118  His doctoral theses, both published in 1930, were on the “philosophy of 
structure” and on Antoine Augustin Cournot’s philosophy of history respectively.   
  While Ruyer remains a somewhat marginal figure in the history of French thought, he 
is nevertheless intricately tied to the story of biology and philosophy.  In what follows, I will 
trace how Ruyer enters that story, emphasizing how biology reshaped his thought in ways that 
often paralleled broader shifts in French philosophy during the mid-twentieth century. Before 
the war, Ruyer had turned his attention to the philosophical problem of mind and body, 
publishing La Conscience et le Corps in 1937.   He spent the bulk of the war at Oflag XVII-
A, and while there he met, among other accomplished scholars, Étienne Wolff, a professor of 
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biology from Strasburg who specialized in embryology, heredity, and teratology.119  While a 
member of the Université en Captivité, Ruyer composed his first of many books inspired by 
problems within biology, and embryology in particular.120  On the basis of his knowledge of 
embryology, he came to argue for the unity of science and metaphysics.  As he elaborated his 
project he developed a philosophy he called neo-finalism, in part to distinguish it from the 
“radical finalism” that Henri Bergson had dispensed with in his his 1907 Creative Evolution.  
Bergson had argued that such “radical finalism,” as is found for example in Leibniz, was just 
as unacceptable as radical mechanism, for it implied “that things and beings merely realize a 
program previously arranged.”121 He objected to this implication because, “if there is nothing 
unforeseen, no invention or creation in the universe, time is useless again.”122  Thus Ruyer’s 
neo-finalism was intended not as a return to Leibniz, but as a convergence of finality and 
unfolding in time.  Embryology was the groundwork of this theory.  As Ruyer explored the 
implications of embryology for his philosophy, his neo-finalism developed as a non-humanist 
neo-materialism.  
 A critical aspect of this evolution in Ruyer’s thought was his method, which he called 
“isomorphic.”  Broadly understood, an isomorphism is a similarity in form or structure 
between mathematical objects, organisms (in biology), or crystals (in crystallography).  When 
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applied to his concept of form as “absolute surface,” this method of looking for similarities in 
form “without worrying about traditional classifications,” allowed Ruyer to scale the 
biological phenomenon of finality in two directions.123 While Ruyer apparently liked to joke 
that with the discoveries of quantum physics, “materialism died in 1900,” his own isomorphic 
materialism drew on quantum physics to argue for a non-mechanistic understanding of the 
organism.124  If quantum physics had initially undermined the scalability of natural laws, 
isomorphic materialism was Ruyer’s way to reconnect the universal with the individual, the 
organism with the molecule.  As we shall see, this isomorphism was critical to the 
development of his neo-materialist finalism. 
 During his imprisonment in Austria, Ruyer participated in a weekly meeting of 
biologists which, as Wolff recalled in his memoirs, met on Sunday mornings to discuss 
“biological or philosophical” questions for about two hours.125  Most of the participants were 
professional biologists of some kind, whether university or lycée professors.  As Wolff 
remembered, Ruyer stood out not only because he was a relative outsider to biology, but 
because of his distinctive, at times “paradoxical” approach to biological problems.  “He had a 
precise, if a bit literary, knowledge of biological problems,” wrote Wolff, “like any scholar 
trained in the classics without himself having experimented on living matter.”126  In Wolff’s 
estimation, Ruyer had a mind both “brilliant and profound,” exemplified by the latter’s 
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comment, upon hearing of a book entitled “The Egg and its Organizing Force,” that the author 
should have called it “The Organizing Force and its Egg.”127  While at first this struck the rest 
of the group as somewhat strange, upon reflection they realized it pointed rather aptly to the 
unresolved and indeed usually ignored question: which came first, the chicken or the egg?  
Although trite in its formulation, Wolff’s reaction to Ruyer nevertheless showed an awareness 
of the substance and direction of the latter’s philosophical finalism.  Ruyer would later use 
L'oeuf et son dynamisme organisateur, by Albert Dalcq, in a critical section of his 1946 
Éléments de psycho-biologie.128  
    As I argue in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively, both Georges Canguilhem and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty saw their humanist commitments subverted by their deepening understandings 
of and engagements with modern biological findings.  In a distinct, parallel trajectory, 
Ruyer’s understanding of embryogenesis led him to a non-humanist materialism.  This 
suggests that biology was not incidental to the turn away from humanism in mid-twentieth 
century France, it was an active protagonist.  For Ruyer, encountering biology was perhaps 
the most significant event in his intellectual life.  
 Ruyer entered the ENS in 1921, passing is agrégation in 1924, the same year that 
Raymond Aron and Canguilhem, the subjects of Chapters 1 and 3 respectively, began their 
studies there.  Both Aron and Canguilhem were aware of Ruyer’s work, citing him 
occasionally in their own.  Interestingly, in his 1952 Néo-Finalisme, Ruyer repeatedly cited 
Aron’s 1938 Introduction to the Philosophy of History and, in a chapter critical previous 
approaches to the organism, found fault with Merleau-Ponty’s 1942 La Structure du 
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Comportement.  Ruyer argued that Merleau-Ponty, along with the Gestalists, had capitulated 
to an overly idealist account of the organism, leaving unresolved the relationship “between 
overall behavior and physicochemical processes.”129  Ironically, it was in the nineteen-fifties, 
around the time of Ruyer’s critique, that Merleau-Ponty’s interest in the organism deepened.  
In addition to several strictly biological sources, Merleau-Ponty also drew heavily on Ruyer’s 
work as he developed his late, and never completed, philosophy of nature.  This phase of 
Merleau-Ponty’s work is the subject of Chapter 4.  
 Despite these connections however, very little work has been done on Ruyer in either 
French or English.130  Recently there has been a small amount of interest in Ruyer among 
scholars of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatarri, in part because these two philosophers used 
Ruyer’s distinction between forms and structures in their concepts of the molecular and the 
molar.131  In France there have been scattered attempts to draw attention to Ruyer’s oeuvre, 
most notably by Fabrice Colonna, who recently oversaw the posthumous publication of 
Ruyer’s L'embryogenèse du monde et le Dieu silencieux, and whose 2007 Ruyer is the best 
introduction to the philosopher’s thought available.132  In 1995, Louis Vax and Jean-Jacques 
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Wunenburger edited a volume of essays, Raymond Ruyer, de la science à la théologie, that 
offered multiple perspectives on Ruyer’s place in the history of French thought.133  As these 
examples attest, Ruyer remains a marginal figure within the canon of French intellectual 
history. 
 Nevertheless, though outside the constellation of Parisian intellectual stars, Ruyer sheds 
light on biology’s role in twentieth-century French philosophy.   As the four philosophers 
under study here clearly show, in period between nineteen-thirty and nineteen-sixty biology 
was a both resource for thought and a fundamental fact of existence.  Life was not a metaphor, 
and neither was biology a simple reductionism to be overcome.  Before going further into the 
development of Ruyer’s neo-materialism, it is worth situating him within this constellation.  
While his thinking changed a great deal over time, at least one sentiment appears to have 
remained constant: his aversion to existentialism.  “I have always been shocked down to my 
last fiber by existentialism,” he wrote,  “or anything which, before the word was in vogue, 
resembled it. The feeling of vertigo, of being caught up in the reality of existence, to be 
oneself, to be an individual living being, like Médor the dog or Charlot the ass, never seemed 
to me to be the starting point of philosophy.”134  He continued rather colorfully: “When I read 
Kierkegaard he inspired an intense repulsion in me.  Personal religion, personal mystique are 
pudenda, and I do not understand why one reveals them.”135  This disgust with what he saw to 
be the vulgarity and indulgence of existentialism to a large degree motivated his prewar work. 
                                                
133 Louis Vax, and Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, eds. Raymond Ruyer, de la science à la 
théologie. Paris: Edition Kimé, 1995. 
134 Raymond Ruyer. “Raymond Ruyer par lui-même.” Les Études philosophiques, no. 80 
(January 2007): 3. 
135 Ibid., 3. 
 
57 
 Ruyer’s postwar philosophy, the philosophy informed by his knowledge about 
embryogenesis, was materialist, posthumanist, and argued for the unity of science and 
metaphysics. Notwithstanding a continuous set of concerns and a great deal of continuity of 
vocabulary (e.g. form, structure, absolute surface), his philosophy was entirely transformed 
during the nineteen-forties.   His encounter with Étienne Wolff and resulting interest in 
embryology played a critical role in this philosophical transformation.    
  As Jean-Pierre Louis and Fabrice Louis highlight in their survey of his thought, 
Ruyer’s early work was in opposition to both idealism and materialism.136  However, in order 
to understand the effect of biology Ruyer’s later philosophy, there are three characteristics of 
his work in the 1930s that are critical to understand: his critique of materialism in favor of 
mechanism in particular, his claim about the limits of scientific knowledge, and his belief in 
the specificity of the human.  Cournot had argued in his 1862 Traité de l’enchainement des 
idées fondamentales dans les sciences et dans l’histoire, that while it was customary to 
believe that the knowledge of order and form were privileged kinds of knowledge, this was in 
fact the only true knowledge.  He wrote that, “the only things we know scientifically are order 
and form.”137  Ruyer believed that Cournot had erred in introducing further concepts, such as 
force and “vital principal.”  His thesis, Esquisse d’une philosophie de la structure, was 
conceived as a kind of corrective to Cournot - a work more true to Cournot than the man 
himself.  As Ruyer wrote, “there is only one kind of reality: the geometrical-mechanical 
reality, form, structure.”138  Form was for him a synonym for physical structure, to be 
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distinguished from both the logical and “vague metaphysical” sense of the term.139  In his 
later work, Ruyer would rely on a sharp distinction between forms, which were “absolute 
surfaces,” and structures, which were mere aggregates.  However here he made no such 
distinction. 
 If the starting point of Esquisse was an epistemic realism in part inspired by Cournot, 
the result of Ruyer’s investigation was ultimately to claim that structures were in fact all that 
could really be said to exist.   “[O]rder and form are all we know,” and further: “this 
knowledge of order and form exhaust the whole of reality, there is no mysterious residue140,” 
he argued.  In contrast to his later work, here Ruyer wanted to show that structural 
descriptions were not only adequate to reality, but reflections of its nature.  Understanding a 
tree as a structure, a system of curves and twists in space-time, did not point to the limits of 
perception or indicate that only surface realities were available to human knowledge.  For 
Ruyer at this point in his thinking, systems were all that were, and they were entirely 
knowable.    
 This metaphysics was partly inspired by Ruyer’s self-described “spite” towards 
existentialism.  There was no subterranean truth being refused to us.  On the contrary, he 
argued, “the world is without mystery…it is completely displayed.”141  While such a claim 
might reasonably have led Ruyer to a version of scientific materialism, in fact he argued that 
scientific epistemology was flawed, at least as it was currently being practiced.  Scientific 
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materialism, he argued, had an inadequate account of social life and history.  In this period 
Ruyer was broadly a humanist, and believed in a fundamental distinction between animal and 
human existence.  Because scientific epistemology privileged material reality of social reality, 
the worldview it offered was not only incomplete, but also incompatible with Ruyer’s 
humanist values. 
 Ruyer’s early concept of form-as-structure therefore served to defend a vague 
philosophical humanism, one based on the non-reducibility of structures. Despite the apparent 
ambiguity introduced by the scientific findings of evolutionary biology, humans could not be 
understood as the causal outcome of the activities of other animals.  This position was linked 
to Ruyer’s aversion “Aristotelian causality,” or formal cause.  For Ruyer, such formal 
causality reduced objects to epiphenomena of their antecedents.  He wrote that, “ once a form, 
a structure, a mechanism exists, whatever the operation that gave rise to this form, it is what it 
is.”142  He continued, “Man is not an animal, despite his biological evolution, but a man, and 
he must break with this prejudice of some scholars, who believe more scientific to speak like 
an animal.”143  Man might not differ from animals materially, but this in no way undermined 
his metaphysical specificity.  Just as a triangle was different from a circle not in “essence” —
both were geometric forms in Euclidian space—but only in “form”—they had properties that 
were totally irreducible—so man differed from animals in form.144 
 Before Ruyer developed his own materialism grounded in embryogenesis, he believed 
that all materialism was a form of reductionism, and that a mechanist philosophy was the only 
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way to account for complexity.  In Esquisse, he therefore defended mechanism in both 
metaphysics and epistemology.  His aim in defending the efficacy of mechanism over 
materialism in metaphysics was also to demonstrate the existence of forms.  Throughout his 
work in the thirties, Ruyer both affirmed scientific results and argued that the scope of science 
was limited.  While it was easier to perceive material objects than, say, historical or social 
realities, he argued that this did not authorize the privileging of one over the other.  “Our 
thesis consists of maintaining that such realities [e.g. social and historical] are in no way less 
‘real’ than an atom, than a bit of iron,” he wrote.145   Materialism, like formal logic, reduced 
things to assemblages of parts, eliminating the possibility of truly understanding complex 
realities.   
 If Ruyer’s earliest work was largely inspired but his distaste for existentialism, his work 
in the mid-thirties was more concerned with overcoming Bergson and addressing the problem 
of mind and body.  In La Conscience et le corps Ruyer made the first steps towards his 
mature philosophy, distinguishing for the first time between form and structure.  This work 
was largely aimed at refuting Bergson’s theory of perception in Matter and Memory (1896).  
Bergson had argued that, “realism and idealism both go too far, that it is a mistake to reduce 
matter to the perception which we have of it, a mistake also to make of it a thing able to 
produce in us perceptions, but in itself of another nature than they.”146  If idealism reduced 
matter to its effects on consciousness, materialism reduced perception to a mechanical 
reaction to stimuli.  Thus, Bergson wrote,  “Matter, in our view, is an aggregate of 
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‘images.’”147  For Bergson these “images” were a way to get beyond the a realism versus 
idealism dichotomy.  They were, he wrote, somewhere in between the “representations” of 
idealism and the “things” of realism.    
 Ruyer, however, believed that Bergson had reduced the brain to a mere tool of 
consciousness.  Bergson had implied, according to Ruyer, that consciousness was a kind of 
machine operator, controlling the functions of the brain.  Ruyer maintained on the contrary 
that the brain was not an instrument of thought but in fact thought itself.148  For Ruyer, the 
distinction between brain and consciousness was false, merely a product of the limitations of 
perspective.  While I experience my own consciousness directly, other peoples’ 
consciousnesses appear to me as external objects in the world .  It was this perspectival 
limitation that caused the confusion whereby the brain could be mistaken for a mere object, 
rather than apprehended as consciousness itself.  
 Yet, Ruyer claimed, if consciousness was not a transcendent machine operator, neither 
was it an immanent effect of physical processes.  Ruyer here targeted psychology for making 
a claim that was if anything further from the truth than Bergson’s.  To psychology, 
consciousness was a mere epiphenomenon of instincts, mind an epiphenomenon of the brain.  
However, Ruyer argued, “Consciousness is not a sign that certain connections have been 
established, it is the reality of those connections.”149  The brain was not a tool of the mind, but 
nor was the mind only an effect of the physical brain.  Both of these solutions made the brain 
an object when in fact it was a quintessential structure.  While he would later develop the 
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concept of form, which he would equate with consciousness, in the nineteen thirties it was the 
concept of structure that resolved, for Ruyer, the problem of mind and body.  
 Though he had not yet become a materialist in La Conscience et le corps—here the 
brain/consciousness was structure, “connections” (les liens), not substance or form—Ruyer 
did begin to articulate one of the central pieces of his materialism, that of absolute surface or 
survol absolue.150  Ruyer rejected the psychological model of consciousness that, he argued, 
required the existence of a kind of “third eye” beyond consciousness observing the activity of 
consciousness itself.  In place of this psychological model, Ruyer proposed that consciousness 
was a survol absolue, an activity that was somewhere between the immediacy of experience 
and the distance of observation.  Conscious was a surface that enclosed itself.  Ruyer insisted 
that “ there is no subject, no observer, no super-retina in a perpendicular dimension, and yet 
all points, all the details of sensation are present, simultaneously ’visible’…”151 
Consciousness was an “intuited surface without a third dimension.”152  Whereas the “third 
eye” observing consciousness created an endless repetition—another eye in yet another 
dimension would be required in order to affirm the presence of this postulated “third eye”—
the absolute surface of consciousness required no outside, no additional dimension.  
 In this period before the war and his internment with the biologists of Oflag XVII-A, 
Ruyer treated consciousness and life as largely unrelated philosophical questions.  While he 
dealt briefly with “consciousness and organism” in La Conscience et le corps, before the war 
his main aim with regard to biology was to distinguish his position from vitalism.  To Ruyer it 
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was clear that biology would never be fully absorbed into the fields of chemistry and physics, 
but this was not because of some spontaneous, vital force that resisted scientific 
understanding altogether.  “[That] which escapes [current scientific knowledge],” he wrote, 
“is not a guiding principle, mysteriously tangent to nature, it is rather, as in every other case, 
the real, self-subsisting form of this structure.”153  As Ruyer here suggested and would later 
make explicit, life did not escape explanation by physical science because it escaped 
knowledge altogether, but rather because physics and chemistry were sciences of the wrong 
sorts of things.  Physics and chemistry looked only at the constituent parts of life, but life was 
a complex structure.  “Life and the reality of an organism or a society are likewise orders of 
surfacing (des ordres d’affleurement), and it is there that we find the two indissoluble sides of 
activity and passivity…”154  As in a geological formation when a vein hits the surface, life 
was the visible outbreak of an invisible but no less real process.  Rock metaphors aside, it is 
clear that Ruyer did not yet understand biological life in the same terms as consciousness.  
Like life, consciousness was a kind of structure, but unlike the organism, it was also an 
absolute surface, capable of survol absolue  Life was a surfacing of material complexity, not 
an absolute surface in itself. 
 Thus, as we have seen, in the nineteen-thirties Ruyer’s philosophy was mechanist, anti-
materialist, and loosely aligned with human exceptionalism. His major concerns were 
consciousness and the limits of science.  While he developed certain key concepts to his later 
philosophy, the distinction between form and structure and the idea of survol absolue, it was 
only after his time with the Université en Captivité that moved towards a neo-materialist, 
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posthumanist finalism.  This later work, in particular Éléments de psycho-biologie (1946), 
which he apparently wrote while at Oflag XVII-A, and Néo-Finalisme (1952), used biology, 
most often embryology, to advance arguments about life as form, the compatibility between 
science and metaphysics, and the existence of consciousness on all scales, from the molecule 
to the universe.   Consciousness was no longer a human phenomenon in need of explanation, 
but instead an attribute of material form itself.  It therefore existed on all scales.  To the extent 
that Ruyer now believed that consciousness was an attribute of being a form, not a structure 
belonging to human experience, he moved further away from humanism.   
 Ruyer spent almost five years as a POW at Oflag XVII-A.  During this time he became 
close with fellow inmate François Ellenberger, a geologist.  Ellenberger, who was thirteen 
years younger than Ruyer, recalled his friend as energetic and engaged, constantly reading 
and writing throughout their imprisonment.  “[He] liked to talk to me as though he were a 
younger friend, curious and ignorant, in no way a specialist in questions in which he was in 
fact very educated.”155  Also among the POWs was a plant physiologist named Alexis Moyse 
(1912-1991), whose 1948 Biologie et Physico-Chimie concluded that life retained a certain 
degree of autonomy within the constraints of physico-chemstry.   Ellenberger believed 
Moyse’s ideas owed much to Ruyer’s philosophical influence on scientific community of 
Oflag XVII-A.  
 The influence went both ways, of course.  Indeed, Ruyer did not know a great deal of 
biology before the war, and he came out of this period with an education in the subject.  He 
seems to have learned most of all from his friend Étienne Wolff, who had completed his 
doctoral research on teratology, the study of monstrosities, in 1936.  Wolff’s thesis, Les bases 
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de la tératogénèse expérimentale des vertébrés amniotes, d’après les résultats de méthodes 
directes, was largely taken up with a history of experimental methods and result within the 
study of teratogenesis.  One of the central research questions was whether deformations were 
inherited and therefore present in the gamete, or whether they were the result of exterior 
influences on the developing embryo.  Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (1772-1844) had 
argued in the nineteenth century that external disruptions during development were the cause 
of monstrosities.  However this had proven difficult to establish experimentally, because 
disrupting embryos in the laboratory, while it might temporarily produce an abnormality, 
usually led quickly to fatality.  It was only in the twentieth century, Wolff showed, that the 
existence of externally caused monstrosities, for example using x-rays to halt development in 
part of an embryo, had been firmly established.156  Many of the sources Wolff used in his 
historical analysis of teratogenesis showed up later in Ruyer’s philosophy, and shaped his 
understanding of the organism.  
  One of the books Ruyer composed at Oflag XVII-A was Éléments de psycho-biologie, 
published in the fall of 1946.  This work was so clearly informed by Wolff that, many years 
later, Ellenberger thought it strange that Ruyer had not cited him.  Of Ruyer, Ellenberger 
wrote, “Let us not forget that he was originally trained as a philosopher.  For upon reading 
Chapter III of Éléments de psycho-biologie [which is devoted to embryology,] it is surprising 
that Wolff’s name does not appear.”157  According to Ellenberger, Ruyer spent at least a year 
in Wolff’s course, which was taught at a “high level” and held privately, in other words aimed 
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at specialists and not generally available to all members of the Université en Captivité.  While 
there are no records—no course notes or lectures—of Wolff’s course, it is safe to assume that 
his lessons reflected the central concerns of his scientific work in embryology.  Wolff’s 
experimental research used targeted electronic and x-ray disruptions to produce specific kinds 
of deformed chicken embryos, whether omphaloceles or cyclopses.  He had also shown that 
injecting female hormones into male chicken embryos produced hermaphrodites.  
Experimental monsters aside, one of Wolff’s main disciplinary concerns as a biologist was to 
locate teratology, a science of the pathological, within the science of the normal, in this case 
embryology.  As he wrote after the war, “The monstrous organism and the normal organism 
obey the same laws, they are endowed with the same properties.”158  In other words, 
malformations did not occur because some organisms followed alternate developmental paths 
altogether, but simply because they had been locally disrupted, at which point their paths 
diverged from the normal.  This consistency of developmental processes was the foundation 
of Ruyer’s “thematic” concept of embryogenesis. 
 The critical chapter in Éléments on embryology was entitled, “La technique du 
développement.”  As Ruyer saw it, experimental science had done philosophy the favor of 
demonstrating its own limits when it came to explaining embryogenesis.  The chapter opened 
with a summary of experimental results, but quickly moved into a critique of both mechanist 
(i.e. purely chemical) and neo-vitalist explanations of these results on the part of scientists.  
Ruyer’s own interpretation was that development was “thematic,” or non-spatial, that 
chemicals, whether gradients or signals were merely “triggers” not causes and that, finally, 
embryogenesis was analogous to a particular process of consciousness, that of memory.  
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Seeing parallel’s with memory in the development of embryos, Ruyer was ultimately able to 
draw a broader connection between consciousness and life, bringing them both under the 
umbrella of finality. 
 Ruyer began by examining experiments on polarity in sea-urchins.  The Swedish 
embryologist Sven Hörstadius (1898-1996) had conducted a series of experiments on urchin 
eggs at the sixteen-cell state.159  Hörstadius had shown that it was possible to split two 
embryos on different axes—in one case dividing the animal from the vegetal pole (a in the 
figure below) and in the other case splitting the embryo down its meridian (b)—graft them 
together (c), and still produce a normally developing embryo.  This result was interesting in 
its own right, and consistent with Hans Driesch’s (1867-1941) earlier work. 
   
Fig. 1 Hörstadius Embryo Splices160 
However, as Hörstadius showed, this result could not be produced at the sixty-four cell stage 
of development.  From this Ruyer concluded that “At a certain moment and in certain parts of 
the embryo, something was therefore produced, which specialized or ‘determined’ such-and-
such cell or such-and-such territory, which could no longer produce just any organ; technique 
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could no longer change its destiny.”161  After reaching a certain point in development, 
individual cells had learned their “destinies” and were no longer governed by mechanism 
alone. They were instead purposeful.  
 As Ruyer observed, this spatial fixity was a phase reached over time, not a property that 
belonged to the fertilized egg or even, as Hörstadius had shown, the sixteen-cell embryo.  As 
a result, Ruyer argued that the embryo’s determination—the fulfillment of its development—
had a “thematic character” that was “not purely spatial.”162  Of course it was possible to map 
the development of an embryo piece by piece, “but this geometric precision must not mask 
the essential phenomenon which is not on the order of the spatial.”163  Experiments that 
disrupted the spatial grid of the embryo were able to produce normal development.  This was 
clear evidence that embryogenesis could not be explained purely geometrically.   Spatial 
specialization was the result of the thematic unfolding of life in time, in other words 
development, not the primary characteristic of life itself.  
 From Hörstadius’s experiments with splitting embryos, Ruyer moved to the work of 
Hans Spemann, who had put forth the theory of the “organizer.”164  Spemann had discovered 
that certain parts of the embryo, when grafted to another part, could induce the cells around 
them to change course.  Animal embryos go through a phase called gastrulation, in which the 
germ layers (ectoderm, mesoderm, and endoderm) are differentiated.  During this process, an 
opening forms in the embryo, and along this opening a “dorsal lip.”  Spemann had shown that 
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when this dorsal lip was removed and grafted onto another part of the embryo, it was capable 
of inducing the formation of a second, vestigial embryo.  Because of this inductive capacity, 
Spemann called the dorsal lip the “organizer,” theorizing that it was responsible for directing 
embryogenesis.  
 As Ruyer saw it, Spemann’s discoveries had been misinterpreted by biologists, who 
were only too eager to get beyond the embarrassment of Driesch’s revival of vitalism.  Yes, 
Spemann’s grafting experiment had shown that the entelechy of the whole could be disrupted, 
and this undermined any attempt to revive Aristotelian finalism.  However, it was wrong to 
conclude that induction was a purely chemical process.  A simple chemical reaction could by 
no means “explain” the inductive power of the dorsal lip.165  Such a claim was as ridiculous, 
Ruyer wrote, as claiming that “the rain explains the forms of plants because it triggers their 
growth.”166  The organizing centers Spemann had discovered were without a doubt, Ruyer 
argued, “triggers and not causes.”167   
 Yet further evidence that cells were not simply passive receptors but had a finality 
specific to them was that they remained species specific even when grafted onto the embryo 
of another animal.  One group of frog ectoderm cells might be induced to become part of the 
endoderm, but they would never become sea urchin cells, even under the influence of an 
urchin inductor (an organizing center).  Frog cells always retained their “frogness.”   For 
Ruyer, the presence of organizing centers highlighted the really crucial question: embryos 
clearly exhibited finality, so what was the true source of this finality?  
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 As Hörstadius’s and Spemann’s respective experiments had shown, embryogenesis 
exhibited a finality that could not be explained by recourse to purely physicochemical 
processes.  Ruyer had little interest in what he saw as Driesch’s “mysterious” finalism, so 
instead he turned to the model of psychological memory.  Embryology was to be understood 
as a mnemic, trans-spatial theme.  As Ruyer wrote, “My brain tissue is not differentiated in 
advance to actualize one memory over another any more than non-determined embryonic 
tissue is differentiated in advance to provide a leg or a kidney.”168  Like the brain, the embryo 
did not already contain its future actualization.  Up to a certain stage, in fact, all of its frog 
cells, for example, were capable of becoming all kinds of frog tissue.  For Ruyer, this too was 
like memory.  “All that my memories have in common with one another is their ‘Ruyerité,’” 
he wrote.169  Embryos and brains both partook of this mnemic quality whereby they were able 
to retain their identities not by virtue of a spatial or physical unfolding, but according to a 
“theme,” whether that theme was “frog” or “Ruyer.”170 
 From Élements, which was written during the war and published just after it, onward, 
embryogenesis was a central theme in Ruyer’s thought.  His final work, incomplete at the 
time of his death, was entitled L’embryogenèse du monde et le Dieu silencieux.  Fabrice 
Colonna recently edited the unpublished manuscript, and it was finally published in 2013.171  
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While the work is largely taken up with Ruyer’s theological concerns, which are outside the 
scope of the current study both conceptually and biographically, it also testifies to the 
profound impact that the study of embryology had on Ruyer’s thought.  This was no passing 
metaphor, no dalliance in interdisciplinary that quickly faded.  The results of experiments by 
Hörstadius, Spemann, and others permanently changed Ruyer’s understanding not only of the 
organism, but of world, materiality, and humanity.  This revolution in his thought took time to 
ramify completely, but even within Éléments the stakes were emerging. 
 To begin with, Ruyer wanted to rethink the classification of the sciences.  A crucial 
distinction to this end was between forms and masses (les foules).  If primary sciences studied 
forms, secondary, statistical sciences could only explain masses.  Moreover, the kinds of 
knowledge being produced were entirely different.  True forms could be “understood” while 
masses, sometimes called “Forme-Gestalt” by Ruyer to signal their status as structures, could 
be causally explained.172  Forms moved towards an optimum, acting according to a normative 
logic of values.  Structures or masses moved towards an extreme, functioning according to 
determinist laws.  
 His approach to this reclassification also signaled his turn to materialism.  Ruyer 
rejected the system of classification inspired by Comte, which placed biology “en sandwich” 
between the physical sciences and psychology.  “We must get rid of this empty 
representation,” he wrote.173  “We observe, in fact, not levels, but lines of continuity.”174  As 
individuals we are alive because none of our ancestors died prematurely, before reproducing, 
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but also because our very cellular material has persisted through time.  “My body’s 
protoplasm has been alive for millions of years, since each of its fragments derive directly, by 
duplication or fusion, from a living fragment…My body is in continuity with, by way of my 
human and animal ancestors, the most primitive life forms.”175  For Ruyer, his continuity of 
substance—from organisms, cells, and viruses, to “chemical individualities,” molecules, and 
atoms— revealed the artificiality the Comtean hierarchy of sciences.   
   For Ruyer the link between living beings and molecules was not only a matter of 
material continuity, however.   It was also a matter of form.  While molecules lacked the 
“historical character” of living species, in other words their form was intemporal rather than 
hereditary, they nevertheless had something essential in common with life.  The ambiguity of 
the case of viruses showed that there was no hard line between being composed of carbon, for 
example, and being a living form that is the product of heredity.   What molecules, viruses, 
and organisms had in common was that they were proper forms, which for Ruyer meant they 
were individualities that not only persisted, but tended to reconstitute themselves over time.   
 To highlight the continuity of form between molecules, viruses, and organisms, Ruyer 
opposed these “individual beings, which exist in a continuous line,” to merely “equilibrious 
phenomena, which arise from the interaction of Beings by step-by-step causality, and which 
are expressed by the secondary laws of statistics.”176  Thus, after rejecting the Comtean 
hierarchy of sciences in the face of the continuity of life with other forms, Ruyer came to his 
own classification system for the sciences.  Some sciences were “primary,” and dealt with the 
forms themselves.  These included quantum physics, biology, psychology, and sociology.  
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Other sciences, those classified as “secondary” dealt only with the secondary, statistical 
effects of interactions among primary forms.  These included not only classical physics 
(especially thermodynamics) and physiology, but political economy as well.  Ruyer’s 
classificatory system relied not on scale—sociology was a primary science after all—but on 
his concept of form. 
  This system of classification also supported Ruyer’s attitude towards Darwinism, which 
resembled that of the zoologist Étienne Rabaud. In addition to criticizing the Mendelian 
Darwinian position for treating life like an “assemblage of letters” rather than an autonomous 
whole, Rabaud had argued that that natural selection might explain the elimination of negative 
traits, but had no way to account for the creation of new ones.177  Without citing him directly, 
Ruyer echoed Rabaud when he wrote, “The natural selection that English biologists continue 
to believe, out of devotion to Darwin, is against all likelihood a general instrument of 
evolution, is in fact a simple instrument of equilibration and external regulation of fauna and 
flora.  All experiments and observations cited in favor of the real action of natural selection 
always involve the movement of species in the biocenosis [basically the ecosystem] and never 
the creation of organs by mechanical triage.”178  Natural selection only explained a secondary 
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phenomenon, and was indeed a prime example of a statistical science.  It did not speak to the 
origins of life.179 
  If Éléments was Ruyer’s chance to think through the implications of embryology for 
science, Néo-Finalism (1952) was an ambitious attempt to build a metaphysics from the same 
set of themes.  It was also in Néo-Finalism that Ruyer first made his isomorphic method 
explicit.  As he wrote, he wanted to find “isomorphisms between facts, without worrying 
about traditional classifications.”180  The result was a further shift away from his prewar 
thought, which had been both anti-materialist and explicitly invested in defining the limits of 
science.  Now Ruyer saw science and metaphysics as compatible reflections of a monist, 
materialist, and finalist universe.   
   In Néo-Finalism Ruyer recapitulated many of the arguments of Éléments, often with 
the aim of carrying them further.  Ruyer had found confirmation for the brain-embryo 
isomorphism in the work of G.E. Coghill (1872-1941).  In his 1929 Anatomy and the Problem 
of Behavior, Coghill had demonstrated the connection between behavioral patterns and 
developmental processes in amphibians.  While Coghill was a mechanist, his work left ample 
room for non-mechanist interpretation.  His position was indeed somewhat conflicted, as 
evident when he wrote that, “Man is, indeed, a mechanism, but he is a mechanism which, 
within his limitations of life, sensitivity an growth, is creating and operating himself.”181 
Ruyer was of course well prepared to interpret this kind of argument on the part of a scientist, 
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since he now believed that all mechanist theories of the organism posited this second self to 
operate the machine.  He therefor was not deterred by Coghill’s attempt at reductionism from 
interpreting the experimental results in an entirely different direction.  “In a relatively precise 
manner,” Coghill had written, “physiological processes follow the order of their 
embryological development in the functions of aquatic and terrestrial locomotion and 
feeding.”182  These findings, Ruyer believed, corroborated the theory that embryogenesis was 
neither mechanistic nor primarily spatial, but rather a theme unfolding in time.  Of Coghill he 
wrote, “locomotive behavior has first a global appearance: the body takes the form of a C and 
then an S, the flexion moving from head to tail. Only then do the legs develop and gradually 
participate in the movement: the theme of the sigmoidal body movement precedes 
differentiation of locomotor reflexes of the limbs.”183  Coghill’s findings were proof that 
development had a finalist character that was realized thematically over time. 
 The connection between embryogenesis and the mind, first suggested in the discussion 
of memory in Éléments, was therefore no longer tentative.  In a chapter entitled “Le cerveau 
et l’embryon,” Ruyer explored the isomorphic connection between equipotency in the embryo 
and in the brain.  “The cortical surface—and it is the same, more or less clearly, for all nerve 
centers—does not function like a material surface with geometrical-physical 
properties…Themes and meanings are not localizable.  They are…outside of space-time.”184  
Thus the brain had an equipotency that was “exactly parallel to embryonic equipotency.”185  
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Here Ruyer returned to the language of survol absolue: “Equipotency is the functionally 
objective appearance that takes on, for an observer, a form of reality that can only be 
consciousness, which is to say…an absolute form, or an absolute domaine that hovers over [se 
survole] itself.”186  Embryological equipotency was just another iteration of the phenomenon 
of survol absolue, and the cortical surface was not geometrical or localizable, but rather an 
absolute surface that enclosed itself. 
 In La Conscience et le corps, Ruyer had wanted to get beyond the idea that 
consciousness required an explanation that was outside itself.  Now he used the isomorphism 
of equipotency to claim that, “Consciousness, memory, the ideas of a man, do not constitute a 
spiritual ‘second man,’ a effervescent avatar of the vertebrate superimposed on the primary 
man of flesh…”187  Whereas before his study of embryology he had argued that mind and the 
brain were the same structure viewed from different perspectives, his new biological 
materialism now led him to claim that, “The brain is an embryo which has not finished 
developing..”188  According to this materialist view, form, consciousness, and development 
were all isomorphs.  Together they constituted a finalism that operated on every material 
scale.  
 Ruyer’s materialist finalism made consciousness an attribute of all forms, from 
organisms to atoms.  He argued that “one could say that there exists a perfect isomorphism 
between the finalist activity of higher organisms and the activity of physical beings.  To speak 
of the ‘the freedom of the atom’ is not some ridiculous blunder of philosophers who are badly 
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informed about science…In fact we must broaden the argument, and speak not only of the 
freedom, but of the finalist and regulative activity of physical individualities.”189  Ruyer 
concluded Néo-Finalism with a strikingly bold claim for the power of isomorphisms, 
presented in the form a list of statements. These were all examples of finalist activity in the 
world. 
 
Fig. 2 Isomorphisms190 
This argument resonated with the scientific vision of “hierarchical continuum” put forward by 
Arnold Gesell and Catherine S. Amatruda in their Embryology of Behavior: The Beginnings 
of the Human Mind.  Though Ruyer did not cite Gesell and Amatruda in Neo-finalism, he had 
very likely read their work, which he referred to elsewhere in the same period.191  Gesell and 
Amatruda had shown how development and behavior were linked in humans, ultimately 
arguing for a connection between the process of embryogenesis and the phenomena of genius 
and creativity.  As their diagram of the “hierarchical continuum” shows, this argument rested 
on a vision of material continuity from the atom to the mind. 
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Fig. 3 Gesell and Amatruda Hierarchical Continuum192 
Ruyer’s concept of form gave philosophical justification for this post-Comtean vision of 
continuity. 
 While he was critical of the sciences for focusing less on these forms, which were 
finalist, than on aggregates, which were not, Ruyer nevertheless believed that science and 
metaphysics were compatible, not strictly opposed modes of understanding.  In an essay 
published the same year as Néo-Finalism, “Le Problème de l’information et la cybernétique,” 
he called for a truce between the two.  “Instead of debating, in absolute terms, the legitimacy 
and meaning of a metaphysics beyond science, it would be good to outline a more modest 
kind of metaphysics, which would be a kind of cosmology of knowledge beyond the 
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observable.”193  Embryology had led Ruyer not only to materialism and finalism, but towards 
a “modest” metaphysics that refrained from challenging science.  This rapprochement 
between science and metaphysics and the accompanying move away from humanism would 
be repeated soon afterwards by Merleau-Ponty, (see Chapter 4). 
 Ruyer now rejected the humanism of La Conscience et le corps.  In that work, as the 
reader will recall, Ruyer described life as a kind of surfacing, or affleurement, analogous to a 
geological formation.  Now in 1966 he criticized the humanist tendency to explain human 
freedom along similar lines, writing, “The humanism of Feuerbach and of Marx, like that of 
existentialist humanism, for which human liberty is an absolute upsurge [surgissement], is the 
by-product of an outdated mechanist science and an archaic concept of matter, in which are 
attributed characteristics actually derived from the behavior of masses of molecules observed 
by common knowledge and studied by classical physics.”194  This mechanist line of thought 
was an estrangement of man from the universe.  “According to this false perspective,” he 
wrote, “man is as foreign to the universe as Mona Lisa’s smile is to the alpine rock formations 
at the base of which she stands.”195  If humanist philosophy required estrangement, Ruyer’s 
neo-materialist finalism emphasized the unity of man and nature. 
 For Ruyer, embryology had revealed a fundamental isomorphism between 
consciousness and biological life.  This meant not only that embryogenesis could be 
understood through the concept of memory, but also that material life and consciousness were 
no longer at odds or in need of reconciliation.  In creating a philosophy of forms as absolute 
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surfaces, Ruyer brought organism and consciousness under the same umbrella of finalism.  
Ruyer’s trajectory illustrates how biology refigured philosophical problems in mid-twentieth 
century France.  As he wrote in 1955, “The philosophical problems of knowledge, 
consciousness, action, form and development, creativity, dynamism, individuality, norm and 
value, communication, meaning, freedmen, and even space and time, are essentially 
biological problems.”196  As the following two chapters demonstrate, Ruyer was not alone in 
believing that philosophical problems were “essentially biological.”  Both Canguilhem and 
Merleau-Ponty believed this to be the case, though the nature of the “biological” itself was of 
course also at stake.  
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 In the Introduction to his 1952 La Connaissance de la vie, Georges Canguilhem wrote, 
“We suspect that, to do mathematics, it would suffice that we be angels. But to do biology, 
even with the aid of intelligence, we sometimes need to feel like beasts ourselves.”197  While 
there was both a pun (in French bête can mean both stupid and beast) and a degree of 
romantic flourish in this statement, it also captured one of the primary impulses behind 
Canguilhem’s oeuvre.  For Canguilhem, the central problem in the history of life sciences was 
whether and to what degree living beings could be scientifically known.  As he understood, 
the perennial impulse towards vitalism came from the intuition that there was a contradiction 
between the fact of science—in other words that there seem to exist knowing minds—and the 
claims of that science to explain those minds as a phenomenon of natural laws.  While 
Canguilhem saw no place for traditional vitalism, such as that of the Montpellier school, he 
nevertheless believed that as it stood modern science had no adequate explanation for the 
phenomenon of life.  The laws of physics and chemistry were treated as doctrine, and 
scientists either reduced life to an epiphenomenon of chemistry or they resorted to crytpo-
vitalism, setting life apart from the world and treating living beings as “zones of dissidence, 
or foyers of heresy.”198 
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 And yet this man whose work Michel Foucault described as “austere” was nevertheless 
deeply committed to a philosophy of life that was vitalist.199  Rather than setting life apart, 
Canguilhem, at least in his earlier work, elaborated a philosophy that attempted to 
universalize life as the ground for all knowledge, whether scientific or historical.  
Canguilhem’s early philosophical project was grounded in an understanding of life as 
normative, or law-making.  Life therefore had a special relationship with history, reflected in 
Canguilhem’s early work on the history of biology. Only in the nineteen fifties did he begin 
reading contemporary biological research, a fact about which he expressed some 
embarrassment when he met the molecular biologist François Jacob in the sixties.200   
 In what follows I will argue that while Canguilhem’s earliest publications were critical 
of vitalism, once he began his medical training he quickly moved towards the philosophy he 
had earlier criticized.  I will then examine the content of his vitalist philosophy in the forties, 
arguing that it was more radical than earlier vitalist traditions.  Finally, I contend that once 
Canguilhem began engaging directly with contemporary biology, his vitalism began to fall 
away.  Though he did not renounce his old positions—in fact he seems to have felt his 
philosophy to be consistent with the discoveries of genetics and molecular biology—he in fact 
moved away from both humanism and vitalism.  After the molecular turn and the discovery of 
the structure of DNA, Canguilhem came to see life not as law-giving but as a structure for the 
transmission of meaning, or information, and approach epistemology lost its humanist 
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aspirations.  As I will argue, through the nineteen fifties Canguilhem’s philosophy and 
epistemology of history were grounded in a conception of the human individual as a source of 
meaning, but after he revised his concept of life in light of molecular biology and DNA, his 
epistemology of history moved away from a humanist grounding and towards a structural 
concept of information.  Not only does this argument offer a new interpretation of 
Canguilhem’s oeuvre as a whole, it also helps situate Canguilhem within the context of a the 
widespread interest in biology among French philosophers in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century.  Although Canguilhem’s theoretical interests were not primarily in the 
philosophy of history, he is nevertheless very much a part of the story of biology and the 
philosophy of history in France.  He approached epistemology as a central task of humanism, 
and remained committed throughout his career to what we might now call “the politics of 
knowledge.”  Moreover, in addition to informing and inspiring Foucault’s archeological 
method, Canguilhem has more recently come into the purview of American historians of 
science.201 
 Interpretation of Canguilhem’s oeuvre has been shaped, and I would argue distorted, by 
the extraordinary impact of his thought on an entire generation of thinkers.  Perhaps as a result 
of the fact that he is largely known through a Foucauldian lens—most readers encounter him 
as a “predecessor” to his famous student—much of the attention to Canguilhem is focused on 
his epistemology in isolation from his humanism and vitalism, commitments that Foucault did 
not share.  But Canguilhem’s philosophical commitments were inseparable from his 
methodology, which became clear when his approach to history changed in light of his new 
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conception of life in the sixties.  It is therefore crucial to understand the trajectory of his 
complicated relationship with biology.   
 For the most part Canguilhem is remembered primarily as a conceptual historian and an 
epistemologist, and much less so as a radical philosopher of the living. Canguilhem was a 
hugely influential teacher who made his mark on many of the most significant French 
philosophers of twentieth century. As Foucault wrote,  
take away Canguilhem and you will no longer understand much about Althusser, 
Althusserism and a whole series of discussions which have taken place among French 
Marxists; you will no longer grasp what is specific to sociologists such as Bourdieu, 
Castel, Passerson and what marks them so strongly within sociology; you will miss an 
entire aspect of the theoretical work done by psychoanalysts, particularly by the 
followers of Lacan.202  
 
This could just as easily be applied to Foucault himself.  Take away Canguilhem, and you will 
no longer understand much about epistemes.  Recently Canguilhem has been celebrated as 
key figure in the development of historical epistemology, an approach to the study of 
knowledge that, thanks in large part to Foucault, has shaped some significant contemporary 
approaches to the history of science.203  
 Canguilhem entered the École normale supérieure in 1924, the same year as Aron, along 
with Sartre and Nizan.  Friends during their time at the ENS, Aron and Canguilhem remained 
in touch in the thirties.  During that time, Aron personally sent Canguilhem his La Sociologie 
allemande contemporaine, which Canguilhem later reviewed for the journal Europe.204   As 
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Canguilhem confessed to his friend, he had known little of Max Weber, and therefore found 
Aron’s book especially informative.205  At that time, Canguilhem was teaching at the Lycée 
de Bézier in the south of France, and had not yet begun his medical studies.  In 1938, while 
teaching at a lycée in Toulouse he read Aron’s Introduction à la philosophie d’histoire, which 
had been published that year. In notes from that time, he referred to his friend’s work as he 
attempted to outline the distinction between natural law and history.  He began by stating that 
law did not exist in itself, but was a product of the relationship between thought and nature.206  
Law required judgment, but the nature of the judgment in each case had to be different.  He 
then distinguished between history and science, writing that whereas history was temporal 
and future oriented, science was intemporal and aimed at the eternal.207  History, he wrote, 
involved “events, singularity, change, concrete,” whereas science concerned “fact, repetition, 
constancy, abstract.”208  It appears that Aron’s dissertation helped set the terms for 
Canguilhem’s thinking about the relationship between scientific and historical understanding. 
 For Aron, as we have seen, biology was the road not taken.  He had arrived at this 
crossroads in 1930, and it was to a large degree the political climate of that time that pushed 
him into other fields.  In his Memoirs he wrote that, “taking as a model and a foundation for 
existence the attitude of the scientists in his laboratory left me unsatisfied.  The scientist 
practices the ethics of the scientist only in his laboratory…A fortoriori, the man in each of us 
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is not a scientist.”209  For Aron, biological epistemology was ultimately circumscribed by the 
space of the laboratory.  Science was self-contained; it did not adequately address the world 
beyond itself.  Crucially, this was not the case for Canguilhem, who was interested in the 
connection between human values and scientific practices.  As we saw in Chapter 1, Aron 
turned instead to the philosophy of history, which he hoped could demonstrate the possibility 
of universal knowledge.  Though Aron would occasionally mention genetics in his later work, 
he never returned to the study of biology after the nineteen-thirties.   
 That Canguilhem was in touch with Aron in the nineteen thirties is significant in part 
because while he, unlike Aron, eventually approached biology through medicine, the 
biological epistemology that he developed in the nineteen forties had echoes of Aron’s 
existential approach to history.  Like many French philosophers in the rationalist tradition, 
Canguilhem never embraced German phenomenology.  It is impossible that Canguilhem was 
unaware of Heidegger’s work, and yet he never so much as mentions the latter’s revolutionary 
critique of metaphysics.  Yet despite his avoidance, Canguilhem’s reading of Aron’s 
Introduction seems to have provided him with the tools of ontological phenomenology 
without the political baggage of direct engagement.  Canguilhem would have had little 
patience for Heidegger’s specific critique of technology.210  Nevertheless, Canguilhem’s 
solution to Cartesian dualism bore the mark of the ontological philosophy that had 
transformed the thought of a generation of young intellectuals. 
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 This was particularly apparent in his 1947 essay, “Aspects of Vitalism,” in which 
Canguilhem argued that both materialism and vitalism were dualisms.  Vitalism, he argued, 
fundamentally accepts the universe as governed by natural law, and simply carves out a space 
for the living that constitutes an exception to these laws. 
Therein lies, in our opinion, the philosophically inexcusable fault. There cannot be an 
empire within an empire without there being no longer any empire, neither as 
container nor as contents. There can be only one philosophy of empire, that which 
refuses any division: imperialism. The imperialism of physicists or chemists is thus 
perfectly logical, pushing to its limit the expansion of logic or the logic of expansion. 
One cannot defend the originality of the biological phenomenon, and consequently the 
originality of biology, by demarcating within the physico-chemical territory—that is, 
within the milieu of inertia, of externally determined movements—enclaves of 
indetermination, zones of dissidence, or foyers of heresy.211 
 
The laws of physics and chemistry describe reciprocal relations between objects, but the 
biological must always be an “absolute center.”212  It was this ontological argument that laid 
the groundwork for his epistemological claims about the specificity of biology.  The 
overwhelming focus on epistemology in the reception of Canguilhem’s work has tended to 
obscure, if not completely efface, this ontological valence of his philosophy of the living. 
 In what was arguably the high point of his vitalism, Canguilhem suggested that 
biological epistemology, unlike other forms of knowing, was tied to the ontic state of being an 
organism.  The line quoted at the opening of this chapter bears repeating here, as it gestures 
wonderfully to the overall argument Canguilhem was elaborating during the forties.  “[T]o do 
biology,” he wrote, “even with the aid of intelligence, we sometimes need to feel like beasts 
ourselves.”213  Knowing life was inseparable from being alive, and was in fact part of the 
                                                
211 Canguilhem, Knowledge of Life, 70. 
212 Ibid., 70. 
213 Ibid., xx. 
 
88 
process of living.  Even the title of his book, Knowledge of Life, gestured at the necessary 
relationship between biological knowledge and being biological.  Knowledge of life is both 
knowledge about life and knowledge that belongs exclusively to life. 
 However, Canguilhem did not begin his philosophical career as a vitalist.  In fact, far 
from it.  Before beginning medical school in the late nineteen-thirties, if he had any particular 
stake in biology, it was as an interested outsider, critical of “confusion” caused by Bergons’s 
Creative Evolution and of the Montpellier school of vitalism.214  After passing his 
aggrégation in 1927 and completing his mandatory eighteen months of military service, he 
spent the next few years teaching philosophy in various provincial lycées.  During this time he 
published reviews and commentary in Libre Propos, the journal of his old mentor, Alain.  In 
this period Canguilhem was faithful to his teacher’s pacifism and also to his strict distinction 
between mind and body.215  Later he revised both positions, in the former case in response to 
the reality of the threat that Hitler posed, and in the latter case, as we shall see, after receiving 
medical training.  Many of Canguilhem’s contributions to Libre Propos were on the subject of 
pacifism, including pieces that he signed C.-G Bernard.216  That pseudonym, a reference to 
the nineteenth-century physiologist Claude Bernard, was certainly an indication of his interest 
in biology, but he wrote only intermittently on the subject. He read journals like Revue 
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générale des Sciences, and was somewhat informed, if not invested, in the debates around 
neo-transformism.   
 Canguilhem’s interest in biology and the living could be seen as early as the late 
nineteen-twenties.217  Before his medical training in the mid-thirties, he was a harsh critic of 
vitalism and finalism.  In 1929, he published a review of René Allendy’s Orientation des 
idées medicales (1929), “À la gloire d’hippocrate, père du tempérament,” in Libre Propos.218  
Allendy was a doctor and a homeopath who in 1926 had been a cofounder of the Paris Société 
psychanalytique.  In Orientation des idées medicales, he had advocated for a “synthetic” 
rather than an “analytic” approach to medicine, arguing that, “the science of medicine 
absolutely does not exist.”219   Analytic medicine treated humans as assemblages of parts, and 
in doing so failed to treat the mind as part of the body.  Because humans lived not only as 
animals, but also inseparably as minds, medicine could not succeed, Allendy believed, 
without addressing itself to both.  For Allendy, medicine fell short of being a science because 
it could not be practiced in the absence of some kind of theory, by necessity speculative, 
about the nature of life.  Unlike chemists, who could work without “speculations on the 
essence of matter,” doctors based their choice of intervention on a “certain representation of 
illness and of its mechanism.”220  As Allendy wrote, 
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The acquisitions of medical science, specks of multiple and disparate facts, are too far 
apart, too fragmented for a synthesis to be possible through scientific advancement—
as is evident in the complete absence of unity in the practice of different specialists 
faced with the same case.  Medicine therefore remains an interpretation, an art, in 
which intuition must play a considerable role to supplement the conclusive 
connections that escape us between the different aspects of life.221 
 
Psychoanalysis, Allendy proposed, could provide the interpretive framework necessary to 
overcome the failure of medicine to “seek the soul above the brain.”222 
 As Dominique Lecourt has pointed out, Allendy’s understanding of medicine had much 
in common with Canguilhem’s perspective in The Normal and the Pathological.223  In 1929, 
however, Canguilhem was primarily suspicious Allendy’s psychological approach to 
medicine.  As Canguilhem summarized, for Allendy, “the human body is doubly 
individualized; it is a living being, and it is so just like any animal; but [it lives] also as—and 
how much more!—a human, which is to say as inseparable from a mind, a personality.”224  
Canguilhem’s critique of Allendy was telling, suggesting that the latter’s method did not fit 
with his professed aims.  While he advocated treating the patient as a whole individual, 
Allendy’s method of searching for “the soul above brain,” was, according the Canguilhem, at 
its core Cartesian.  Canguilhem also pointed out that Allendy’s antipathy towards doctors 
echoed August Comte’s complaint about doctors, which was that, “Basically, they study only 
the animal in us and not the human…Our alleged doctors are in reality nothing but 
veterinarians, but more crude than they are right now, at least in France, and therefore even 
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less able to heal animals than men.”225   Moreover, Allendy’s solution was to bring Freudian 
analysis into medical practice.  While Canguilhem agreed with Allendy’s humanist critique of 
analytic medicine and his call to treat the human as an individual whole, he worried that the 
psychoanalytic method was not sufficiently scientific, allowing doctors to introduce a new 
level of uncertainty, however unintentionally, ask leadings questions, hinting to their patients 
what they already believed to be true. 
 Thus already in 1929 Canguilhem was drawn to holist biology while at the same time 
critical of its tendency towards both irrationalism and vitalism.  We can see more evidence of 
his critical approach in a 1930 review of  Louis Vialleton’s 1929 L’origine des êtres vivants. 
L’illusion transformiste, entitled “The rebirth of vitalism?”.226  Vialleton (1859-1929), a 
professor of comparative anatomy at the Faculté de Médecine de Montpellier, had devoted 
much of his career to criticizing the failures of transformism in France.  L’orgine des êtres 
vivants was his final, most sustained attempt.227  Vialleton argued that transformism was 
“essentially a mechanist doctrine that claims to pull the living world out of the play of blind, 
undirected forces, the order found in nature as the secondary result of the elimination of the 
unfit.”228  Canguilhem was amused to find in L’orgine des êtres vivants this remnant of the 
vitalism invented two centuries earlier in the same city in which Vialleton now taught 
medicine.  Despite Vialleton’s protestations to the contrary, Canguilhem accused him of 
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“reincarnating Barthez,” the famous eighteenth-century Montpellian doctor and inventor of 
the idea of the “vital force.”  By arguing that life must be seen as “discontinuous with the rest 
of nature,” Vialleton undermined his own profession of faith in determinism.229 
 Canguilhem’s review took up the tension between vitalism and materialism, a theme he 
would return to throughout his philosophical career.  Drawing a connection, if somewhat 
ironically, between this tension in Vialleton’s work and the methodological concerns of the 
history of science, Canguilhem’s review suggested that Vialleton’s failures as a critic might 
be traced to his crypto-vitalism. Vialleton’s argument, Canguilhem wrote, “is a case of 
intellectual fixism and the permanence of type.”230  He wryly continued: “The true 
achievement would be to turn the explanation of the doctrine to the confusion of the doctrine 
itself, by relating this frame of mind to the Montpellian milieu, in the biological way of 
Lamarck and the materialist way of Marx.”231  That a twentieth-century doctor from 
Montpellier should make an argument against environmental determinism that, in 
Canguilhem’s view, ultimately came down to a mystical form of vitalism, was too ironic to 
pass over in silence.  Canguilhem’s joke suggested that perhaps Vialleton himself was more 
influenced by his environment than he knew. 
 L’origine des êtres vivants, Vialleton’s final work before his death in 1929, was aimed 
at “definitively dissipating the illusion” of transformism, as Canguilhem put it.232  Although 
Canguilhem too was critical of many of the tendencies of the neo-transformist tradition in 
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biology, he found Vialleton’s argument lacking.  Canguilhem argued that Vialleton’s critique 
of transformism relied too heavily on a straw man, arguing against some kind of transformism 
to be sure, but having little bearing on actual transformist science.  For one, his argument 
relied primarily on skeletal morphology when, as Canguilhem pointed out, contemporary 
transformist arguments were concerned above all with physiology.  Furthermore, Vialleton 
wanted “at all costs” to link the question of transformism with the origin of life, arguing that 
because the neo-transformists had no account of the latter their theory must be wrong.   Citing 
a 1930 article by Lucien Cuénot, who was one of the earliest French biologists to accept 
Mendelism and Darwinism, Canguilhem argued that these questions ought to remain separate, 
and since neither Darwin nor the transformists had an account of creation, the question was 
beside the point.233 
 Concluding his review of L’origine des Êtres vivants, Canguilhem summarized the 
meaning of transformism:  
Transformism is a hypothesis that connects living beings to one another and to their 
environment.  As Auguste Compte said, to explain is to connect. Transformism is in 
the strong sense of the word an explanation of living beings because it constructs, with 
regard to organisms, spatial relations and temporal series. That which is connected and 
ordered is thus understood.234 
 
 For Canguilhem, scientific knowledge was produced by acts of arrangement.  Life was 
mapped onto space and into time and thereby rendered knowable.  The paradox of the 
historical status of this theory was illustrated, for Canguilhem, by the fact that it was Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin, a Jesuit, who had provided its clearest enunciation to date.  De Chardin 
had written that “to scientifically know something (whether a being or a phenomenon) is to 
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situate it in a physical system of temporal antecedents and spatial relationships…Until the 
appearance of the evolutionary point of view, natural history could not really be a science.”235  
For Canguilhem, this left the real problem unsolved.  The question remained, he wrote, 
“whether there is anything contained in life that authorizes an understanding other than that 
[outlined by de Chardin,] or whether renouncing this mode of understanding is not a 
renunciation of understanding altogether.”236  If one rejected the mysticism of vitalism as well 
as religion, was life knowable in any way that did not reduce it to spacio-temporal extension?  
Canguilhem did not yet have a definitive answer, but this question later animated his seminal 
Knowledge of Life (1952). 
 Though written in 1929, over a decade before he developed his own radical 
epistemology, Canguilhem’s review of Vialleton prefigured some of his later claims about the 
distinctions between forms of knowing.  After dispensing with Vialleton’s critique of 
transformism, Canguilhem put forward his own.  The scientific theory of transformism was 
badly supported, he argued, in part because of a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
relationship between science and philosophy.  Here Canguilhem alluded to Félix Le Dantec, a 
neo-transformist who, in addition to inspiring Maurice Caullery’s claim that evolution was 
coming to an end, as we saw in Chapter 1, had advocated a firm scientism in his 1912 Contre 
la métaphysique. questions de méthode.  In that work he had stated, “For me, as an 
enthusiastic scientist, in the twentieth century the word philosophy should no longer have a 
separate definition from science; the conquests of the scientific method are such in our time 
that we must expect everything from [this method]…outside of science, one cannot hope to 
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build an edifice that has any chance of lasting!”237  These sorts of claims did not sit well with 
Canguilhem, who warned that transformist scientists had failed “to resist the temptation to 
articulate a philosophy that is not just aligned with his science, but is his science itself.”238   
The conflation of science and philosophy was a fundamental misunderstanding of knowledge.  
While Canguilhem did not elaborate at the time, the specificity of epistemology would 
become absolutely central to his own philosophy of the living in the forties and fifties.  In 
fact, one of the central aims of Knowledge of Life would be to challenge the universality of 
precisely the kind of scientism Le Dantec had advocated. 
 As is clear from these early book reviews, to the degree that Canguilhem was interested 
in biology and life before his medical training, it was primarily as a critic of the tendencies 
towards vitalism and psychology.  While his criticism of scientism foreshadowed some of his 
later positions, it remained largely undeveloped. This changed, however, once he began his 
medical studies.  In October 1936 Canguilhem was appointed professor to the classe de 
khâgne at a lycée in Toulouse and it was during this time that he began studying medicine.  In 
1940 he resigned from his lycée post, refusing to teach under the Vichy Regime.  He took up 
full-time medical studies, completing his dissertation in 1943.  This work, Essai sur quelques 
problèmes concernant le normale et le pathologique, remains Canguilhem’s best known 
outside of France. 
 In his 1943 introduction to The Normal and the Pathological, Canguilhem explained 
what had drawn him to medicine ten years into a career in philosophy.   
Medicine seemed to us and still seems to us like a technique or art at the crossroads of 
several sciences, rather than, strictly speaking, like one science. It seemed to us that 
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the two problems which concerned us, that of the relations between science and 
technology, and that of norms and the normal, had to profit from a direct medical 
education for their precise position and clarification. In applying to medicine a spirit 
which we would like to be able to call “unprejudiced,” it seemed to us that, despite so 
many laudable efforts to introduce methods of scientific rationalization, the essential 
lay in the clinic and therapeutics, that is, in a technique of establishing or restoring the 
normal which cannot be reduced entirely and simply to a single form of knowledge239 
 
Canguilhem saw medicine as a way to approach knowledge that resisted immediate reduction.  
The centrality of the clinical situation, with the presence of both the patient and the doctor, 
provided an epistemic friction that appealed to him.  “Certainly pathology,” he wrote,  “is 
correct in suspecting and rectifying the opinion of the sick man who, because he feels 
different, thinks he also knows in what and how he is different.”240  One might doubt the 
patient’s knowledge of the “what and how,” but with regard to the experience of illness he is 
always the only authoritative source.  Canguilhem went further, suggesting that the fact that 
patients often do have interpretations of their symptoms should be taken seriously. “Perhaps 
[the sick man’s] feeling is the foreshadowing of what contemporary pathology is just 
beginning to see, namely that the pathological state is not a simple, quantitatively varied 
extension of the physiological state, but something else entirely.”241  Medicine had for too 
long ignored the factual, if qualitative, experience of the patient.  
 For Canguilhem, medicine was a humanism.  He argued that the only way to distinguish 
the normal from the pathological was “at the level of organic totality, and when it concerns 
man, at the level of conscious individual totality, where disease becomes a kind of evil...”242  
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In the clinical context, the pathologist can only recognize illness based on the patient’s 
interpretation of his experiences as an “evil.”  René Leriche, a famous surgeon in France at 
the time, had argued that health was “life lived in the silence of the organs,” whereas disease 
“irritates men” and “makes them suffer.”243  For Leriche, health was a kind of unawareness, a 
numb unity of body and mind.   
 Canguilhem agreed with Lariche’s approach a degree, writing that, “It is life itself and 
not medical judgment which makes the biological normal a concept of value and not a 
concept of statistical reality.”244  Illness was not a product of medical judgment but an 
experience of the living.  However, Canguilehm did not accept Leriche’s definition of health.  
“If health is life in the silence of the organs, then, strictly speaking, there is no science of 
health. Health is organic innocence.”245  As argued argued in The Normal and the 
Pathological, health was neither normality nor silence, but rather the capacity to make new 
norms.   
 This concept of health as the capacity to make norms was in stark contrast to nineteenth-
century medicine, which had ascribed to an ontological understanding of pathology, equating 
illness with the existence of Evil in the world.  Modern medicine had taken a different 
approach, treating illness as a merely quantitative deviation from a state called health.  
Following Kurt Goldstein—whose work on brain injured patients after the First World War 
had shown how patients were able to cope with trauma through a narrowing of their 
environments, a shrinking of the sphere of action, and who had therefore argued that the brain 
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must be understood as a whole, capable of compensating for localized injuries—Canguilhem 
asserted that “health is the possibility of transcending the norm, …of tolerating infractions of 
the habitual norm and instituting new norms in new situations.”246  This definition of health 
and illness resisted the pitfalls of  both previous modern definitions.  It did not call for a 
“magical or mystical” therapeutics, but neither did it ignore the experience of the organism. 
“For the living being life is not a monotonous deduction, a rectilinear movement, it ignores 
geometrical rigidity, it is discussion or explanation (what Goldstein calls Auseinandersetzung) 
with an environment where there are leaks, holes, escapes, and unexpected 
resistances….Science explains experience but it does not for all that annul it.”247  In 
Goldstein’s medicine, Canguilhem had found a science that could accommodate the epistemic 
friction between the scientist and a living object of knowledge. 
 In the Conclusion of The Normal and the Pathological, Canguilhem gestured at the 
relationship between his study of the idea of pathology in medicine and the broader question 
of the specificity of life: “If biological norms exist it is because life, as not only subject to the 
environment but also as an institution of its own environment, thereby posits values not only 
in the environment but also in the organism itself. This is what we call biological 
normativity.”248  The claim that life instituted its own environment went directly to his 
critique of transformism, the germ of which he had expressed in his review of Vialleton’s 
work ten years before.  Determinism was incompatible with an understanding of the living not 
because life escapes understanding, but because the living, in this case the patient in the 
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clinic, always had something to say about its own condition.  Canguilhem would continue this 
line of argument, in much more radical form, in a series of lectures a few years after he 
completed his dissertation. 
 Thus between Canguilhem’s earliest publications in the thirties and the completion of 
his medical dissertation in 1943, Canguilhem’s thought had moved towards something more 
compatible with vitalism.  While he would not have embraced this label, he was certainly no 
longer supporting a mechanical understanding of the body.  His medical epistemology 
positioned the human individual as the source of meaning, describing a clinical knowledge 
that emerged out of an encounter between two individuals, two centers of meaning.  
Canguilhem’s vitalist works in the mid-forties were informed by this medical humanism.  
Once he began to delve more deeply into contemporary biology, but his vitalism and his 
humanism became more ambiguous. 
 Throughout the forties, Canguilhem was also interested in the relationship between 
life and history.  As mentioned above, had read Aron in 1938, reflecting on the differences 
between history (“events, singularity, change, concrete”) and science (“fact, repetition, 
constancy, abstract”).  His teaching notes from the early forties, when was teaching at the 
University of Strasbourg Clermont-Ferrand, reveal a deepening interest in questions of 
historical method, and in particular the relationship between the epistemology of natural 
history and the epistemology of biology. “Natural history considers the living being as a 
typical form, stable, closed on itself and in relation to the environment [milieu] in which is 
was placed…” By contrast, “Biology considers the living to be the product of chronological 
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events and topographical conditions in the environment [environnement].”249  What set 
biology apart from natural history was its desire to be more than descriptive.250  Natural 
history’s aspirations to completeness—its desire to be an exhaustive account of life on 
earth—was in fact what constituted its limit.251 
 Between February and May of 1947, Canguilhem delivered three lectures at Jean 
Wahl’s Collège Philosophique in Paris: “Aspects of Vitalism,” “Machine and Organism,” and 
“The Living and its Milieu.”  “Aspects of Vitalism” was primarily a defense of biology 
against the encroachment of physics and chemistry.  In particular, it was an attempt to grant 
the category of life epistemological priority.  Canguilhem asked, “Is vitalism nothing more 
than the transposition of the limits of mechanism and the physico-chemical explication of life 
into dogmatic interdicts?”252  In other words, does vitalism simply point to the limits of our 
knowledge of life?  Given enough time would not scientists be able to “explain life without 
life”?253  Canguilhem’s answer to these questions was resoundingly negative.  And yet the 
history of vitalism, and one could argue all vitalism before Canguilhem’s, had lent itself to 
this kind of attack by the physical sciences. 
In “Aspects of Vitalism,” Canguilhem began by suggesting that vitalism’s longevity—
its persistence as a theory of life—was enough to require that we take it seriously.  Even in 
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the face of the massive explosion of scientific knowledge about organisms, the tendency 
towards vitalist explanations of life did not go away.  Canguilhem argued that the roots of 
twentieth-century vitalism were to be found in the eighteenth century.  While vitalism owed a 
debt to Aristotelianism, it was essentially true to the “spirit of Hippocratism.”254  It was the 
“expression of a distrust, shall we say an instinctive one, of the power of technique over 
life.”255  In other words, it was an insistence on the reality of the experience of the living.  
Canguilhem was of course also invested in asserting this reality, and had done so, as we have 
seen, with great force in The Normal and the Pathological.  Now, just a few years later, he 
went so far as to argue that this need to recognize experience as real was what gave vitalism 
its explanatory power and made it so difficult to overcome.256   He wrote, “vitalism translates 
a permanent exigency of life in the living, self-identity of life immanent to the living.”257  
Vitalism was, according to Canguilehm, the expression of a permanent need.  Perhaps as a 
consequence of the depth of this need, vitalism had gone under-examined for centuries.  For 
Canguilhem, the impulse expressed in vitalist thought was so entirely central to the 
experience of being alive that it had made analysis difficult. 
Early vitalism, according to Canguilhem, had been inspired by a desire for raw vision.  
“[The] vitalist’s eye,” he wrote, “seeks a certain naïve vision of things, a pretechnological and 
prelogical vision, a vision of life anterior to tools and language, that is, to instruments created 
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by man and consolidated to it.”258  This desire for naïve vision proved to be the fatal weakness 
of vitalism when it came to be faced with modern science.  The classical vitalist “accepts the 
insertion of the living organism into a physical milieu to whose laws it constitutes an 
exception.  Therein lies, in our opinion, the philosophically inexcusable fault.”259  Here, 
interestingly, Canguilhem turned to metaphors of political space.  Physicists and chemists are 
fundamentally imperialists defending their empire (Canguilhem lumped them together, to the 
chagrin, undoubtedly, of many), and the logic of imperialism precludes a space within a 
space, an empire of biology within the empire of physics and chemistry.  Biology cannot 
constitute itself as an “exception” and remain territorially sound.  Canguilhem wrote: “One 
cannot defend the originality of the biological phenomenon, and consequently the originality 
of biology, by demarcating within the physic-chemical territory—that is, within the milieu of 
inertia, of externally determined movements—enclaves of indetermination, zones of 
dissidence, or foyers of heresy.”260  Thus, the “sin” of classical vitalism was its modesty, its 
“reluctance to universalize its conception of experience.”261  
Canguilhem concluded that mechanism had to be placed back within its context, 
namely life.  Physics and chemistry must operate within the milieu of life and not the reverse.  
As an activity of the living, science belonged to the living, was of the living.262  Canguilhem 
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thereby inverted the relationship between natural law and life, arguing for the epistemological 
priority of the living.  Life had the capacity to know law and itself.  The worlds of physics and 
chemistry were governed by the logic of life. 
Canguilhem’s argument proceeded through a series of inversions, the first of which 
was to flip the usual relationship between the organism and the machine.  In “Machine and 
Organism” he performed another epistemic reversal, but this time on Cartesian dualism.  
According to Ian Hacking, in this essay Canguilhem deserves credit for a crucial new insight, 
namely for seeing “how central to Descartes was the idea that animals are machines.”263    
“[Almost] always,” wrote Canguilhem, “the attempt has been to explain the structure and 
function of the organism on the basis of the structure and function of an already-constructed 
machine.”264  Instead, he argued, it was necessary to see how the machine had been 
historically constructed and modeled on the organism. 
In order to uncover this priority of the organism, Canguilhem revisited the relationship 
between technique and science.  Again, he performed an inversion.  He argued that 
knowledge was not anterior, chronologically or logically, to its application.  Canguilhem 
turned to the history of automata to explain how it was possible for machines to become the 
model for understanding the organism.  A forgetting had to take place.  “It is [the] interval 
between the storing up and the release of energy by the mechanism that allows one to forget 
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the relationship between the mechanism’s effects and the action of a living being.”265  This 
moment of forgetting  stood as synecdoche for the deeper forgetting at play in historical time. 
Canguilhem argued that the question that had to be remembered was how these 
automata came into existence in the first place.  He turned to Descartes’ handling of this 
question in his Traité de l’homme (1662/1664).  Canguilhem’s “naïve” reading of the 
beginning of that text revealed that even God, in Descartes story, had to model his automata 
after living men.266  Even in Descartes, “[the] model of the living machine is the living itself.” 
Canguilhem concluded:  “The theory of the animal-machine would thus be to life what 
axiomatics is to geometry—that is to say, merely a rational reconstruction, which ignores only 
by means of a feint the existence of what it represents and the anteriority of production over 
rational legitimization.”  The267 reversal of the Cartesian relationship between animal and 
machine was now complete. 
 And yet, it was not enough to show that the organism was prior to the machine, both 
logically and historically.  Canguilhem further insisted that one had to understand technique, 
or machine-making, as a “universal biological phenomenon.”268  It was here that 
Canguilhem’s biology became far more radical than mere anti-Cartesianism.  Descartes had 
been reversed, the organic was prior to the mechanical, but now Canguilhem called for an 
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inscription of “the mechanical within the organic.”269  In “Aspects of Vitalism” he had argued 
that biology not only needed its own epistemology, but that, in fact, it must encompass all 
other epistemologies.  Similarly in “Machine and Organism,” Canguilhem moved towards a 
universalization of the biological.  
 In “The Living and its Milieu,” Canguilhem continued his universalizing project, 
arguing for the priority of the organism over the milieu.  He began by tracing the history of 
the concept of the milieu to its origin in mechanics, noting that the milieu was not a question 
for Descartes since, for him, all physical action was collision and contact.  What Newton 
called “fluid,” Canguilhem called the first instance of the modern concept of the milieu.  
Newton had used the concept of fluid to explain how bodies interact at a distance.  
Canguilhem gave Newton credit for introducing the concept of milieu into biology, since with 
the ether/fluid he had sought to explain not only gravity but vision and the sensation of light.  
In any case, when Lamarck picked up the term “milieu,” he appeared to have gotten the 
concept from Newton.  As a result, Canguilhem wrote that in nineteenth-century biology, “it 
is in a purely mechanical sense that water is said to be a milieu for the fish that move about in 
it.”270 
  Canguilhem saw this mechanical concept of the milieu permeating biology. He cited 
as an example the French zoologist Louis Roule (1861-1942), who had written that, “fish do 
not lead their lives on their own; it is the river that makes them lead it; they are persons 
without personality.”271 For Canguilhem, this presented “an example of what a strictly 
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mechanist usage of the notion of milieu necessarily leads to.  We are brought back to the 
theory of animal-machines.”272  This critique in fact echoed Vialleton’s criticism of 
transformism in L’origine des êtres vivants, which Canguilhem had reviewed in 1929.  If the 
transformist claim that the milieu dominated and shaped the individual implied a mechanist 
understanding of the organism, a new theory of the milieu was required.  This was 
Canguilhem’s task. 
 The solution to this problem emerged only gradually in “The Living and its Milieu.”  
Early in the essay, in reference to Newton’s physical milieu, Canguilhem referred to the 
concept of the center.   
When we consider separately the body that receives an action transmitted by the 
milieu, we forget that a milieu is a medium, in between two centers, and we retain only 
its function as a centripetal transmitter, its position as that which surrounds a body.  In 
this way, milieu tends to lose its relative meaning and to take on that of an absolute, a 
reality in itself.273 
 
It was not that transformists, in applying the milieu to the organism, had distorted its meaning.  
Rather, the concept of milieu had contained from its inception a misdirection, this 
“forgetting” of the center.  Canguilhem argued that it was the absolute, decentered quality of 
the milieu—not the mechanical determinism, which reinscribed the animal-machine—that 
was the greatest threat to the integrity of the living.   
 This absolute milieu, Canguilhem argued, was simply a secularization of God’s 
omnipresence, and as such it left no space for the living.  As he wrote, 
Newtonian science, which was to underlie so many empiricist relativist professions of 
faith, is founded on metaphysics.  Its empiricism masks its theological foundations.  
And in this way, the natural philosophy at the origin of the positivist and mechanist 
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conception of the milieu is in fact itself supported by the mystical intuition of a sphere 
of energy whose central action is identically present and effective at all points.274 
When the milieu was understood through this “mystical intuition,” in fact theological 
argument about God’s presence at all points, the living was no longer a center of meaning or 
action. In this model life was, Canguilhem argued, reduced to a Newtonian point in space.  If 
the Newtonian concept of milieu erased the life at its center, Canguilhem’s goal was to render 
life anew, no longer as the isolated points surrounded by God(like) universality, but as the 
source of universality itself. 
 Here Canguilhem performed one final inversion, placing the living at the center not 
only epistemologically, as he had done in “Machine and Organism,” but even more 
fundamentally.  Life, he argued, was ontologically prior to the milieu, and therefore also to 
the world.  As he wrote, “the milieu proper to men is not situated within the universal milieu 
as contents in a container.  A center does not resolve into its environment.”275   Rather, the 
reverse was true.  The milieu belonged to life, and it was therefore life that was universal.  All 
of science and nature existed within the universal milieu of the living. 
 As illustrated by these three lectures, Canguilhem’s philosophy in the later nineteen 
forties was to some degree a continuation of his work in The Normal and the Pathological.   
But it was also a radicalization. Critical of classical vitalism’s impotence and lack of self-
consistency, Canguilhem proposed a universal epistemology of the living.  He did so via a 
series of conceptual histories —of vitalism, the animal machine, and the milieu—that treated 
life as the central category of philosophy.  
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 By now it should be clear that Canguilhem’s philosophy in the forties was in many 
ways more radical than traditional vitalism.  He took the concept of the milieu, first explored 
in the context of the medical subject, and argued that it was the means by which the living 
universalized itself.  Rather than merely defending “foyers of heresy” against the physico-
chemical inquisition, Canguilhem, to mix his metaphors, founded an empire of the living. 
 Like all empires do, however, Canguilhem’s vitalism eventually began to crumble.  In 
the nineteen-sixties, as he became more aware of the advances in contemporary biology, the 
borders between life and non-life began to blur.  Canguilhem did not move towards scientism 
- it was not that he began to believe that history or life were products of scientific law, or that 
he believed, as Le Dantec had half a century earlier, that science could absorb philosophy.  
Rather, as Canguilhem became acquainted with molecular biology and the significance of 
genetics and DNA, there was a shift in his understanding both of the organism itself and of 
the relationship between meaning and the living. 
 As we saw above, Canguilhem’s early epistemology was firmly rooted in the 
individual, whether the patient as in the case of The Normal and the Pathological, or the 
organism as an absolute center in as in Knowledge of Life.  DNA and the language of 
information that accompanied it changed all of this.  In course notes from 1965, Canguilhem 
considered the significance of entropy and information for the understanding of life.  Reading 
Erwin Schrödinger, he learned that information could be conceived of as reverse entropy.276  
Quoting Schrödinger, he wrote than “an organism feeds on negative entropy.”277  For the first 
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time in decades, Canguilhem was framing the organism in terms of physical laws.  Whereas 
Knowledge of Life elaborated on a concept of life that privileged the living as a center and a 
source of meaning and experience, in the sixties Canguilhem’s philosophy began to explore 
life as a a quantitative, thermodynamic phenomenon.  Perhaps ironically, this echoed an 
argument of Le Dantec, who had argued in La Stabilité de la vie. Étude énergétique de 
l’évolution des espèces (1910) that evolution was a kind of reverse entropy.   
 It was not the case, however, that Canguilhem discarded his entire previous 
philosophy of the living.  Even in the sixties he remained committed to the specificity of life 
on epistemological grounds.  In this period, biology, which had once been for Canguilhem a 
kind of self-knowledge, the knowledge of life, became a process of permanent questioning.  A 
question was a lack or a need, and because the living was in the special situation of having a 
permanent need, the living existed in a permanent state of questioning.  “The fact of life 
places the living in a permanent situation of conflict,” he wrote.278 This conflict was life’s 
battle against it’s opposite, “the non-living.”279  By the non-living Canguilhem meant both 
death and the material world.  Life must always face death, but it must also always defend 
itself against a hostile milieu.  
 This new definition of life, life as physical opposition, resistance to entropy, 
environmental threat, and death left little space for the role of the individual, for meaning, or 
for experience.  It also transformed the meaning of “life” in Canguilhem’s thought from a 
permanent condition of biological phenomena to a new invention of the modern period. 
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Following Foucault, Canguilhem conceded that life as such did not exist before the end of the 
seventeenth century.280  Of course it was not that organized beings had not existed, but rather 
that before biology emerged to investigate “the relationship between matter and life,” such 
beings were simply givens.281 As Canguilhem saw it, it was only in the in the wake the 
microscope, which revealed the scale of material complexity in the universe, and the 
emergence of polemical materialism in its wake, that life came to need a defense and a 
science of its own. 
 What is striking about these teaching notes from the sixties is that they reveal a new 
openness to understanding life in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry.  Canguilhem, it 
seems, had reversed his earlier claim that vitalism was a permanent need of the living.    
Considering life as as a kind of negative entropy, a quantitative phenomenon, would have 
been anathema to Canguilhem’s philosophy in the forties. As these notes reveal, life, for 
Canguilhem, was no longer an absolute source whose task was to universalize itself.  It was 
not even a source of epistemic friction, requiring science to accommodate pluralist 
epistemologies.  Life was merely a form of information, a localized negation of entropy 
within the universe.  As Canguilhem began to incorporate the language of genetics and 
information into his philosophy of the living, his philosophy of history also changed.  Events 
became moments of transmission, individuals mere conduits, and history itself was muted. 
 Canguilhem’s new method was at work in his brilliant 1966 essays, “Le concept et la 
vie,” in which he celebrated the recent transformations in biology.  “The science of life,” he 
wrote, “no longer resembles a portrait of life as it could when it consisted in the description 
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and classification of species: and it no longer resembles architecture or mechanics…But it 
does resemble grammar, semantics, and the theory of syntax. If we are to understand life, its 
message must be decoded…”282 This history of life was materially inscribed in matter. 
  In this essay, Canguilhem argued that, “to say heredity is the communication of a 
certain kind of information is, in a sense, to acknowledge that there is a logos inscribed, 
preserved and transmitted in living things.”283 Life had always sought to “transmit 
messages.”284 In writing this, Canguilhem suggested that Aristotle had himself intended a 
“message” with his philosophy of the relationship between logos and life.  In other words, 
Canguilhem did not understand this new concept of life as a break with his previous 
philosophy or with Aristotle. He now saw a consistent thread running from Aristotle to DNA. 
 Towards the end of the essay, Canguilhem suggested an approach to the history of life 
that entirely collapsed the philosophical distinction between evolution and history that Aron 
had worked so hard to establish, and to which Canguilhem himself had previously been 
committed. Genetics could explain evolution entirely, and history, he argued, was a matter of 
the production, transmission, and reception of information. “Knowledge, then,” he wrote, “is 
an anxious quest for the possible quantity of and variety of information.”285 In the nineteen-
forties Canguilhem had found natural history unsatisfying precisely because while it was an 
ambitious attempt to acquire knowledge, it lacked a theory of meaning. Biology and history 
had offered counterpoints. By equating evolution and history as well as knowledge in the 
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strong sense with the acquisition of facts, Canguilhem suggested that the philosophy of 
history was no longer an essentially humanist project requiring subjectivity and interpretation, 
but was instead an act of decoding. 
 Thus, between 1929 and 1966 Canguilhem’s philosophy of the living underwent two 
major transformations.  Before his medical training, he was highly critical of the vitalist 
tendencies in science, which he saw as a form of irrationalism.  During and after his medical 
training, first with The Normal and the Pathological and then Knowledge of Life, he 
elaborated an increasingly radical vitalist philosophy of his own.  In the sixties, as he 
absorbed and reflected upon the findings of genetics and molecular biology, he moved away 
from vitalism and towards a concept of life that was no longer entirely distinct from non-life.  
The “empire” of the living that Canguilhem had founded in the nineteen forties, in which 
human life as law giving had been central, dissolved into a sea of information with no center, 
human or otherwise. 
 
113 
From Marxist Totality to Global Vision: Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenological Natural History 
 
 On the august occasion of his inaugural lecture, “In Praise of Philosophy,” at the 
Collège de France, Maurice Merleau-Ponty reflected with unease on the condition of 
philosophy at the time.  It was 1953, and philosophy was in peril, at risk of “[evaporating] 
into nothing but clouds.”286  Between religion and history, permanence and contingency, the 
cosmic and the human, where did philosophy belong?  Unlike the theologian, declared 
Merleau-Ponty, “The philosopher does not say that a final transcendence of human 
contradictions may be possible, and that the complete man awaits us in the future.”287  In fact 
it was quite the opposite.  Undoubtedly referring to his own project, Merleau-Ponty insisted 
the the philosopher “does not place his hope in any destiny, even a favorable one, but in 
something belonging to us which is precisely not a destiny—in the contingency of our 
history.”288  If the denial of this contingency was an anti-philosophical position, an account of 
it was the principal task for thought. 
 Following this call to acknowledge contingency as that which “belongs” to human 
existence, Merleau-Ponty wondered whether philosophy was therefore by definition a kind of 
humanism.  “Must we then say that the philosopher is a humanist?,” he worried.289  To 
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anyone in the audience familiar with his work, his answer would have seemed rather curious.  
“No,” he declared, “if one understands by ‘man’ an explanatory principle which ought to be 
substituted for the others. One explains nothing by man, since he is not a force but a weakness 
at the heart of being, a cosmological factor, but also the place where all cosmological factors, 
by a mutation which is never finished, shift directions and become history.”290  While at the 
time this was a somewhat cryptic statement, in the years that followed Merleau-Ponty would 
explore the implications of his striking claim.  Abandoning man as an explanatory principle, 
Merleau-Ponty looked to biology for answers as he he began to develop a new approach to the 
philosophy of history. 
 Between 1956 and 1960 he gave a series of courses at the Collège de France in which he 
began to develop a philosophy of nature.291  We have only trace evidence of these lectures, in 
the form of an unknown student’s transcriptions and some of Merleau-Ponty’s own notes.  
Nevertheless from these notes a picture does begin to emerge.  By announcing that “one 
explains nothing by man” Merleau-Ponty had signaled a shift in his thinking, which had up to 
that time been operating in a quite explicitly humanist register, towards what I will call a 
phenomenological natural history.  This latter approach was informed directly by his 
developing concept of the organism as an organic whole that was not the product of its parts, 
but was actually the principle that gave rise to the articulation of the parts themselves. This 
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approach therefore also constituted a shift in focus away from the human sciences, in 
particular the Gestalt psychology that inspired Phenomenology of Perception, towards 
organismic and evolutionary biology.  In his nature lectures, Merleau-Ponty deployed 
concepts that had developed within the discipline of biology to construct his new 
phenomenological natural history. 
 While Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological natural history was never fully realized, a 
close examination of his lectures on nature does give some substantial clues as to the direction 
of his late philosophy of history. Out of his evolving concept of the organism, Merleau-Ponty 
was moving towards a rapprochement between science and philosophy and a reworking of 
relations of scale.  With regard to the philosophy of history, this entailed an increasing 
epistemic modesty, especially in relation to science, and a move away from the belief, so 
central to the Marxist epistemology that Merleau-Ponty subscribed to in the forties, that 
zooming out or taking the long view was not only possible, but provided an objective 
knowledge of a history that was more determined than were events seen from the immediate, 
local perspective.  Scale and epistemology fed into one another; as Merleau-Ponty’s began to 
identify with the microscopic perspective biology, he began rethink the relations between 
contingency, the whole, and the part.  In the nineteen forties he had argued along Marxist 
lines that local contingencies were absorbed by the objective movement of global history.  In 
nature lectures of the late fifties, this claim was inverted, and Merleau-Ponty suggested that it 
was the local and microscopic that were determined.  The organism was a model totality, and 
biology had shown that its movement was from causality to contingency.  Totality became the 
realm of contingency.  
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 The concept of contingency in Merleau-Ponty’s work has long been a central theme for 
his former student Claude Lefort.  In the nineteen-seventies, Lefort argued that it was in the 
forties that Merleau-Ponty first began to have “doubts that we could ever free ourselves from 
the contingency of a situation and of a perspective.”292  For Lefort, it was this worry that drew 
Merleau-Ponty to Marxism in the first place, seeing power in its claim that “history is only 
clarified from within itself, that only one particular social formation – the proletariat – 
provides in its class being the power to decode the becoming of humanity, that its task cannot 
be entirely conceived nor its sense entirely detached from praxis, and that there is thus no 
objective criterion for deciding upon the revolutionary project – not in any of its moments.”293  
In Lefort’s reading, the indeterminacy of proletarian praxis was what appealed to Merleau-
Ponty more than a dialectical or deterministic philosophy of history. 
 If we accept Lefort’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s Marxism—that it was a detour 
on the road to an account of contingency—this need not commit us to the idea that Merleau-
Ponty’s epistemology was consistent throughout his life.  As I will show, Merleau-Ponty 
substantially adjusted his account of contingency between the forties and the late fifties.  If his 
Marxist phase required accommodating both the phenomenological situatedness of knowledge 
and the objectivity of history, a delicate balancing act he attempted through a theory of the 
dialectic, his philosophy of nature in some ways relieved this tension.  Because he believed 
that the contingent and the caused were organically entwined, objectivity did not increase 
when one enlarged the perspective or scale of knowledge.  Whereas his phenomenological 
Marxism required that the local contingencies immediately available to knowledge be either 
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integrated into an objectively knowable totality or ignored as random “noise,” his 
phenomenological natural history saw contingency and totality as one.  In this new 
philosophy of history, it was the local that was determined and the total that exhibited 
spontaneity and freedom. 
 Merleau-Ponty’s early philosophy of history involved the combination of two modes of 
understanding man as such, Gestalt psychology and phenomenology. In each case he took 
“man” and scaled outward, from the individual to the historical.  Gestalt theory, by insisting 
that perception had a prelogical structure, opened the way for the claim that an underlying 
historical structure could be discerned and indeed agreed upon from multiple perspectives.  
Phenomenology staked out a space of indeterminacy, both for the individual and on an 
historical scale, allowing meaning and ambiguity to commingle. 
 Merleau-Ponty had learned about Gestalt psychology in the nineteen-thirties from 
Aaron Gurwitch, who was lecturing on the subject at the Institut d’Histoire des Sciences.294   
Gestalt theory opened the way for a critique of the idea that there was “a point-by-point 
correspondence and a constant connection between the stimulus and the elementary 
perception.”295  The Gestaltists (Max Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, and Wolfgang Köhler) had 
shown that perception had a prelogical coherence. It did not accumulate as the result of 
atomic sensory input, but rested instead on preexisting, meaningful ground, a structured 
perceptual world.  In Phenomenology of Perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty had suggested that 
history, like perception, had an underlying Gestalt, a structured whole on the basis of which 
interpretation could take place.  In the mid-forties Merleau-Ponty became a Marxist, and it 
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was on the basis of Gestalt theory that he argued, in Humanism and Terror (1947), that 
history was "a holistic system moving toward a state of equilibrium.”296   
 The discernment of meaning in history was therefore not a matter of arbitrarily choosing 
between a nearly infinite number of interpretable events. “If we examine an event up close, 
then everything appears to happen by accident at the moment it is lived,” Merleau-Ponty 
wrote.297  Discrete perspectives created the impression that truth was multiple, or an illusion.  
But this was a false conclusion. “Must history be understood through ideology,” he asked,  
“through politics, through religion, or through the economy? Must we understand a doctrine 
through its manifest content or through the psychology of the author and the events of his 
life? We must in fact understand in all of these ways at once; everything has a sense, and we 
uncover the same ontological structure beneath all of these relations.”298  To make possible 
this enlarged, multivalent perspective which could in turn reveal the underlying truth that was 
not immediately available to pre-philosophical perception was the task of philosophy of 
history. Gestalt had shown that perception had a primary coherence, that there was no magical 
operation necessary to go from “sense data” to perception, because in fact perception did not 
begin with discreet, atomic units of input.  For Merleau-Ponty, this insight could be scaled to 
intersubjectivity and to history.  It was in theory possible to understand history “in all these 
ways at once.”  Perspectives could blend, historical truth could emerge, on this basis. 
 Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of history in the forties rested simultaneously on this 
engagement with Gestalt and on a critique of naturalism, or naïve scientism.  “I cannot 
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enclose myself within the universe of science,” wrote Merleau-Ponty.  To pretend to do so 
was an act of dishonesty: “Scientific perspectives according to which I am a moment of the 
world are always naïve and hypocritical because they always imply, without mentioning it, 
that other perspective—the perspective of consciousness by which a world first arranges itself 
around me and begins to exist for me.”299  Husserl’s phenomenology, one of the key 
inspirations for Phenomenology of Perception, had shown that one could not imagine oneself 
as the product of external causes, that there was indeed a logical incoherence in attempting to 
do so.  So, for Merleau-Ponty, just as Gestalt’s insights into perception could be scaled to 
historical understanding, phenomenology had something to teach the philosophy of history.  
Adopting a phenomenological narrative mode, Merleau-Ponty wrote, “I am the absolute 
source. My existence does not come from my antecedents, nor from my physical and social 
surroundings; it moves out toward them and sustains them.”300  The past no more determines 
my consciousness than do the laws of nature.  Understanding history was a humanist task, and 
the assumption was that the better one understood the essence man, the clearer history would 
become.  Man was an explanatory principle. 
 In the period just after the Second World War, Merleau-Ponty continued to argue that a 
philosophy of history was urgently needed.  If anything, the situation had become more dire.  
With the fall of Vichy and the institution of Charles de Gaulle’s provisional government in 
1944, the French Left had taken on a critical role in the formation of the Fourth Republic.  
And yet Marxism’s inability to account for recent history was, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, 
compromising the Left’s political project.  In November of 1945, writing in Les Temps 
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modernes, a journal he had just founded with Jean-Paul Sartre, Merleau-Ponty expressed 
frustration at the state of political discourse in France, a state that he believed had resulted 
from a failure to think through the epistemological importance of historical perspective.  He 
wrote, “Marx thought the class struggle could not bring about revolution as long as it was 
unaware of what it was; he also thought that no predetermined process makes such awareness 
inevitable, and he feared that for want of understanding its own history, the world may rot and 
dissolve into barbarism.  It may be that we have reached this very point.”301  With the 
proletariat “more or less won over to class collaboration,” and the state socializing production 
while reinforcing capitalism against revolution, Marxists were going to have to think more 
creatively about history. 
 While Merleau-Ponty would soon move away from Marxism over the period between 
the start of the Korean war and the publication in 1955 of Adventures of the Dialectic, the task 
he outlined in this 1945 essay, evocatively entitled “Pour la vérité,” would motivate much of 
his work up until his tragically early death in 1961, at the age of 53.  The job of the 
intellectual was to make sense out of what was on the surface an ambiguous and chaotic 
world, and in doing so to help create the conditions for a political life neither haunted by the 
phantoms of the past nor governed by fear.   
 Writing in the fall of 1945, Merleau-Ponty observed a degree of confusion and fear that 
reflected a degraded understanding of history among intellectuals and politicians.  He saw 
Marxism failing to offer the perspective necessary to overcome the immediate political crisis.  
By this time he had already written his first two major works, The Structure of Behavior, 
published in 1942, and in 1945 his masterpiece, Phenomenology of Perception.  Both works 
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attempted to take account of the relationship between science, experience, and what we call 
knowledge.  Merleau-Ponty believed that on its own science was inadequate.  It might provide 
information about the world, but it always masked its own perspectival situation.  But neither 
was an idealist return to consciousness enough, because, as Merleau-Ponty argued, it made 
the world dependent on the subject’s analysis of it.302  In Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty had attempted to articulate an account of knowledge that fell neither into the 
aperspectival lie of science nor into the solipsism of idealism.  In “Pour la vérité” he applied 
this same impulse to politics, for he believed the choice between Marxist determinism and 
objective realism to be a false one.  
 Marxism, Merleau-Ponty argued, was in theory well-equipped to adjust its account of 
history to the changing facts on the ground.  In any case there was nothing inherently 
deterministic about a Marxian view of history.  As Merleau-Ponty wrote, “Marxism has never 
excluded from the theoretical plane the ambiguity it encounters in action. The spontaneous 
development of objective history can give us nothing more than a certain convergence of 
facts, and only history as it is thought and wished by men can make a univocal meaning 
emerge from that given arrangement.”303  Distinguishing accidents from necessary 
movements, revolutionary actions from counter-revolutionary ones, was precisely the task of 
the historian.  Since there was “a perpetual ambiguity about history,” these distinctions 
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needed to be drawn carefully and with the understanding that there was always some degree 
of error possible.304  
 In France, the alliance between the Communists (PCF), the socialists (SFIO), and the 
Christian democrats (MRP) had ushered two Marxist parties into the majority in the 
parliament. But as Merleau-Ponty saw it, this situation did little more than provide bourgeois 
policies with an “aura of Marxism.”305  Moreover, this diluted Marxism had lost the ability to 
provide a “detailed explanation of the history we are living.”306  If the socialist party was 
playing a “double game” consisting of “continuing to style itself ‘Marxist’ while living under 
the surveillance of the bourgeoisie,” this was only too reminiscent of the failures of the 
1930s.307   
 To illustrate the weaknesses of such politics, Merleau-Ponty pointed to Léon Blum’s 
1936-7 Popular Front government.  Blum had set a disastrous course for socialism in France, 
paying lip service to Marxism while enacting an essentially conservative policy.  Moreover, 
like conservatives, Blum had invoked objectivity to support his political decisions.   Merleau-
Ponty wrote that it was “dishonest for a Marxist politician to postulate any universal truth or 
morality, since Marxism is a theory of revolution, which opposes the capitalistic world to its 
proletarian counterpart and forces us to choose between them.”308  This dishonesty was still 
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playing out in the nineteen-forties, and the need to develop a philosophy of history, one that 
could aid in the overthrow of capitalism, was therefore acute.   
 Skeptics might argue that philosophizing about history and the practical matters of 
politics ought to be kept separate, but Merleau-Ponty suggested that this allegedly realist 
approach to politics was not only wrong, but logically inconsistent.  He conceded that if 
Marxism was facing explanatory impotence even in a time of great political potency, not only 
in France but in Russia, this did not speak well for the relationship between governing and the 
philosophy of history.  Perhaps this situation demonstrated that “nothing in history is 
essential, that everything counts equally, that no perspective is preferable to any other, and 
doesn't this then lead us to skepticism?”309  Maybe politics should “abandon the idea of basing 
itself on a philosophy of history and, taking the world as it is no matter what our wishes, 
dreams, or judgments may be, define its ends and its means by what the facts authorize?”310  
But a return to “the facts” in the name of realism was a mere fantasy.  In the same manner in 
which, following Husserl, he had criticized science for its appearing to be without 
perspective, Merleau-Ponty dismissed anti-Marxists skeptics for their claim to be outside of 
values, judgments, wishes, for sticking to “the facts.”  “[One] cannot do without perspective,” 
he wrote, “and, whether we like it or not, we are condemned to wishes, value judgments, and 
even a philosophy of history.”311  Claims to pure objectivity were a mere pretext for 
conservatism, and in fact eliminated all human will from the course of history.  A philosophy 
of history was therefore the fundamental first task for any politics. 
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 When it came to the task of articulating a philosophy of history adequate to the situation 
of 1945 in France, Merleau-Ponty might have found a natural interlocutor and collaborator in 
Raymond Aron, who had been just two years ahead of him studying philosophy at the École 
Normale.  While Aron did not share Merleau-Ponty’s Marxism, he had written his dissertation 
on the philosophy of history.  Like Merleau-Ponty, Aron had argued that such a philosophy 
was necessary in order to understand how best to act in the present.  The two men also shared 
the belief that previous philosophies of history, in particular Hegel’s, lacked necessary 
flexibility.  It is perhaps curious then that Merleau-Ponty never directly addressed Aron in his 
published work.  Kerry Whiteside has argued that Merleau-Ponty was in fact involved in a 
“covert debate” with Aron with regard to the philosophy of history, and indeed there are 
traces of such an engagement throughout Merleau-Ponty’s work.312  In contrast to Lefort, who 
understood Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of history as primarily an attempt to take account of 
contingency, Whiteside sees the political commitment to objectivity as fundamental.  
According to Whiteside, we ought to read Merleau-Ponty’s defense of historical objectivity as 
a response to Aron’s philosophy of history, which “stresses the inherent subjectivity and 
historicity of any interpretation of the past.”313  Whiteside stresses the contrast between 
Aron’s suspicion of Hegelian totality and Merleau-Ponty’s commitment to a form of 
objectivity.  For the latter, Whiteside writes, “the political ramifications of the abandonment 
of objectivity as a goal are an irresponsible voluntarism or a delusory conservatism.”314    
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 While Whiteside’s work at uncovering the connections between Aron’s and Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophies of history is illuminating, he nevertheless misconstrues Aron’s 
philosophical intentions, which were in fact the recovery of a valid objectivity for history.  At 
the same time, he conflates two concepts of the total in Merleau-Ponty’s work.  It is certainly 
the case that Merleau-Ponty hewed more closely to Hegelian Marxism in his concept of 
history than did Aron.  Nevertheless, when he defended the concept of totality with regard to 
historical understanding, he did so from the perspective of a phenomenological account of 
perception, not as an invocation of Hegelian epistemology, nor as a claim to view history 
from the outside.  As is clear in the Preface to Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty 
sought to show that Husserl’s refinement of Kantian intentionality could lay the groundwork 
for historical understanding.  Unlike pure intellection, which could only take up immutable 
truths, Husserl’s operative intentionality allowed phenomenology to “become a 
phenomenology of genesis.”315  Merleau-Ponty continued,  
Whether it is a question of a perceived thing, an historical event, or a doctrine, “to 
understand” is to grasp the total intention – not merely what these things are for 
representation, namely, the “properties” of the perceived thing, the myriad of 
“historical events,” and the “ideas” introduced by the doctrine – but rather the unique 
manner of existing expressed in the properties of the pebble, the glass, or the piece of 
wax, in all of the events of a revolution, and in all of the thoughts of a philosopher.316 
 
Historical understanding was a matter of grasping the “total intention” of events in the past. 
This task was not opposed to a partial or subjective understanding, but rather to an analytic, 
piecemeal approach.  Understanding of the total meaning preceded interpretations of the 
details.  
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 For Merleau-Ponty, history was more than an ex post facto discernment of significance; 
it was also critical to the creation of the revolutionary consciousness.  This was why the 
tendency, which he observed on all sides of the political spectrum, to forsake philosophy of 
history was so troubling.  In the absence of theory history would continue to move, but new 
forms, revolutionary change, could not be brought into being.  Merleau-Ponty used the 
language of natural selection to make this point. 
Accidental facts—that is, the isolated facts which are, not necessary to the total 
situation—disappear from history of their own accord for want of historical supports, 
agreements, and complicities, just as mutational monsters disappear by themselves, 
according to Darwin, because they are incompatible with the general life of the 
organism. This selection, however, only guarantees the destruction of nonviable 
systems and irrational societies; it does not guarantee the appearance of a new viable 
form, which would presuppose a selection guided this time by an idea.317 
 
Like evolution, history could be depended upon to develop in an internally coherent manner, 
following a logic that for Merleau-Ponty was statistically determined.  However, just as neo-
transformists had seen in Darwinian theory a failure to explain the appearance of new traits, 
Merleau-Ponty worried that practical politics taken up in the absence of a theory, and “idea,” 
would never succeed in bringing about a truly new society.  
 But just a few years later, in part out of distaste at the Soviet Union’s role in the Korean 
War, he began to question this allegiance to Marxism.  In January of 1950, in light of recent 
revelations about the extensiveness of the Soviet labor camps, Merleau-Ponty wrote that, 
“there can be no socialism when one out of every twenty citizens is in a camp,” indicating that 
his attitude towards state violence in the name of Communism had changed.318 In 1953 he 
resigned from the editorial board of Les Temps modernes as the result of increasingly strong 
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political disagreements with Jean-Paul Sartre.  In a letter to Merleau-Ponty in June of that 
year, Sartre criticized his erstwhile friend’s decision to move away from politics, calling it 
“both legitimate and unjustifiable.”319  Sartre insisted that Merleau-Ponty was aligning 
himself, however unintentionally, with reactionary anti-Communism.  Merleau-Ponty replied 
that he was not abandoning politics, but simply deciding not to comment on events as they 
happened.  He saw “the writer’s act as moving back and forth between the event and the 
general line, rather than struggling (in imagination) against each event as if it were decisive, 
unique, and final.”320  For Merleau-Ponty philosophy was a political task, and it was precisely 
because the stakes were high that he wanted to put more space between event and judgment.   
 Merleau-Ponty no longer believed that Communism allowed such intellectual distance, 
and he formalized his break with Marxism in 1955, with the publication of Adventures of the 
Dialectic, in which he pointed to and attempted to complete a “liquidation of the 
revolutionary dialectic.”321  He argued that Marxism had fallen pray to a faulty epistemology.  
“This new dogmatism,” he wrote referring to Leninism, “which puts the knowing subject 
outside the fabric of history and gives it access to absolute being, releases it from the duty of 
self-criticism, exempts Marxism from applying its own principles to itself, and settles 
dialectical thought, which by its own movement rejected it, in a massive positivity.”322  
Marxism’s theory of history rested, according to Merleau-Ponty, on “the old allegory” that 
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objects and representation had a one-to-one correspondence, a philosophical position that had 
been untenable since Epicurus, as Merleau-Ponty quipped.323 
 Thus at the moment that Merleau-Ponty declared the end of man as an explanatory 
category, it was not only his relationship to the sciences that was shifting, but his philosophy 
of history as well, from Marxism to a post-Marxism, the nature of which has yet to be fully 
understood.  Perhaps more so than his contemporaries Aron and Canguilhem, Merleau-Ponty 
saw the philosophy of history as a permanent exigency, a fundamental task for thought.  Thus 
when Marxism failed to fulfill its promise, far from abandoning the question of history, he 
reopened it in new ways.   
 Before going into further detail about how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological natural 
history emerged out of his engagement with biology, it is worth exploring some of the 
difficulties of grasping his oeuvre as a whole.  Interpreting Merleau-Ponty’s later works has 
presented a particular challenge to historians for a number of reasons, not least of which is the 
fact of his tragic, untimely death in 1961, at the age of 53.  His unfinished works, 
subsequently edited for publication by his former student Claude Lefort, has required a great 
degree interpretive care, and a significant body of scholarship has emerged attempting to 
discern the philosophical project that was brewing in the final years of Merleau-Ponty’s 
life.324  Taylor Carman suggests that while it is tempting to search for a new philosophy in his 
                                                
323 Ibid., 60. 
324 For an analysis of how Lefort has shaped the reception of Merleau-Ponty’s oeuvre, see 
Moyn, Samuel. “Marxism and Alterity: Claude Lefort and the Critique of Totality.” In The 
Modernist Imagination: Intellectual History and Critical Theory in Honor of Martin Jay, 
edited by Warren Breckman, Peter E. Gordon, A. Dirk Moses, and Samuel Moyn, 99–116. 
New York: Berghahn Books, 2009.  The literature on Merleau-Ponty is of course extensive, 
but the following works are particularly useful with regard to placing his late and posthumous 
work: Brett Buchanan. Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze. SUNY Press, 2008; Mark Hansen. “The Embryology of the 
 
129 
final works, scholars have “tended to overestimate the novelty of Merleau-Ponty’s late 
work…”325 Mark B. Hansen argues on the contrary that in the late works, and in the nature 
lectures in particular, we can see a move from phenomenology to ontology.  As Hansen sees 
it, Phenomenology of Perception took the distinction between consciousness and object as a 
given and then attempted to overcome it, whereas the new ontology outlined in the nature 
lectures was a way to escape this flawed foundation.326  Thus it is not only the content of 
Merleau-Ponty’s late project that is debated, but also whether, in relation to his oeuvre as a 
whole, it is best interpreted as a continuation or a rupture with his early work. 
 Equally contentious among intellectual historians has been the question of Merleau-
Ponty’s Marxism, or more precisely, what to make of his relatively brief but fairly militant 
commitment to Marxism in the late nineteen-forties.  For Martin Jay, Merleau-Ponty’s holism 
was primary, and therefore, “when he finally abandoned Marxism, he did so in the name of a 
competing holism.”327  More recently Stefanos Geroulanos has argued that the misguided 
desire to shield Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology from his Marxism, exemplified in the work 
of Étienne Bimbenet, has led to a flawed reading of his post-1953 (the year he openly broke 
with Sartre) work.  According to Geroulanos, this is the case both because such a reading 
ignores the intricate connections between Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and his politics, and 
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because it obscures what Geroulanos takes to be Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to found a 
humanism based on a concept of political humanity but without recourse to an idea of human 
essence.328  
 Though they characterize Merleau-Ponty’s project differently, Geroulanos and Jay both 
suggest that his late work is best understood as the continuation and refinement of a consistent 
set of concerns.  For Jay these were holism and phenomenology, while Geroulanos’s 
emphasis is aimed at placing Merleau-Ponty within the trajectory of the development of 
negative anthropology.  Both, however, stress the importance of ambiguity, especially with 
regard to the relationship between historical understanding and political action.  As 
Geroulanos writes, “[In Humanism and Terror, T]he embodied perceiver, whose thrownness 
into nature and need of others define a mostly formal experience of the world, turns into a 
temporal subject whose existence bends to the fundamental ambiguity of its historicity and of 
its future.”329  According to his reading, this ambiguity is what ultimately enables historical 
understanding.  For Geroulanos, Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of history was founded on the 
assertion (or discovery) that “action and engagement [are] suspended in the uncertainty of 
history and bound to the impossibility of predicting consequences.330”  Geroulanos sees 
Merleau-Ponty as Heideggerian beginning in the forties.  He suggests that Merleau-Ponty in 
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Humanism and Terror was already developing a negative anthropology in this period.  In 
other words, by 1947, he was already not a humanist.331 
 By contrast, Jay characterizes Merleau-Ponty’s earlier work as an attempt to reconcile 
Marxism to a basically humanist phenomenology.  It was only in the early fifties, he suggests, 
that Merleau-Ponty began to question the “human chauvinism” of much philosophy.  He cites 
Merleau-Ponty’s 1953 inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, in which he declared that, 
“One explains nothing by man, since he is not a force but a weakness at the heart of 
being…”332  Merleau-Ponty had abandoned “Hegelian Marxism” out of fidelity to holism, 
spurred by Soviet aggression in Korea but also motivated by the belief that Marxism had 
failed to account for, in Jay’s words, “historical residues that were reducible neither to spirit 
nor to matter.”333  As Jay sees it, Merleau-Ponty’s “socialist humanism” was a casualty of his 
break with Marxism.  This shift away from man and the renewed interest in nature that went 
with it “meant a subtle de-emphasis of history, which was no longer the privileged locus of all 
meaning.”334 When Merleau-Ponty then turned to language and the structural linguistics of 
Ferdinand de Saussure, his concept of totality also took on a new valence.  As Jay writes, 
“From an essentially critical concept capable of providing a vantage point from which the 
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present might be judged and found wanting, it became an essentially descriptive one used to 
make sense of what was.”335   Jay takes Merleau-Ponty’s interest in history to have waned as a 
result of his increasing skepticism about humanism.  In Jay’s position there is a faint echo of 
Sartre’s disapprobation.  Merleau-Ponty’s move away from Marxism was, Jays suggests, an 
implicit quietism.   
 Perhaps Jay’s reading suffers from the benefit of hindsight, however.  In the aftermath 
of the linguistic turn and the poststructuralist antihumanism that came in its wake, it is 
tempting to see Merleau-Ponty’s interest in Saussure as an abdication of history.  But in 1953, 
Merleau-Ponty saw in linguistics a way around the dualism that had ultimately sunk Marxist 
history.  As he wrote, “The theory of signs, as developed in linguistics, perhaps implies a 
conception of historical meaning which gets beyond the opposition of things versus 
consciousness.”336  In linguistics, he continued, “there is a rationality in the contingent, a lived 
logic, a self-constitution of which we have definite need in trying to understand the union of 
contingency and meaning in history, and Saussure, the modern linguist, could have sketched a 
new philosophy of history.” 
 As I have suggested, we should take Merleau-Ponty’s expression of ambivalence 
towards humanism in 1953 not as a sign that he was abandoning the philosophy of history, 
but as an invitation to examine his last works through the lens of such a philosophy.  In part 
this means reading the nature lectures as work towards a new philosophy of history, even 
though they contain no programmatic statement on the subject.  Such a reading, as we shall 
see, reveals that far from either continuing in line with his earlier work or abandoning history 
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altogether, in the late fifties Merleau-Ponty was working towards an inversion of his early 
epistemology.  His phenomenological natural history and the “global vision” he advocated 
offered a new way to connect totality and contingency.  As we will see, Merleau-Ponty used 
biology to conceptualize this linkage. 
 Thus, we ought to read Merleau-Ponty’s work in the fifties as a search for a new 
philosophy of history.  In “In Praise of Philosophy,” he suggested that Saussure might offer a 
new way to make contingency and structure cohere, and indeed Merleau-Ponty would 
continue to explore linguistics in the years to come.  However he would also turn to another 
body of scholarship, modern biology, as he began to think through the implications of a 
philosophy of history that did not rest on man as explanatory principle.  His turn to the 
question of nature led him to rethink the relationship between science and philosophy.  The 
prevailing criticism of science was that it instrumentalized nature in a way that was 
detrimental both to human understanding and to the world.  This position had been 
crystallized by Heidegger’s distinction between the ontic, which was the realm of science, and 
the ontological, which belonged to philosophy.  Merleau-Ponty now claimed that this 
opposition was “valid only in the case of Cartesian science, which posits nature as an object 
spread out in front of us, and not in the case of a modern science, which places its own object 
and its relation to this object in question.”337  Such reflexivity was a characteristic of 
philosophy in general, and the philosophy of history in particular.  Science had moved closer 
to both. 
 This was of course a revision of his previous claim that science offered a deceptively 
aperspectival worldview.  Now Merleau-Ponty claimed that, “There is no need to justify the 
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resort to science.  Whatever one’s conception of philosophy, its business is to elucidate 
experience, and science is a sector of our experience, admittedly subject to a very particular 
treatment by algorithm, yet in which in one way or another there is an encounter with 
being.”338   If science was a realm of experience, scientists needed a little help interpreting 
their experiences.  Of embryology Merleau-Ponty wrote that “scientists glimpse a philosophy 
of life, but they forget what they discovered.”339 As he turned to science in his search for a 
new philosophy of history, Merleau-Ponty did so as neither disciple nor critic, but rather as 
memorialist.   
 In the nature lectures, Merleau-Ponty examined not only biological science, but physics 
as well.  However if biology was a resource for philosophy, physics by contrast played a 
primarily negative role.  “Physics,” he claimed, “ destroys certain prejudices of philosophical 
and non-philosophical thought without, for all that, being a philosophy.”340  Quantum 
mechanics, for example, had suggested an underlying incoherence in Pierre-Simon Laplace’s 
(1749-1827) thought when he claimed that an intelligence that knew all the laws of nature and 
the position of every particle at a given instant would thereby know the future in its entirety.  
Physics was capable, in other words, of calling into question philosophy that had itself been 
founded on the claims of physics.  It could also destabilize received wisdom.  But it made no 
positive philosophical claims.  Without saying so explicitly, Merleau-Ponty clearly thought 
biology different.  Biology did not just refute itself or rework the edges of philosophy; it was 
the starting point of a philosophy of life.  
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Phenomenological Natural History 
  In the lectures on nature, Merleau-Ponty went to some length to distinguish his 
philosophical project from either a “theory of knowledge” or what he called a metascience, a 
science of the reality underlying the appearances of science itself.  His project was “rather a 
reading of science itself as a certain (reduced) ontology in the broader context of the 
relationship with the most primordial Being.”341  Merleau-Ponty proposed, in other words, to 
examine the relationship between the Being of experience and the Being of science.  This 
would be accomplished by “underlining the Vor-Sein (Husserl) from which the Euclidian and 
causal Being of classical science is drawn, as well as the being of mechanistic biology.”342  
Extension and causality, in other words the objects of science, were drawn from something 
more primordial, pre-Being.   To move beyond the distinction between the lived and the 
caused, the contingent and the determined, the true relationship between science and this 
primordial Being had to be accounted for. 
 Because Merleau-Ponty did not address the question directly in the nature lectures, it 
can at times be difficult to discern the connections between his philosophy of nature and his 
philosophy of history.  Most broadly, as Merleau-Ponty saw it both nature and history 
required grappling with the “antinomy between causality and finality.”343  The difficulty had 
emerged with Kant.  Whereas for Descartes, “humanism appeared as a task in the midst of a 
luminous, 
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intelligible world,” for Kant, “humanism appears at the center: it is the human subject who 
carries Being.”344  In Kant, therefore, “My subjectivity appears as a power of ordering, a 
capacity to give laws, to posit the idea of a world to which I can refer throughout my own 
duration.”345  Kant was thereby left with a choice between nature as Inbegriff, simple 
correlates of perception in which case nature lost its “savageness,” or nature as Naturebegriff, 
which led to what Brunschvicg had called a “constructivist fantasy” involving a “bizarre 
parallelism of Aristotelian logic and modern mechanics.”346  Kant’s concept of human 
freedom as antiphysis had put man in opposition to nature.  As Merleau-Ponty wrote, “This is 
a humanist idea. Human being reintroduces the concept of finalized Nature, despite the 
Cartesian reduction.”347  In other words, Kant bought freedom at the price of nature. 
 This problem reemerged in Bergson, who in Creative Evolution had described the living 
in opposition to the physical world.  Living beings were defined by their duration, the fact that 
they were not identical over time but nevertheless possessed an internal coherence. As 
Merleau-Ponty saw it, Bergson had fallen into a positivism in which nature and contingency 
were radically opposed.  In such a philosophy, “There is no place for a conception of Nature 
or for a conception of history…”348  Merleau-Ponty suggested there was in fact a “kinship” 
between nature and contingency, and his elaboration of this kinship in the later nature courses 
was precisely an attempt to make space for the philosophy of history. 
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 It seems that Merleau-Ponty did not personally read biological sources until the late 
nineteen-fifties.  In Adventures of the Dialectic he had made passing references to the 
relationship between history and natural selection as he had done in “Pour la vérité.”349  
Nevertheless, in the early fifties he was already beginning to think through the beginnings of a 
new theory of history.  As he suggested in “In Praise of Philosophy,” philosophy was in need 
of a new approach to both history and man.    
 Before turning to biology, which would help transform his thinking about the 
relationship of the whole to the parts, the microcosm to the macrocosm, Merleau-Ponty had 
already begun to reexamine the relationship between scale and causality.  In a lecture from 
1952-53 entitled “Materials for a theory of history,” he wrote, 
There is no history where the course of events is a series of episodes without unity, or 
where it is a struggle already decided in the heaven of ideas.  History is there where 
there is a logic within contingency, a reason within unreason, where there is a 
historical perception which, like perception in general, leaves in the background what 
cannot enter the foreground but seizes the lines of force as they are generated and 
actively leads their traces to a conclusion.350 
 
This language, in particular the idea of a “logic within contingency” foreshadowed some of 
the conclusions he later drew from biology, suggesting that it was precisely in order to 
address problems of history that had turned to biology for answers.  In “Materials for a theory 
of history” he was returning to the problem of logic and contingency, but rather than see logic 
as existing on a larger scale than local contingencies as he had, following Trotsky, in the 
forties, he had begun to think that perhaps logic might be immanent in the contingent.  This 
reworking of scale would find its fullest expression only later, in the nature lectures, when 
                                                
349 Merleau-Ponty, Adventures of the Dialectic, 77; 126. 
350 Merleau-Ponty, In Praise of Philosophy, 97-98. 
 
138 
Merleau-Ponty, seemingly influenced by Raymond Ruyer, explored the implications of 
embryology for the relation of part to whole. 
 Ruyer in fact stood in the background as an interlocutor throughout many of the 
arguments in the nature lectures.  While Merleau-Ponty did not follow Ruyer down the path to 
finalism, it is nevertheless clear that his reading of biological texts and concepts was deeply 
informed by the latter’s work.  Merleau-Ponty cited Ruyer repeatedly as a source for 
statements of biological fact, but he also used Ruyer’s philosophy to decode the philosophical 
implications of scientific claims.  Exasperated by scientists’ forgetfulness and their desire to 
“grasp,” but not really “understand,” Merleau-Ponty pulled an example straight from Ruyer’s 
Éléments de psycho-biologie.  In an attempt to explain patterning during embryogenesis—in 
other words how the leg cells know they are leg cells—embryologists including Étienne 
Wolff and Albert Dalcq had argued that an organizing center within the embryo secreted a 
chemical, organisine, that effectively told other cells what to do.  Using Ruyer’s language, 
Merleau-Ponty wrote that this chemical could only be a trigger (déclencheur), and therefore 
explained nothing. “We cannot thereby better understand that the organism acts, and how it 
acts, any more than the localization of images in the cortex can make us understand 
perception,” he wrote.351  This critique of triggers as an explanatory slight of hand had been a 
central theme in Éléments.  
 Both causality and scale continued to be central concerns in the lectures on nature.  
Rather than looking to Gestalt psychology or Marxism, Merleau-Ponty now focused his 
attention on twentieth-century biology.  The work of the German neo-vitalist Hans Driesch, 
whose embryological experiments had led him to posit an organismic entelechy, or 
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underlying teleology within living forms, had been a watershed for biology.352  Unable to 
explain life with simple oppositions between organisms and machines, biology, Merleau-
Ponty claimed, was by necessity becoming a philosophy.  This by no means made it less 
scientific.  It was simply a matter of science running up against the limits of its epistemic 
paradigms.  For Merleau-Ponty, Driesch’s vitalism signaled a turning point in biology that 
was in many ways parallel to the quantum revolution in physics.  In a sketch for his 1959-
1960 course he wrote,  
In our opinion, the difficulties which Driesch encountered show that life is 
incomprehensible both to the philosophy of the object (mechanism and vitalism) and 
to the philosophy of the idea, and can only be clarified through a philosophy of 
“something,” or, as one says nowadays, a philosophy of structure.   Embryology since 
Driesch seems to us to have been moving in this direction in refusing to opt either for 
preformation or epigenesis, rather taking both notions as “complementary” and 
describing embryogenesis as “flux of determination.” …  Physicists are rejecting both 
the restriction of space and the resort to a second positive causality; they conceive life 
as a sort of reinvestment of physical space, the emergence of original 
macrophenomena between the micro-phenomena, “singular areas” of space or 
“enveloped phenomena.”353 
 
Embryology had the potential to be a “philosophy of something” precisely because 
embryogenesis seemed to resist both mechanical and idealist causal explanations.  Merleau-
Ponty suggested that this was in step with developments in physics, for which life was the 
expression of a totality within the folds of the causal world. 
 Biology was a natural ally in the search for an account of causality.  Because it refused 
to alienate man from nature, it could be applied to the understanding of both nature and 
history.  As Merleau-Ponty was aware, biologists had long struggled with the opposition 
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between vitalism and mechanism.  Was it possible to have a science of life that reflected life’s 
capacity for creativity, action, and purpose without falling back on the idealism of vitalism?  
In the twentieth century, Merleau-Ponty began to observe, biologists had been addressing 
some of the most central philosophical problems, albeit without always being explicit.  
Embryology, perhaps most crucially, spoke to the problem of totality.  “What status must we 
give totality?,” Merleau-Ponty asked. “Such is the philosophical question that Coghill's 
experiments pose, a question which is at the center of this course on the idea of nature and 
maybe the whole of philosophy.”  
 In his readings of  G. E. Cohill’s Anatomy and the Problem of Behavior (1929) and 
Arnold Gesell and Catherine S. Amatruda’s The Embryology of Behavior (1945), Merleau-
Ponty had begun to see a new, non-mechanist understanding of the organism within biology.  
The organism was no longer treated as a machine and, just as significantly, it was no longer 
seen as existing within “the ultimatum of the milieu.”354  Both Coghill’s and Gesell and 
Amatruda’s theories of behavior left “the organism entirely armed, or at best there is an 
initiative, an endogenous character of behavior which is evidenced.”355  The organism was no 
longer either the causal result of its milieu, nor entirely subjugated to it.  Advances in 
developmental biology had restored to the organism, if not spontaneity, then at least some 
degree of autonomy. 
 Coghill’s experiments on the amblystoma axolotl, a species of salamander, had 
underlined the non-mechanical nature of behavior.  He had shown how development and 
behavior were reciprocal.  Before it was able to swim, the axolotl’s motor and sensory 
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systems were distinct.  In this phase, Coghill wrote, “the muscles can be excited to contraction 
by direct stimulation, as by the stab of a sharp needle, by mechanical impact or by electricity, 
but cannot be excited by light touch on the skin.”356  As it developed further, its nervous 
system gained greater control over the body and flexion would begin.  In the next stage, the 
animal would develop sensitivity to touch and non-directional movement: “As the embryo 
advances in age the muscular contractions extend farther down the trunk until, in the course of 
about 36 hours, the entire trunk is in the performance.  The animal now bends itself into a 
tight coil.”357  Shortly after it began moving in the shape of a C, the axolotl would begin 
moving into the shape of an S.  It was this sigmoidal movement, when executed repeatedly 
and at increasing speeds, that enabled swimming.  The nervous system and the body were 
now linked. 
 Of course salamanders do not just swim, they also grow legs and learn to walk.  Coghill 
had been able to show that the process of learning to walk—a new behavioral pattern—was 
inseparable from the development of the legs themselves.  One experiment involved using a 
thin hair to stimulate the back legs, which developed after the front legs were formed, at 
progressive stages of development.   When the animal’s back legs were just beginning to 
articulate themselves from the body, direct stimulation initially engendered no response.  
After quite a bit of touching with the hair, the entire animal would twitch (15 in Fig. 1 below).  
Eventually the legs would begin to move independently.  In the figure below, the bottom 
image (17) depicts an animal that “was killed when it first responded to a stimulus on the hind 
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limb with a local reflex.”358  This showed that it was only over time that the limbs became 
independent of the torso. 
 
Fig. 4. Leg development in salamanders359 
 
 Merleau-Ponty found Coghill both stimulating and perplexing.  As he understood this 
research, “For the axolotl, to exist from head to tail and to swim are the same thing.”360  
However, if both swimming and walking were “realized by the calendar of development,” this 
nevertheless left the central problem unresolved.  “In effect,” he wrote,  
we can attach all the perfections to the successive connections being realized in 
embryogenesis. But why does this rhythm of development get translated into an 
adapted behavior? The question is posed all the more as walking is first a follow-up to 
swimming; it is only gradually that the animal eliminates the movements of the trunk. 
How does it come about that maturation is realized in a beneficent way?361 
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Merleau-Ponty pointed to the fact that certain movements, like the movement of the gills, 
occurred in the preneural phase of development, in other words before the development of the 
nervous system.  Behavior, he observed, preceded even the nervous system. 
 If behavior preceded function, as in the case of the movement of gills during 
embryogenesis, the former could not be reduced to the latter. “We cannot define the animal by 
its immediate functioning,” Merleau-Ponty insisted, since some of its parts “[have] meaning 
only for the future.”362  This led to an understanding of life that was indeed material, but not 
reductive.  From Coghill, Merleau-Ponty was able to conclude that life was matter, but not in 
a simple sense.  Rather, it was “matter which refers to the future.”363  Here one begins to get a 
sense of what, for Merleau-Ponty, the material unfolding of life might offer the philosophy of 
history.  It was not that the future could be “thought in the present,” but rather that, “the 
plurality of phenomena binds together and constitutes an ensemble that has a meaning.”364  
The future might be within the present not as spirit, but as a property of living matter.   
 Of course couldn’t the future merely appear to be within the organism?  What if this 
was just a property of the psychology of observation, a case of projection?  Perception of life 
was clearly pre-conceptual, experienced like a “wince” upon encountering “a caterpillar 
where we weren’t expecting it.”365  Once life was perceived, “A field of space-time has been 
opened: there is the beast there; the space in question is inhabited, animated.”366 The apparent 
                                                
362 Ibid., 144. 
363 Ibid., 144. 
364 Ibid., 153. 
365 Ibid., 155. 
366 Ibid., 155. 
 
144 
continuity of cause and effect was a perceptual phenomenon.  “Likewise,” Merleau-Ponty 
acknowledge, “in the global vision of the becoming of the embryo, there is the experience of 
the imminence of the future, the apparition of a center…to which this or that could happen, 
seized by an ipseity.”367  This apparition could in no way be dismissed.  Far from proving that 
Coghill and Gesell merely reflected “the psychology of man striving to think embryonic 
becoming,” this phenomenon of perception in fact revealed an entry point into being, a way of 
“passing into the things.”368  Biology was a phenomenology of life. 
 Even more significant was what Coghill’s work implied about the relationship of the 
whole to the part.  Merleau-Ponty saw an apparent paradox.  “At the beginning,” he wrote, 
“the animal does not live in all of its body, and it is only gradually that behavior develops 
across the whole of the body.”  That is, in the early stages of development, the body was not 
yet an integrated whole.  The paradox was that it was through the process of realizing its 
wholeness that the body also became more articulated as the limbs, organs, etc. gained 
functional independence from one another.  Thus,  
at the same time that the total pattern spreads through the whole organism, the parts of 
the organism acquire an existence proper to them and in the very order in which they 
are invaded by the total pattern. Life is hidden to the extent that it is realized. At the 
same time that the reign of totality is extended, this totality is translated into an 
organization articulated in distinct parts.369 
 
The totality of the organism was therefore not simply a matter of increasing codependence 
between whole and parts.  Totality gave rise to specificity. 
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 Nor what this just a matter of morphology.  Totality was also a distinct realm of 
causality.  As Coghill had suggested, it was only when organisms were examined piecemeal, 
in discrete parts, that they could be explained by physicochemical processes.  Coghill 
conceived of development as the “creative function of the nervous system,” arguing, against” 
behaviourists” (in other words mechanical physiology), that “man is more than the sum of his 
reflexes, instincts and immediate reactions of all sorts.”370  As soon as one looked at the 
organism in its totality, mechanical causality failed.  Contingency was therefore a 
phenomenon that belonged to totality.  
 Here Merleau-Ponty returned to an image he had employed many years earlier. In the 
Preface to Phenomenology of Perception he had written, “I cannot enclose myself within the 
universe of science,” suggesting that scientific perspective must always be partial.  Science 
claimed univalence while always in fact employing multivalence.  Now he returned to that 
claim, but he carried it further.  In one sense the organism really could be explained by 
science, as physicochemistry, a dense conjuncture of causality.  However, as soon as one tried 
to describe these processes, one was adopting what Merleau-Ponty called a global view.  For 
“a proximal thinking,” the organism was indeed only physicochemistry, but “proximal 
thinking is not exhaustion; the global view, spatially and temporally, is not an epiphenomenon 
of it; the organism is not a sum of instantaneous and punctual microscopic events; it is an 
enveloping phenomenon, with the macroscopic style of an ensemble in movement.”371  In 
other words, it was not simply that science failed to admit of perspective, but that it viewed 
the phenomenon of life at too close a range.   
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 In advocating for a global view, Merleau-Ponty was not calling for philosophy to adopt 
the “high-altitude thinking” of science.372  Nor was he settling back into a Marxist 
epistemology.  Global thinking, the kind that could see primordial Being and the Being of 
science simultaneously, was not simply superimposed, or even a scaling outward.  It was 
rather an ability to grasp the total within the local. “In between the microscopic facts,” 
Merleau-Ponty wrote, “global reality is delineated like a watermark, never graspable for 
objectivizing-particular thinking, never eliminable from or reducible to the microscopic: we 
had only a bit of a protoplasmic jelly, and we then have an embryo, by a transformation 
which, always too early or too late, we were never witness to in our investment in a biological 
field.373  This global reality was intricately woven into nature.  It did not disappear on the 
level of the microscopic, even if that was the level on which causality could seemingly 
explain everything.  In other words, where Gestalt as structure had scaled, phenomenological 
natural history was fractal and intertwined.  
 This concept of intertwining resonated with Gesell and Amatruda’s The Embryology of 
Behavior.  Citing Coghill as critical background and inspiration for their research on human 
development, they had emphasized the reciprocity between body and behavior.374  As 
Merleau-Ponty summarized,  
On the one hand, the body is like the envelope, the sketch of behavior; on the other, 
behavior is literally a second body which is added to the natural body. On the one 
hand, the body is a sketch of behavior; embryonic development anticipates future 
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behavior, the organs or outlines of organs of the embryo have no meaning if we 
consider them independently of all logic of behavior.375 
 
Gesell and Amatruda called this reciprocal relationship a neurological “interweaving,” or 
entrelacement in the French translation Merleau-Ponty was working from.  This concept 
certainly fit with the scientific understanding of behavior, but Merleau-Ponty argued that it 
ultimately led back towards vitalism and was therefore still a displacement of the primary 
question.  The new school of embryology of which Coghill, Gesell, and Amatruda were 
representative focused on the connections between development and behavior, developing 
concepts that, according to Merleau-Ponty, “express certain remarkable properties of the 
organism, but which do not explain them.”376 
 If Merleau-Ponty found fault with embryology, this evidently did not prevent him from 
using it to think towards a philosophy of nature.  As the reader will recall, he saw biology as a 
kind of forgetful philosophy of life.  Modern embryology defended epigenesis and rejected 
preformation, but fell back on vitalist metaphors and ultimately on the preformationist idea 
that the future of the organism was immanent in it.  Nevertheless Merleau-Ponty did not reject 
this idea altogether, he simply did not accept it as a “second positive causality.”  The future 
was immanent in the organism, but it was not “folded back in potential in the beginning of its 
organic life, as in a nutshell in its beginning.”377  Rather, it was present as a negativity or an 
absence.  “We can say of the animal,” wrote Merleau-Ponty,  “that each moment of its history 
is empty of what will follow, an emptiness which will be filled later.”378  This emptiness was 
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constitutive of temporality.  “From the moment that the animal is made,” he wrote, “it was not 
absent at the moment when it was not yet made.”379  If the organism referred to the future, it 
did so by instituting emptiness, which was also a future, within matter.  
 In a working note from January of 1960, Merleau-Ponty elaborated on this negative 
concept of the living.  “When the embryo's organism starts to perceive,” he wrote,  “there is 
not a creation of a For itself by the body in itself, and there is not a descent into the body of a 
pre-established soul, it is that the vortex of the embryogenesis suddenly centers itself upon the 
interior hollow it was preparing.”380  The “philosophy of something” called for by the failure 
of both idealism and positivism was ultimately a philosophy of the “hollow” at the center of 
life.   The organism as a totality was that which centered itself around the hollow it had 
created in the process of coming into being.  Centered on absence, this philosophy of the 
living nevertheless authorized a renewed concept of totality.   The part was that which obeyed 
the laws of physicochemistry.  The whole was that which, in circling an emptiness, instituted 
the possibility of meaning, and therefore also freedom and contingency.  
 In 1953, Merleau-Ponty had called for a turn away from humanism, declaring that man 
was nothing but a “weakness at the heart of being.”381  By 1960 he had replaced humanism 
with a philosophy of nature that understood the organism as an emptiness to be filled.  The 
immanence of the future within life suggested that temporality was proper to life, but it was 
unclear whether this temporality was historical.  In a working note from June 1960, he hinted 
at a new approach to time.  The philosophy of history was too implicated in the language of 
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praxis and interiority—humanist concepts that obscured the “flesh” and the thickness of 
being.  What was needed instead was a “philosophy of structure.”382  History had treated 
space and time as axes, when they were in fact a nexus, interwoven.  This philosophy of 
structure brought Merleau-Ponty back to Marx, whose concept of capital was, Merleau-Ponty 
seemed to suggest, analogous to the organism.  Capital was a “thing,” a chiasm or nexus of 
subject-object, contingent-caused, whole-part, and Capital was therefore a “philosophy of 
something.”  This was of course an entirely different Marx than had inspired Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy in the mid-forties.  The Marx of dialectical determinism had been replaced by 
Marx, philosopher of totality.  
 Totality now had a new role to play in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of history, or as he 
now called it, philosophy of structure.  With embryology he was able to articulate a 
philosophy of totality in which the whole was the realm of contingency, not the realization of 
a determined logic.  This phenomenological natural history rested on reevaluation of the 
relationship between science and phenomenology.  Though perhaps somewhat impoverished 
or stunted, science was nevertheless an approach to experience that could offer philosophy 
new ways to see the world.  As Merleau-Ponty moved closer to science, his epistemic claims 
for philosophy became more modest.  If the philosophy of history had once been a way to 
isolate meaning in apparent chaos, it was now above all a philosophy of contingency.  That is, 
the task was no longer to articulate what was possible in the world, but simply to protect the 
idea of possibility itself. 
                                                





 In 1970, the eminent French biologist François Jacob concluded his Logic of Life: A 
History of Heredity with a bold claim about his discipline:  “Biologists no longer study life 
today,” he wrote.  “They no longer attempt to define it.  Instead, they investigate the structure 
of living systems, their functions, their history.”383  For Jacob, this “algorithmic” approach to 
the study of “living systems” offered at long last a way around the choice between 
reductionism and vitalism.  In the previous two decades, discoveries about the structure of 
DNA and the mechanisms of its replication had led to a convergence of genetics and 
biochemistry.  This convergence, which led to the creation of a new field, molecular biology, 
was in no small part thanks to Jacob’s own work on DNA transcription. As a result of these 
exciting discoveries, a tantalizing possibility had emerged: a rapprochement between biology 
and the physical sciences.384  This new molecular approach to life appeared to give strength to 
the longstanding argument, put forward most famously by Erwin Schrödinger in the nineteen-
forties, that life could be explained purely on the basis of the laws of physics.385 
 Jacob, however, cautioned against the belief that molecular structures, which were 
indeed accurately described by the laws of physics and chemistry, could explain all the 
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properties of organisms.386  His “integrationist” approach maintained instead that the whole 
organism was more than the sum of its parts.  While Jacob could agree with reductionists on 
metaphysical matters, agreeing that “biology has demonstrated that there is no metaphysical 
entity hidden behind the word ‘life’,” he distinguished his integrationist approach from 
reductionism on epistemological grounds.387  For Jacob, the major insight of the integrationist 
epistemology was to rethink scale. This is, where reductionists focused on “proximate 
causes,” in other words causes that “affect the components of the organism, its functions and 
its reactions to environment,” integrationists were interested in large-scale causality: the 
history of life on earth.388   
 As Jacob suggested, this new epistemic scale in turn made the category “life” obsolete.  
The organism should no longer be understood as a discrete entity, he argued, but instead as 
“the realization of a programme prescribed by its heredity.”389  Understanding living 
phenomena as instantiations of a program was a rejection of both reductionist and vitalist 
concepts of the organism.  It also undermined the very idea of individuality.  As Jacob wrote, 
“The intention of a psyche has been replaced by the translation of a message.  The living 
being does indeed represent the execution of a plan, but not one conceived in any mind.  It 
strives towards a goal, but not one chosen by any will…The aim is to reproduce.”390  
Information, Jacob seemed to suggest, was the true subject of the history of life on earth. 
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 This was all apparently to the delight of Michel Foucault, whose gleeful review of The 
Logic of Life, “Croître et multiplier,” appeared in Le Monde in November of 1970.  Foucault’s 
pleasure was evident in the tone of his review as he pointed out some of the most radical 
implications of Jacob’s work.  According to Foucault, Jacob’s book illustrated “how and why 
it is necessary to entirely rethink life, time, the individual, and chance.”391  But it wasn’t just 
the ambitiousness of The Logic of Life that piqued Foucault, but even more so the 
subversiveness of Jacob’s biological philosophy.  Jacob’s molecular perspective had led to the 
“marvelous ‘flippancy’ of biology, which places prior even to the individual the eagerness to 
reproduce.”392  Not only had Jacob decentered the subject, he had shown that, ultimately, it all 
came down to sex.  Thus, as Foucault saw it, Jacob was, to borrow Mark Poster’s phrase, a 
“great detractor of man.”393  Jacob’s biology accomplished “flippantly” what Foucault had 
hoped to achieve philosophically, most recently at the time in Archaeology of Knowledge 
(1970): the dethroning of man. 
 If Jacob’s Logic of Life laid bare the ultimate affinity between biology and 
posthumanism, it also signaled a shift within the intellectual trajectory of twentieth-century 
biology.  By declaring that biologists no longer studied life as a “metaphysical entity,” Jacob 
correctly implied that they had done so in the recent past.  The work of French biologists like 
Rabaud, Caullery, and Wolff, to name a few that have figured centrally in this dissertation, 
had been very much concerned with the concept of life.  Through the middle of the twentieth 
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century, biologists struggled explicitly with the question of how to understand life 
scientifically in such a way that its metaphysical specificity was protected.  This made 
biology an incredibly rich, if ultimately fickle resource for philosophy. 
 The thinkers examined in the preceding chapters all saw connections between biological 
findings and their own philosophical concerns.  To capture the connection between biology 
and the philosophy of history, I originally considered calling this dissertation “Foyers of 
Heresy.”  The phrase is a bit opaque, and for that reason I have dropped it as the title, but it 
points to a particular vision of both biology and history as epistemically unstable.  The phrase 
comes from Canguilhem’s 1952 “Aspects of Vitalism,” in which he tried to defend biology as 
an autonomous form of knowledge. For Canguilhem, this task had an ethical, if not explicitly 
political end.  A biology reduced to a satellite of physics and chemistry was also a reduction 
of its object, the living.  Classical vitalism posited life as an exception to scientific laws, but 
this could not, for Canguilhem, solve the problem.  In arguing that life was an exception, it 
reduced living phenomena to “enclaves of indetermination, zones of dissidence, or foyers of 
heresy.”394  He continued, “classical vitalism sins, paradoxically, only in its excessive 
modesty, in its reluctance to universalize its conception of experience.”395  I believe that this 
anxiety about the very relationship between human experience and natural laws, about the 
possibility of a universality outside of idealism or scientific determinism, is what made 
biology such a powerful resource for thinking about history in 20th century France.  The 
stakes were too high for history to be allowed to be reduced to an inexplicable exception 
within a universe governed, ultimately, by laws not subject to political action.  Like biology, 
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history had to become more than a foyer of heresy. It could not be limited, enclosed, forced to 
make only local claims.    
 This story remains relevant today, not only because it set the terms for theoretical 
conflicts that persist, but because biology is resurfacing as a potential source of historical 
data.396  A renewed interest in biology among historians is widespread, as a recent roundtable 
in the American Historical Review, as well as multiple panels at the 2015 Annual Meeting of 
the American Historical Association, illustrate.397  Other historians have taken up narratives 
from physics in the attempt to unite human history with the history of the universe, a project 
designated by its practitioners as “Big History”398 (a name that in itself echoes Canguilhem’s 
worry about “excessive modesty”399). As Ian Hesketh has recently written, big history is 
notable in part because of its appeal to the “aesthetic dimension of science,” and it is part of a 
broader attempt to popularize history.400  In the hands of TED Talks and Bill Gates, big 
history wants to be the latest “theory of everything.” 
 While the recent return to biology comes from a related impulse—like big historians, 
those advocating the use of biology are worried about the scale and therefore relevance of 
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historical knowledge—it has a different relationship to historical and methodological debates 
of the past.  Therefore, in light of this recurrence, it is worth asking what 1930 and 2015 
might have in common from the perspective of historians.  Why has biology re-emerged now 
as a field of interest to historians?  I would provisionally suggest that it has something to do 
with the fate of materialism in historical theory, and in particular Marxism in the historical 
profession.  Biology might appeal now, as it did 80 years ago, because it appears to offer a 
concrete and even material basis of thinking historically without the baggage, either of “grand 
narrative” or of Soviet atrocities, that gets carried in the door with Marxism.  Whether this is a 
fair characterization, and more generally how we should think about the biological in relation 
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